A Los Angeles Times article has this subhed:

Prime Minister Nouri Maliki's camp warns of southern Shiites' threat to sever ties with Baghdad

The article goes on to quote Maliki homey Sami Askari, who says, contrary to Nir Rosen and his band of optimists, that, "The question is not who will be the prime minister, but what will be the fate of the country. Will we face chaos? Will we be an unstable country? This is the question."

(HT to BH)

Tony Blair supposedly has reaped 20 million pounds since leaving office in 2007, some of it from advising the Kuwaiti royal family and from a South Korean firm making oil deals in Iraq.

Perhaps he can contribute a million or two of that to helping Iraqi refugees? It would be good to see him doing something to help clean up the mess he helped make. It is easier for a camel to pass through a needle's eye . . . .

Reidar Vissar says the Sadrists did particularly well in Baghdad, and implies that they will be playing a big role in the king-making coalition.

Here's the story in which Maj. Gen. Tony Cucolo, the U.S. commander for northern Iraq, discusses the need to keep a combat brigade up there beyond President Obama's August deadline to get all combat troops out of Iraq. As reported here about two weeks ago, I might add.

What say you now, Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell?

Here is an item from last July made more relevant by this movie winning a boatload of Oscars last night, including best picture, best director, and best screenplay:

My wife's idea of a good time last weekend was going to see The Hurt Locker, the new movie about Army EOD techs (explosive ordnance disposal guys-that is, the bomb squadders) in Iraq. So off we went, faster than an EFP in Sadr City.

It's a gripping movie, and I think it gets the emotions right. I also am guessing that it was good on the technical details of EOD work, since the credits listed an expert in that. The film was well-made, notably with persuasive bomb detonations -- not just the usual Hollywood explosions of a cloud of fiery gas, but big rumbling blasts with lots of rocks and dirt and dust hurled your way. Also, they got lots of the American military in Iraq right-the feel of a FOB (forward operating base), even the look of the latrines. And they do the heat of Iraq and its trashy streets right. I think it is the best movie made about the Iraq war so far -- the only one that comes close is The Situation, and that was more about journalists than about soldiers. Interestingly, both movies are set in the summer of 2004, when it was becoming clear that this thing was kind of a fiasco.

But there were enough mistakes on the details to keep me squirming in my seat:

• The squad appears to travel around alone in one Humvee. I have never seen that in Iraq. There always is a minimum of two, if only so one can tow the other, or if one gets hit, everyone can pile into the other.
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Here's a report from my CNAS colleague Matt Irvine on a conference he attended Thursday at which Colin Kahl demonstrated that being associated with CNAS sure doesn't mean we march in lockstep:

By Matthew Irvine
Best Defense chief think tanks correspondent 

The United States and Iraq are on a path towards a peaceful long term partnership and current U.S. military drawdown plans will remain intact, a Pentagon official argued Thursday at a Washington conference.

Speaking at a session held by the Jamestown Foundation, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East (and former CNAS senior fellow) Colin Kahl delivered a strong rebuttal to skeptics of the Obama Administration's Iraq policy. However, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and other prominent Iraq hands were cautious to downright depressing about the future of Iraqi politics and security.

Kahl outlined what he called three "myths" regarding the United States and Iraq:

Myth #1: "Iraq is teetering on the edge of chaos and is going to unravel." Peddlers of this myth argue that large numbers of American troops will be required for the long term to prevent a return to the violent days of years past. They cite recent sectarian rhetoric, bombings and high profile political setbacks (such as recent de-Baathification efforts by Iraqi National Alliance) as evidence of Iraq's supposed unraveling. Kahl, by contrast, argues that "this ignores broader trends that Iraq is emerging as a largely self-reliant state." He supported that point with five observations:

First, violent incidents are at the lowest levels since the invasion. The United States has only had one combat fatality in Iraq in the last three months.

Second, there is no evidence of Sunnis and Shi'a returning to militias and insurgencies for protection.

Third, al Qaeda in Iraq is weaker than ever. Kahl went so far as to argue, "Al Qaeda in Iraq is no longer an insurgency capable of maintaining a high tempo of operations or holding territory.... In our assessment it does not represent a strategic threat to the government of Iraq."

Fourth, Iraqi Security Forces have stepped up. For the first time since the invasion there are fewer than 100,000 U.S. soldiers in Iraq while violence levels have hit all-time lows.

Fifth, Iraqi counterterrorism forces are robust. So strong, Kahl says, "Iraq probably has the most robust and most capable counterterrorism forces in the entire Middle East."

