Another
major question arising from the Wanat
battle in eastern Afghanistan
that left nine American soldiers dead last summer is whether the soldiers in
the fight were adequately supported. And a review of the investigation and
interviews with key sources suggests there's lots to be concerned about here -- from
potentially insufficient troop numbers to conduct this kind of operation to
insufficient supplies of basics such as potable water and concertina wire.
This
is a touchy subject because it goes directly to the actions -- or lack thereof
-- of senior officers. At the same time, if the lesson learned here is that
more backup was required, that's easily remedied in future situations, if
people speak up, so it is especially worth examination. This issue breaks down
into four key questions: Were there enough troops for the task at hand? Did
they have what they needed? Was there sufficient aviation support? And was
there adequate command attention?
Troops:
On the face of it, it would appear that there were not enough soldiers assigned
for mission. The platoon leader sensed this going in, telling his best friend
in the battalion, according to that friend's sworn statement, "1st
LT Brostrom expressed concerns to me about the number of men he was taking with
him for the mission." One platoon may have been fine if there was no enemy
action. But it wasn't enough to build the outpost while also providing
deterrent security, including foot patrols. They probably needed two platoons
for those two tasks.
Supplies:
I am told they ran out of concertina wire. Also, they lacked earth-moving
machinery big enough to fill 7-foot-high Hesco barriers, so they cut them down
to just over 3 feet and then filled them. This is grueling work, especially in
the Afghan summer. Daytime temperatures were more than 100 degrees. In their
exertions, they ran low of potable water, which was rationed, and so went on a
reduced work schedule, which in turn lessened the amount of defenses finished
by the time of the attack. Most of the men were "mildly dehydrated" by the
second day of building the outpost, one soldier stated. By the afternoon before
the attack, "we continued to improve positions and were unable to do anything
else due to the lack of proper equipment and Class 4 supplies," a staff
sergeant stated.
Helicopters:
I am told that aviation resources were stretched, that the unit had only a
handful of AH-64 Apache attack helos, and that those were mainly devoted to
escorting CH-47 Chinooks carrying troops and cargo and UH-60 Black Hawks flying
around commanders. In addition, the attack was launched just as the Apaches
were switching from night crews to day crews, with the arriving aviators
needing to do preflight checks on their aircraft, debrief the old crews, get a
weather update, and be briefed on the enemy situation. It took roughly an hour
for the attack helos to come on scene and begin firing, I am told. "By the time
they got there, the enemy was in retreat mode," said one person who has
reviewed the data.
Staff
and command support: The unit had been there for a year, and the brigade staff
appears to have been busy with planning for redeployment and taking care of the
RIP, or "relief in place," with the incoming unit. "They were distracted and
didn't focus on this particular mission," said one veteran who has looked at
the Army investigatory material. (There also was lots of intelligence that an
attack was imminent, but I don't make too much of that, because in my
experience there is always intelligence of that sort, so I don't think it means
that much.) The platoon at Wanat could have used a visit by someone like the
battalion commander or his XO to visit to ensure they were getting what they
needed, from supplies to aerial surveillance.
The
feeling that there was a distracted staff trying to do too many things at once
originated with the platoon sergeant who likely was the savviest soldier at Wanat.
"[It] is my own personal belief that this was the wrong time to start a new
FOB," he said in his statement to an Army investigator. "The RIP was going on,
so that was using up assets that could have been used."
There
is lots to take away from this:
One
likely lesson:
Don't bite off more than you can chew. If you don't have the troops to hold,
don't move in.
A
second lesson:
One or two little mistakes are tolerable, but more than that and they begin to
accumulate into a dangerously big mistake. Blow the whistle before they
snowball.
A
third very simple lesson: Don't try to establish new bases at the end of your deployment.
A
fourth time-honored lesson: Don't be predictable. Maybe move around the crew shift
time. And make sure you have attack helicopters ready to go at the most likely
time of an enemy attack, just before dawn.
U.S. Army
Inside An Afghan Battle Gone Wrong: An Investigative Series
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