So in other words, Metz is a gutless weenie to what might be whom right or wrong is an unimportant consideration.

"Maybe it is time for the commandant of the War College to issue a statement emphatically reaffirming his institution's commitment to academic freedom?"

Yes. This has been another episode of short answers to obvious questions.

...is a misnomer. Why not just say that the normative discourse in a government run bureaucracy should be just a little broader.
The Army War College is a trade school after all, and full freedom of inquiry would include those critical of that trade and its function.

Freedom of inquiry in the service of nationalism is not freedom of inquiry.

Steve Metz writes in: 

The Army War College (like the rest of PME) operates under a policy of academic freedom but it is, by necessity, different than academic freedom in the civilian world.

If a faculty member at, say, the University of North Carolina slams the President, the next day's headlines don't read "State of North Carolina Attacks President."  Everyone knows that the professor was only expressing his or her personal opinion.

Things written by PME faculty under the academic freedom policy are also their own personal positions and opinions.  Everything we write says so, and every time we give a public talk we make the point.  But sometimes that isn't made clear in the media.  It's more attention-grabbing to suggest that the Army rather than just plain, old Professor X is critical of the President.  When that happens, Professor X (and his chain of command) can be put in an uncomfortable position.   

Conscientious writers understand the sensitive position PME faculty are in and handle us so that we aren't put in uncomfortable, even damaging positions.  That's what allows academic freedom in PME--which is both a fragile and valuable thing--to survive.  It may not be a perfect system but I suspect it's the best we can do when we are simultaneously an agency of the government and a part of academia.

Chris:

I fully accept your comment that what I thought mattered little. But I've always lived by the rule that it's important to do the right thing whether it changes history or not. That's why I regret that I kept my misgivings about the Iraq adventure largely to myself. Even though my protestations would not have mattered, to have voiced them would have been the right thing to do. But I didn't.

Another sad example of my realization that this country, the government, the press, and the people, are powerless to prevent criminal behavior at the highest levels of government *while it is happening,* even when it is in-your-face obvious. The press failed, the civilian government failed, the "checks and balances" of the Constitution failed and people like me sat on the sidelines watching it happen, powerless and marginalized. Good of the gentleman to admit his error, but a little late, I must say.

Professor Metz's commentary just doesn't pass muster...for starters, PME programs--most conspicuously NDU, as an example--rely on the traditional definition of academic freedom as defined by the Association of American University Professors back in the 1940s. Academic freedom is widely accepted as the open exchange of ideas that bear on strategic and operational matters without fear of reprisal or intimidation: my experience is that PME programs assert this--with an eye on their standing with accrediting bodies--while often subverting it in practice. Hypocrisy has not been rationed. Why should this surprise us? Look at the biographies of most general officers who head PME programs: what qualifies them for such a position? Come to think of it, what are the admissions standards at these places; academic ability and temperament don't figure largely. As said elsewhere, they are for the most part extravagantly expensive trade schools, finishing schools is more like it. My own experiences--two, to be precise--with US Army generals in charge of PME programs conforms to what apparently went on at AWC, actually both circumstances where somewhat more contemptible, sad really. Second, I've never heard of a situation in which the media has quoted an article critical of any official DOD position and plugged that criticism as one element of the military attacking another. You can google Yingling's commentary on Army leadership to see just how rare this sort of irresponsibility is. Metz's commentary strikes me as an example of self-serving in masquerade as high principle.

I learned of the blackballing of Tom Ricks several weeks after it happened. I spoke with a number of faculty members at the Army War College who were enraged by this -- and quite nervous about talking about it. But that's not the worst. I was told by the faculty members that faculty freedom was a fleeting dream at the AWC, particularly among those faculty teaching about Islam. One faculty member had assigned her students readings from Sayid Qutb, a jihadist theorist executed under the Sadat regime. The faculty member was told to take the reading off her curriculum reading list: "We don't want to teach that stuff here," she was told. She told me: "This is like taking Marx off a reading list during the Cold War."