Myth #2: We aren't paying attention to Iraq. According to Kahl, the administration has focused on Iraq, it's the media that hasn't. This myth comes from essays by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and recent articles in the Washington Times. "Iraq is the only place on Earth that President Obama has appointed the Vice President as a special envoy. Iraq is the only place on earth that the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense have all been to."

Myth #3: We define success as disengagement. This myth is a legacy of the 2008 presidential campaign, and ignores the Obama administration's actual policies. Citing the president's February 27, 2009, speech at Camp Lejeune, Kahl outlined the American objective as a "sovereign, stable and self-reliant" Iraq. "With the drawdown our engagement with Iraq will increase." The Strategic Framework Agreement to be worked out with the new government (if there is one) will show this strong bilateral relationship.

Regarding the renegotiation of the SOFA, it is not going to happen. There is much flexibility in the Bush administration's original agreement and the force levels will be just fine. "The timing was recommended by General Odierno and he feels it gives him sufficient capabilities on the ground," said Kahl.

Not everyone at the Jamestown Foundation's conference was as optimistic as Kahl, the only current Pentagon official employee who spoke. Former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad speculated that "if the election produces a protracted period for negotiation, and there are various possibilities for things working and not working... then our timetable needs to have the flexibility to do what we can to assist Iraq and it's progress forward."

Reidar Visser, a research fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs said that, "I've changed from being an optimist about Iraqi politics a year ago and am now a pessimist. . . . People are being intimidated, they don't know if they are going to lose their jobs." Provincial leaders, he added, "are inventing de-Baathification processes every day. This comes from the Iraqi National Alliance, trying to use it to destroy the Dawa. . .  . De-Baathification has been threatening the integrity of the election ever since it came on the agenda a couple of months ago."

There was a clear lack of consensus among participants over how Sunday's election will play out in the coming weeks and months, and where the United States and Iraq stand as partners. The only point of agreement was that the Iraqi civil war of 2005-2008 has not returned yet.

Tom again: Kahl's a smart guy, and also knows his music. I disagree with him. Why? Because I think a lot of Iraqis are just waiting for the Americans to get out of the way so they can start fighting again. And because I think the incentives that have led to violence in the past are still there. That is, none of the basic questions facing Iraq have been answered.

The good thing is that we will now in the coming months who is right. I hope I am wrong. Let's see how the formation of the new government goes.

Bottom line, there are a lot of things going on in Iraq right now that feel to me like early 2006. Let's hope Kahl and the Gang do better than Feith and the Stooges.

***Here's an update with some comments from the Hon. Kahl, and a counter-response from the Hon. Irvine:

Colin Kahl responds:

Two small but important corrections from Matthew Irvine read-out. Matthew writes that I said: "The Strategic Framework Agreement to be worked out with the new government (if there is one) will show this strong bilateral relationship."

This is not actually not what I said. As you know, the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) exists and does not need re-negotiation with the new government. In my remarks, I noted that the SFA provides the foundation, moving forward, for continuing our strong bilateral relationship, including a strong security assistance and cooperation relationship. The exact quote from my speech was: "The precise contours of that long-term relationship with Iraq, including our security relationship, are beginning to take shape as we move forward in implementing the Strategic Framework Agreement, signed with the Iraq government at the same time as the Security Agreement in November 2008, and will be further defined in the coming months once a new Iraqi government is formed and is ready to have more detailed conversations."

Matthew also reports: "Regarding the renegotiation of the SOFA, it is not going to happen." In my remarks and during Q&A I did not say anything about renegotiating or not renegotiating the SOFA. What I said was that the drawdown of our forces, consistent with the current Security Agreement (or SOFA), was on track, and that General Odierno is comfortable with how the responsible drawdown is proceeding.

Matthew Irvine then responds:

Secretary Kahl is right to point out that the Strategic Framework Agreement has already been inked. However, as he states, much of its implementation remains undefined. The outcome of Sunday's election will determine our Iraqi partners, or lack thereof, in the ongoing SFA process. Kahl was optimistic that the elections and these discussions will demonstrate the strong bilateral U.S.-Iraq relationship. Others are more skeptical of those chances for success.

Secondly, although there was no explicit reference to recent debates over the renegotiation of the SOFA agreement or General Odierno's troop request/non-request, it was my interpretation that Kahl was to have none of it. Myth #1 rejected the assumption that large numbers of troops will be required for the long term. In addition, emphasizing that General Odierno himself recommended the existing withdrawal timelines and troop levels seemed to be a clear refutation of recent media reports to the contrary.

