I am about to get into real inside baseball, so skip this item unless you care about the plumbing of policymaking.
The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986
governs the U.S. military chain of command. It was devised in response
to operational problems seen in the botched hostage rescue mission in
Iran in 1980 and the screwy U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983. There is
no question that the act improved the "jointness" of the U.S. military,
making the services work better with each other. The Iraq war has
subjected the act to its first sustained test. "War is the great
auditor of institutions," Corelli Barnett writes in his great history
of military leadership in World War I, The Swordbearers.
So, how has
the law done? My guess, based on a review of the formulation of
strategy in the war is that it has been more of a hindrance than an aid
in strategic decision-making. But this question needs a lot more study
before any conclusions can be reached. I'd welcome reader suggestions
on how to go about this.
I think the question is especially important because so many government
officials, especially at the Pentagon, talk about a "Goldwater-Nichols
Act for the interagency" that would make different departments work
with each other as well as the military services have under the act.
Before we leap into that, I'd like to know how well this thing has
really worked.
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