Academic freedom begins with faculty freedom. After I gave my talk at the AWC on events in the Middle East, I was again approached by the faculty: "You got by these guys this time," I was told, "but you'll never be invited back." The faculty had specific complaints and asked me for their help. I wrote a paper on my experiences and my concerns for faculty independence to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Perhaps Mr. Ricks will disagree with me, but I think the real problem here starts at the top: at the time of his scheduled appearance with the commandant -- since promoted.

A sad tale, to be sure. But a talisman, perhaps, of the years that we can hope are now ending.

In my earlier post I suggested that academic freedom in the Professional Military Educational system is inherently different that academic freedom in civilian academia. I wanted to take the opportunity to elaborate on that.

Everyone agrees that academic freedom is important for the further development of knowledge. The development of knowledge is a key mission for civilian academia, perhaps even the paramount one. Hence academic freedom is a crucial value.

The development of knowledge is not a key mission for the U.S. Department of Defense. I believe it could accurately be called a subsidiary mission at best.

Organizations are willing to bear greater costs to promote their crucial values than they are to promote subsidiary values. This is not a critique of the U.S. Department of Defense, but simply a characteristic of all organizations. It means that organizational support for academic freedom within the Department of Defense will always be less than it is in civilian academia.

There are other important differences between academic freedom in a DoD setting and a civilian academic setting. Much of the analysis done within DoD is about the organization itself--its structure, policies, leadership, etc. Most of the analysis done in civilian academia deals with organizations, policies, and people outside the academic organization itself. This means that as a general rule, critical analysis done under the policy of academic freedom within DoD strikes more directly at DoD itself than does critical analysis undertaken in a university. Very few academics build their careers through critical analysis of academia, particularly their own institution or their own leaders. But that's exactly what DoD academics do.

It is also true that most of the leadership in DoD, whether uniformed military or senior civilians, have not spent all or most of their careers in an environment where the value of academic freedom is inculcated. They understand "strategic communications" used to promote the messages and interests of the organization, but may not be as comfortable with public criticism of their organization from inside it. Given that, there is an amazing depth of tolerance for self criticism from DoD's senior leaders. I have long been amazed that the U.S. Army pays me to, with some frequency, tell it that I think it's wrong. That Army and DoD leaders can understand, tolerate, and value something that they may not have deep personal experience with says much about their sagacity.

But what does all this mean? Most importantly it means that academic freedom in a DoD setting is (and must be) more fragile than in civilian academia. This places special responsibility on those in DoD who make use of academic freedom (i.e. the students and faculty in the Professional Military Educational System). Frankly, they must understand that there are limits to the costs their organization will bear to sustain academic freedom. But this fragility also places responsibilities on the consumers of the information or knowledge generated by DoD under the policy of academic freedom. Like Blanche Dubois, we in PME rely on the kindness of strangers to help us make the point that our opinions and positions are strictly our own, and do not reflect official organizational positions. We also rely on them to not make our statements and written words appear more critical than we intended. We have a fairly good idea of how much criticism DoD and national political leaders will tolerate from people who are "part of the team." But we need others outside DoD to not attempt to push us beyond these bounds.

As I mentioned earlier, academic freedom within DoD is both fragile and important. I am certain that it is valued more than in any other defense establishment anywhere around the world, today or in the past. Again, this is a sign of the wisdom of our defense leaders. But distorting or abusing DoD's academic freedom can pose a challenge to it. It is incumbent on both those of us within DoD and the outside consumers of the information or knowledge we create to remain aware of this.

I also want to correct a misperception that seems to be running through this thread: there was never any "blackballing" of Mr Ricks in the sense that the leadership at the U.S. Army War College refused to deal with him or instructed its faculty members to avoid him. That simply did not happen. In fact, I believe the word "blackball" is patently inaccurate (and deliberately so). The use of this emotion-laden word is propagandistic rather than an accurate portrayal of actual events.