Tom again: Colin's phrase "further defined in the coming months" could prove to be mighty interesting.

I am sorry to see the three bombings that killed at least 29 people in Baqubah today, but I am not using the "unraveling" title on this because I think the current bombings in Iraq are simply an attempt to scare people before this Sunday's election. They may get media attention but don't seem to me necessarily to represent any long-term trend.

The big question in my mind is what happens in the three months after the election. How long will it take to form a government? And will that process exacerbate ethnic and sectarian tensions? If we don't see an Iraqi government by June 1, I will be very concerned.

It isn't a "dark victory," either. For fun, read aloud this Newsweek piece and substitute "Vietnam" and "Saigon" for Iraq and Baghdad. Reads like a Luce product circa 1967. Or maybe China 1946, for that matter. Funny how a Western symphony orchestra and a store selling Johnny Walker are such perennial signs of a breakthrough in a land war in Asia. All we need is a scholarly Asian president who enjoys reading Shakespeare in his rare moments of relaxation. Speaking of the Lucites, Time magazine does a much better job of describing the outlines of post-occupation Iraq. And the AP reports that a new warrant for the arrest of Mookie has been issued. Interesting timing. 

And Karl Rove has written a book that says, kind of, that they might have handled this whole Iraq thing badly. You think? 

(HTs to Steve Coll for the Howard Hart blog, and to Juan Cole for the Sadr warrant.)

Here is an interesting note from commenter "Tintin":

. . . the division has three deputy CGs instead of two, which is unorthodox. More interesting is the background of all those generals. One of the three DCGs has a traditional background -- BG Ralph Baker spent some time in light units but his big Iraq assignment was as commander of 2/1 AD.

The others are more interesting. The CG, MG Terry Wolff, spent most of his career in normal command assignments, including taking 2nd ACR to Iraq in 2003, but more recently he commanded the CMATT at MNSTC-I. The second DCG, BG Kevin Mangum, who is in charge of U.S. troops in western Baghdad, is a career special operations aviator (he commanded the 160th SOAR) who also used to run the SOF advisory section of MNSTC-I -- very out of the ordinary. The third DCG is BG Kenneth Tovo, a career SF officer -- he commanded at every level in SF, including commanding 10th Group and CJSOTF-AP on multiple tours, and he used to be the senior SOF officer on the MNF-I staff.

Even two years ago, a command team like that would probably have been completely impossible for 1st AD, don't you think?

In our continuing sparring, Andrew says he sees my point but stands by his charge of "imperialism."

Friends, I ask you: What could be more imperialistic than invading a country pre-emptively on false premises and then leaving many years later in a selfish, callous and clumsy manner?

We may not get an answer as Sullivan has taken a week off. I do not believe this has anything to do with my arguing with him.

I am a big fan of Andrew Sullivan, and read his thoughtful blog every day. But I am tempted to give him one of his Von Hoffman-ish awards for his item criticizing me for advocating keeping 35,000 or so troops in Iraq for many years to come. Andrew asks:

When will this madness end? Do we really have to go completely bankrupt and be forced to withdraw from these anachronistic pretensions? Are seven years not enough?  

Tom responds: Good questions! I wish you had posed them before you supported the invasion, Andrew. The decision to attack Iraq may was one of the biggest blunders in American history, and is going to cost a lot more. This thing is far from over, and I am surprised that you think you can just walk away from it now. You are an interesting moral thinker -- how can you justify that?

A Best Defense Exclusive:

In a move that could force President Obama to break his vow to get all combat troops out of Iraq by August of this year, his top commander in Iraq recently officially requested keeping a combat brigade in the northern part of the country beyond that deadline, three people close to the situation said Wednesday.

Gen. Raymond Odierno asked for a brigade to try to keep the peace in the disputed city of Kirkuk, but only got a polite nod from the president when the issue was raised during his recent meetings in Washington, according to two of the people familiar with the discussions. If the brigade in northern Iraq is indeed kept in Iraq past the deadline, there will be a fan dance under which it no longer will be called a combat unit, but like the six other combat brigades being kept past the deadline, will be called an advisory unit. I can imagine the press releases that will follow-"Three U.S. Army soldiers were killed last night in an advisory operation . . . ." 

The feeling in the corridors of the White House is that the general is asking the right questions, but a bit clumsily, and certainly too early for political comfort, especially in Iraq, which is about to hold a national election. So I suspect the administration's bottom line for Odierno was, Hey, Shreko, put a sock in it until after the Iraqi elections, because what we need is a new Iraqi government to be formed so it can quietly begin talking to us about re-visiting some of those 2008 SOFA agreements about future troop levels.

