I first saw that video with a bunch of Army and civilian police mentor types in Tikrit this fall. They thought it was pretty funny. It strikes me as what everyone wants to say - but what no one really does say, except the officer in the video, which is what made it so satisfying to watch.

Great video. Do we know the circumstances around it? The speaker obviously believes the unit is infiltrated by Mahdi militia. Did the mutiny? Were they more or less willing to fight? I'd think in a shame culture that speech would be effective.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/thegamble/documents/Petraeus_Losing_War.pdf

Did anyone notice that, in the Washington Post, that the document does not have declassification informaiton on it? Should we assume it's still classified?

I agree with Tom that the patronizing tone wouldn't seem to be the most effective method to get the point across. Lecturing a bunch of people who are putting the lives on the line to help provide security for their country as if they were a bunch of insolent school children isn't going to win hearts, minds, or respect. One doesn't really need to be an expert in Arab or Iraqi culture to understand that people being yelled and cursed at like this probably isn't effective. Better training for the American soldiers probably would have prevented this ineffective tirade.

Also, I wasn't too pleased with Tom's answer on Pakistan on Meet the Press. Just about everybody seems to agree with him on the point that no one has a clue as to how to solve the Pakistan problem. This scares me.

Finally, Ricks on MTP quoted someone saying we'll have troops in Iraq in 2015. If American soldiers are still dying by the hundreds or thousands by 2010 or 2012, I'd find it hard to imagine the Congress and the President being able to resist the pressure of the American people to withdraw.

Thx for the, links, transcripts and excerpts. The WaPo online with Biddle should boost your FP hits here. I look forward to the Daily Show appearance on Tue, especially since I live in a city of soldiers, not likely to see your book tour.

Biddle mentions the 2006 Sunni defeat, mostly at the hands of a Bagdad Shiite militia coalition, as a primary element in setting conditions for Odierno's 2007 military success. You talk about the new severity of '07 Baghdad belt combat for US troops; one quarter of our war to date casualties, as we partitioned combatants and defended neighborhoods from both sides.

Wasn't a Shiite push into central Baghdad predictable? 2005 saw a doubling in uniformed Shiite cabability, and part of that huge US arms and training investment hemhoraging to Shiite militias. The US focus on the Sunni insurgency in Anbar made it a two front war for the W. Baghdad defenders. I recall that we were redeploying in late 2005 to block Anbar insurgents infiltrating into Baghdad.

Given the horrific car bombings perpetrated in E. Baghdad, some manner of Shiite push across the river, a bid for domination in central Baghdad could be expected. The Shiite coalition needed a perimeter of control around their seat of government, to have any future claim to sovereignty, or even survive. CentCom/MNFI could have perceived their clients need, and been looking for a winners/losers trend.

The Samarra shrine bombing kicked the Shiite side into high gear, but conditions were set, and the civil war in Baghdad already had a lot of momentum by January 06. The rising toll at the Baghdad Morgue in mid 2005 gave a pretty good preview of what a 2006 civil war in Baghdad would do to the neighborhoods.

What did we at home think 'they stand up, we stand down' was going to look like? The Sunni defeat at the hands of JAM/Badr's looked a lot like Iraq dropping into an Iranian orbit.

Look forward to reading the entire book. However, based upon the excerpts in the Post, I wonder:

Where was CJCS and the Joint Staff in all this? Decisions regarding Iraq were being made based upon discussions between the President and his operational level commander. Who was watching the strategic store and reviewing the Petraeus position(s) in light of long-term strategic goals? Who was responsible for bouncing the operational commander's needs against the existing force structure and recommending short and long term changes?

Where was the CENTCOM staff when Admiral Fallon made his calls about mission and progress? Were the Admiral's positions basically his own judgements - or were they informed by the CENTCOM staff's informed interpretation of events?

What are the implications of this whole business on the way we organize our use of force in the future? Is Goldwater-Nichols ripe for review and modification? What is the utility of a large, complex theater headquarters in an era of digital communications?

The videos provide great examples of one soldier that “gets it” and one that “doesn’t get it” when it comes to conducting counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Those of us who have studied and practiced COIN know that Captain Cook is the one that “gets it” and his methods will actually accomplish the mission and lead to some semblance of victory. Those who get their military knowledge from movies are likely to think that the soldier giving the “motivational speech” is the next Patton and that we need more like him.

There is nothing wrong with hardnosed, combat leadership, but the “motivational speech” is well off the mark. Not inspirational, not motivational, not demonstrating leadership by example, not mutually respectful…(you get the idea).

Counterinsurgency is a thinking man’s war and requires a great deal of maturity, ingenuity and discretion. I served with an Iraqi Army unit and wanted to give similar “motivational speeches” many times, but when I considered the adverse affect it would have on the mission, I thought of better ways to improve performance without ruining my relationship with the Iraqi soldiers. Getting mad, yelling at someone, telling them to shut the F%^& up, and challenging them to fights requires little thought and even less ingenuity.

Looking at counterinsurgency tactics, techniques and procedures from an insurgent’s perspective is often a useful exercise. In the case of the two videos, the insurgent would definitely prefer that the Army give more “motivational speeches” berating the Iraqis soldiers and policemen, challenging them to fights, etc.; thus, reinforcing everything the insurgency has been telling them in the mosques…

This is how military folks are lectured. If the Iraqis got this kind of talking to, they had already seen American soldiers getting the same kind of "abuse." In my estimation, it would make them feel more part of the team. It just should not have been taped. Many years from now, that day will be a legend, as in, "Remember when Sarge chewed us out so bad?!"

http://www.mahjoob.com/en/forums/showthread.php?t=253895