My 2005 email which began this was primarily a suggestion to people I supervised that we needed to exercise particular care in our dealings with the media. It was not sent to or approved by the War College's leadership. It was my personal advice to close colleagues, each of whom was free to take it or leave it.

I considered and still consider Tom the most astute defense journalist our nation has. And I continued to provide comments to him after the 2005 email (as did several of my colleagues).

While the broader issue of the parameters of academic freedom in the Professional Military Institution is an important one, I personally believe that this 2005 email is a tempest in a teapot which was dredged up not because it suggests or says anything vital about the way the Army War College or DoD functions, but as part of a personal vendetta to embarrass me.

May I cite the following from the recently released report of the Senate Armed Services Committee relative to the torture of USA prisoners.

Between mid-December 2002 and mid-January 2003, Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora spoke with the DoD General Counsel three times to express his concerns about interrogation techniques at GTMO, at one point telling Mr. Haynes that he thought techniques that had been authorized by the Secretary of Defense “could rise to the level of torture.” On January 15, 2003, having received no word that the Secretary’s authority would be withdrawn, Mr. Mora went so far as to deliver a draft memo to Mr. Haynes’s office memorializing his legal concerns about the techniques. In a subsequent phone call, Mr. Mora told Mr. Haynes he would sign his memo later that day unless he heard definitively that the use of the techniques was suspended. In a meeting that same day, Mr. Haynes told Mr. Mora that the Secretary would rescind the techniques. Secretary Rumsfeld signed a memo rescinding authority for the techniques on January 15, 2003.

I could also cite General Shinseki and legions of other military and government officials who, in the interest of what is right, put their careers on the line to bring misdeeds to the fore.

If the likes of George Tenet, Colin Powell, and others who knew the Iraqi invasion was forged from lies had exhibited the nobility of the likes of Mr. Mora and Gen. Shinseki, and just simply told the truth, perhaps the Chenypaths would not have succeeded in their subterfuge.

I have been a faculty member both at the Army War College and at a civilian university. My sense is that those at the Army War College who published were very conscious about the impact of their writings on the institution that they cared so deeply about. Such concern is reflected in Dr. Metz' posting on this subject. I saw more a form of self-censorship than an actual institutional inhibition of academic freedom. This stemmed from a possibly inflated concern about how others might interpret negative comments and it was partly a reflection of a remarkable culture of civility. The organizational culture there certainly did not encourage bombastic language or hyperbole. It did appreciate critical thinking when arguments were balanced and thoroughly supported. One can find many writings by faculty members and SSI research professors that sought to influence changes in policy.

There was plenty of vigorous, passionate, and contentious debate in seminar rooms and behind the walls of the institution, protected by a cloak of non-attribution. Many felt that it would be inappropriate for military officers to carry out such debates in public where they might be misused and taken out of context. Such action would be in contrast to the kind of apolitical and selfless service that has been the hallmark of the American military.

Senior leaders who were wise fully supported the notion that academic freedom was to be protected in the system of professional military education. Not all were wise in this sense so the possibility of repercussions for critical statements were real during the tenure of an administration that had a reputation for reacting negatively to loyal dissent.

Whatever the motive for the posting or the controversy over the semantic strength of the descriptive term blackball, the subject and the discussion are important. And it is not merely academic: As a young Marine whose voluntary enlistment was extended during the Vietnam conflict, I strongly, albeit discreetly, disagreed that the use of the military in that conflict was defensive in nature. I do not know what I'd have done had I been assigned to direct combat but I wrestled with the sometimes conflicting elements of the training I had received: Officially - I must obey all legal orders; if I have doubt about the legality, I should obey first and question later. Unofficially, and more constantly: Mine is not to reason why; mine is but to do or die.

Every member of the US Military from the highest rank to the lowest faced a similar dilemma with respect to Iraq (assuming most agree the invasion of Afghanistan was a validly defensive undertaking). Being conscious of my own experience while watching the example of even General Powell following the era where UN inspectors were literally begging the Bush administration for the actionable intelligence as they were repeatedly berated for not finding evidence of WMD in Iraq was ... wrenchingly disappointing.

