Inside an Afghan battle gone wrong (VI): How the Army handled the matter

Posted By Thomas E. Ricks Monday, February 2, 2009 - 4:41 PM Share

Okay, I am down to the last couple of posts on this. We will soon return to our regularly scheduled programming. I apologize to those of you who have been bored, or think I have treated this like the 2008 version of Gettysburg. Rather, what I had in the back of my mind was some of the work Bernard Fall did on small actions in Indochina. I think we study the big stuff far more than the small stuff.

That goes for the institutional Army as well. How it handled the Wanat battle may be the most disturbing aspect of this incident. We've seen indications of problems with how the Wanat mission was planned, executed and supported, but no one in the Army seems particularly interested in exploring the issue.

This oddly reminds me of the Army's reaction to the third Armored Cavalry's success in Tell Afar in northern Iraq in 2005-06. What was done there suggested a different path in Iraq-one that the surge eventually implemented-but the Army didn't seem much interested. In fact, Secretary of State Rice picked up on Tell Afar long before Defense Secretary Rumsfeld did, mentioning it in her speeches and congressional testimony.

The Army attitude was crystallized in its responses to a congressional inquiry on Wanat. Sen. Inouye's office asked how it came to pass that a platoon was sent into a light, remote, ill-prepared position, without overhead surveillance or observation posts, when there were indications of a large Taliban band operating in the area. The Army's answer is non-responsive: It explains why the move was made, rather than how it was made.

I've been told lately that the Army's Infantry Center has conducted its own "after action review" of the Wanat battle, including a new series of interviews with soldiers from the unit. (Is it significant that they decided not to rely on the 15-6 report? I don't know.) I am glad this was done. I'd be interested in reading that review, if anyone has a copy.

By the way, I think it is just a coincidence, but I've also learned in the last few days that the Army IG has been directed to look into Wanat.

Lesson that might be learned: Just because something important happens, don't expect the chain of command or the Pentagon to notice it and act on it. In fact, the more significant it is, I suspect the less likely it is that the institutional Army will act on its own. In other words, the more troubling the mistakes, the more likely external forces will be needed to get the attention of the brass, especially when the situation points to lapses in strategic thinking or by senior leadership.

Photo: U.S. Department of Defense

Read On:

Inside An Afghan Battle Gone Wrong: An Investigative Series

EXPLORE:AFGHANISTAN, WANAT

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RPM

8:13 PM ET

February 2, 2009

Roarke's redux

No reason to apologize for the detail you have provided. There is good reason to study Roarke's Drift today, much less Wanat. Small unit actions often provide a unique window into larger events.

Sadly this story reminded me of the errors in planning and judgement that characterized Operation Anaconda, seven long years ago, particularly in the lack of heavy supporting firepower. How can it be that with all of our technical, material, training, and now experiential advantages, and with the incredible ability and bravery of our troops, that American soldiers can find themselves outnumbered and outgunned in the dirt of a foreign field? It would be easy to blame some intermediate level BN or BDE commander and staff. But the problem recurs too often for that excuse to fly. Is it possible that, institutionally, the Army places too much faith in the ability of small unit/company grade leaders and soldiers? Do we assume they can handle anything, simply because most of the time they do?

IDMAJ

6:57 PM ET

February 3, 2009

The Army Ignoring Wanat?

Your assumption that the Army is ignoring the battle at Wanat and others like it is misplaced and reflects a bias against the Army as a learning organization. As a current student at the Army's Command and General Staff College (CGSC) we have spent a significant ammount of time studying the nature of the Afghan conflict to include vignettes such as the one you have covered in detail. The Army's Counterinsurgency doctrine and other readings such as David Galula's "Counterinsurgency Warfare" make up a major portion of the course. Most of students at CGSC understand that at some point or another, we will all rotate through Afghanistan. Incidents such as the battle at Wanat form the basis of daily discussions and debates.

I have followed your blog closely and appreciate the detail you go into, but you have not emphasized several significant points. First, intelligence provided accurate forwarning that a significant attack would take place in the Wanat area. While it didn't provide the exact time, the Company Commander had enough forewarning to ensure that his forces were on alert at the moment the Taliban struck. The Company continually improved its positions and identified the likely enemy attack positions and avenues of approach. Second, the Afghan National Army forces performed ably with only two U.S. mentors fighting alongside them. While the ANP were most likely complicit in the attack, the ANA held their own. This provides significant hope that if ANA and ANP forces are provided sufficient training, resources and mentorship in the future they will be able to do the same. Finally, you dop not emphasize that an understrength company was able to defeat a major attack by what was most likely a battalion sized enemy force that had several days if not weeks to prepare.

I do find agreement with your analysis in some areas. The fact that the 15-6 identified that the attack aviation assets were delayed because the new crews had to perform pre-flight inspections prior to launching represents a significant fault in staff planning. An effective staff would have ensured that a seamless rotation occured between day and night crews to ensure that a team of AH-64s was always mission ready. The decision to push to the Wanat valley at the end of a unit's rotation likely over extended the Brigade staff. The Brigade could have chosen to set the conditions for the unit replacing them by conducting reconnaissance in the Wanat area to enable the follow on Brigade to establish the new outpost at a later date. The use of unmanned ISR asstes may have helped, but these systems capabilities are severely limited in the terrain found near the battle.

The battle at Wanat represents a operational defeat only in respect that the American people are conditioned to military operations with only minimal casualties. The enemy understands this and will continue to conduct similar operations despite the fact that they will suffer far more casualties than we will. Training more effective and reliable ANA and ANP forces is the cornerstone for success in Wanat and other areas in the future, insurgencies are solved on a local level and take time. I hope that U.S. and Afghan forces re-establish their presence in Wanat and demonstrate that we cannot be forced from the region.

NYGDAN

3:09 PM ET

February 5, 2009

...

"I hope that U.S. and Afghan forces re-establish their presence in Wanat and demonstrate that we cannot be forced from the region."
What if the presence is the only reason for the fighters fighting to begin with? If the Nuristani wanted to be connected to the center, they probably would, no?

"Finally, you dop not emphasize that an understrength company was able to defeat a major attack by what was most likely a battalion sized enemy force that had several days if not weeks to prepare."
I almost get the impression that Mr. Ricks isn't over-emphasizing these things any more than he already is, because its obvious. Despite being ill-prepared, they weren't wiped out, and the attackers eventually had to leave. But were they repelled? Or was this never more than a hit-and-run attack anyway?

"The battle at Wanat represents a operational defeat only in respect that the American people are conditioned to military operations with only minimal casualties."
I think that the people who were actually casualties would've appreciated not having an operational defeat, no? I mean, the point is, this could've been avoided, like Mr. Rick notes, a few mistakes can be handled, but several in coordination with one another, then its just a matter of having the misfortune for the enemy to attack.
Also, its high casualties that are pushing us out of this war. Sure we can compare all this to WWI or WWII or Vietnam or any other campaign in history and realize that, its pretty damned amazing that we've occupied Iraq /and/ Afghanistan without the level of casualties that people in the past have taken on. But that doesn't matter to the modern public. For most of the civlians in the US (myself included as a civilian), the losses, relatively 'low' as they are, are unacceptable. The public has no stomach for it. So here we've lost a lot of great soldiers, and thats in a way all that matters, its part of what turned public opinion around 180 degrees, from support to street protests against it.