If the young low ranking members of the military cannot depend upon the integrity of the highest ranking echelons to ensure that the slaughter of civilians, designated enemy and, perhaps them selves is a defensive necessity then the entire system of military discipline and responsibility is undermined.

Given the importance of their responsibility to and for the nation, I think that there is no valid argument (certainly not the false shifting of context from academic controversy to heated battle with incoming fire) that can justify the forfeiture of one's integrity to avoid disfavor among those who interact with elected/appointed civilians who would use the military irresponsibly as pawns for national political/geo-political and/or personal (i.e. G.H.W. cum G.W.) reasons, particularly including unsubstantiated hypothesis hyped into propaganda.

It is impossible for me to fathom, much less articulate here, what should be changed. It is very clear, however, that something should be changed and I think military academia is a most appropriate forum for sorting these things out.

Good post, great exchanges.

The AWC put out a great study BEFORE the Iraq disaster in Feb 2003 titled "Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario". It was prescient--and ignored. I have seen few references to it. Check it out.
JF

Tom was to be avoided like the plague? That was par for the course in and around the Bush administration, particularly in the first term. Larry Lindsey, Paul O'Neill, John DiIulio, Christie Whitman, Gen. Shinseki. Scott Ritter, Hans Blix!

Editors got irate phone calls from the White House when journalists were perceived as having stepped out of line. Dan Rather was ambushed, Carol Coleman of Irish TV lost her DC beat, and even Helen Thomas, dean of the White House press corps, was left out in the cold for a time.

Besides, who would expect academic freedom in a military establishment? Especially in an era of information management by the Pentagon? Consider the way the media were treated during the Grenada venture. (They were a managed afterthought). Move on to the Panama invasion and an attack with bombers on a sleeping city! With little substantive reporting in American media, it was left to the veteran Martha Gellhorn (Granta) to give a detailed post hoc report, which included information on the suppression of Panamanian media. That suppression involved internment in some cases, and shut-down of a radio station courtesy of rockets fired from a helicopter. In Iraq, of course, media involvement meant a circus at a site distant from the action or embedding with the troops. Some brave media souls went independent, but they were a minority.

Blackballing of Tom by Metz, if real, should be no surprise. Moral courage is not something we expect of people who’ve been processed through the military. Physical courage, yes, that exists in plenty, but moral judgment is meant to be trained out of the products of military orientation. How else can young men and women bomb civilians without qualms? How else could so many senior officers know about torture and say essentially nothing? How else could a great man like Colin Powell fail to make the transition from a military career to being a civilian and our most senior diplomat? Why did the proud Wehrmacht officer corps succumb to Hitler, and begin to stir only when defeat stared them in the face? Google Milgram for an insight into passive acceptance of authority.

Perhaps there's a case for bringing the Army War College (along with Newport and Maxwell) under National Defense University, at least for academic supervision.

In 1989 I was a Navy O-6 and a full-time faculty member teaching military strategy at The (always capitalize) National War College. NDU (parent body) put out an edict that henceforth all manuscripts by NDU, ICAF, Armed Forces Staff College, and National students and faculty would have to be cleared by the JCS prior to publication ... anywhere.

LtGen Brad Hosmer USAF was President of NDU at the time and I booked a call on him (had never met with him before). When we got together, I described to him the scope of my writing for Naval institute Proceedings and gave him my opinion that requiring JCS clearance was anathema to academic freedom at the schools for which he was responsible: "You can't ask students and faculty to think boldly and 'shake the steeples' (to quote his predecessor John Pustay) if what they write is going to be chopped on pre-publication by some O-4 in the Building who's never written and has zero interest in anything beyond protecting his boss and his Service."

General Hosmer reversed the ruling in less than 24 hours and told the JCS to go stuff themselves. (And then went on to a distinguished tour running the Air Force Academy, perhaps the last such tour at that institution that could be so described.)