This debate is just beginning. I expect that Obama actually is going to have to break his promises on Iraq and keep a fairly large force in Iraq, but of course that won't be the first time he's had to depart from his campaign rhetoric on this war.

Speaking of which, CNAS, the little think tank that could, plans today to post a report (Update: now posted) by me titled The Burden about the way forward in Iraq. It argues that we need to think about keeping troops there for many years, not because I think it is a good answer, but because I think it is the least bad one.

Let's open the betting: How many U.S. military personnel will be in Iraq four years from today--that is, Feb. 25, 2014? The person who guesses closest gets a signed copy of any of my books. My guess: 28,895. Not "combat" troops, of course! Goodness no. Just "advisory" troops who carry M-16s and call in airstrikes and such. 

This blog knows all too well that no one is right all the time, and that it is important to listen to people who know their stuff and disagree with you. So when I saw Nir Rosen, a fellow at the NYU Center on Law and Security, make some comments that sharply disagreed with my pessimistic views on Iraq, I asked him to write a guest post for Best Defense explaining his take on the situation. Nir, who has been knocking around Iraq lately, graciously did so. 

By Nir Rosen
Best Defense guest Iraq political commentator

It's been frustrating to read the latest hysteria about sectarianism returning to Iraq, the threat of a new civil war looming, or even the notion that Iraq is "unraveling." I left Iraq today after an intense mission on behalf of Refugees International. My colleague Elizabeth Campbell and I traveled comfortably and easily throughout Baghdad, Salahedin, Diyala and Babil. We were out among Iraqis until well into the night every day, often in remote villages, traveling in a normal Toyota Corolla. Our main hassle was traffic and having to go through a thousand security checkpoints a day. Stay tuned for our report next month about the humanitarian crisis in Iraq (which deserves more attention than political squabbles) and the situation of Iraqis displaced since 2003. Stay tuned for my own article about what I found politically as well. And finally stay tuned later this year for my book on the Iraqi civil war, the surge, counterinsurgency and the impact of  the war in Iraq on the region.

From the beginning of the occupation the US government and media focused too much on elite level politics and on events in the Green Zone, neglecting the Iraqi people, the "street," neighborhoods, villages, mosques. They were too slow to recognize the growing resistance to the occupation, too slow to recognize that there was a civil war and now perhaps for the same reason many are worried that there is a "new" sectarianism or a new threat of civil war. The US military is not on the streets and cannot accurately perceive Iraq, and journalists are busy covering the elections and the debaathification controversy, but not reporting enough from outside Baghdad, or even inside Baghdad.

Iraqis on the street are no longer scared of rival militias so much, or of being exterminated and they no longer have as much support for the religious parties. Maliki is still perceived by many to be not very sectarian and not very religious, and more of a "nationalist." Another thing people would notice if they focused on "the street" is that the militias are finished, the Awakening Groups/SOIs are finished, so violence is limited to assassinations with silencers and sticky bombs and the occasional spectacular terrorist attack -- all manageable and not strategically important, even if tragic. Politicians might be talking the sectarian talk but Iraqis have grown very cynical.

When you talk to people they tell you that the sectarian phase is over. Of course with enough fear it could come back, but Shiites do not feel threatened by any other group, and Sunnis aren't being rounded up, the security forces provide decent enough security, and they are pervasive, there is no reason for people to cling to militias in self defense and besides militiamen are still being rounded up, I just don't see enough fuel here for a conflagration -- leaving aside the Arab/Kurdish fault line, of course. (Though if Maliki went to war with the Kurds that would only further unite Sunni and Shiite Arabs.) The Iraqi Security Forces like Maliki enough, even if they prefer Alawi. The Iraqi army will not fall apart on sectarian lines, it would attack Sunni and Shiite militias, if there were any, but these militias are emasculated. They can assassinate and dispatch car bombs but they can't hold ground, they can't engage in firefights with checkpoints. The Iraqi Security Forces might arrest a lot of innocent people, but they're also rounding up "bad guys" and getting a lot of tips from civilians. The Iraqi Security Forces might be brutal, sometimes corrupt, but they no longer act as death squads, they take their role very seriously, perhaps too seriously, but these days anything is better than the recent anarchy and sectarian massacres.

Of course Maliki is in the end still a Shiite sectarian actor and has a core constituency, as Chalabi cleverly forced him to reveal, but Maliki is not pro-Iranian (though Iran is too often demonized as well as if the dichotomy is pro-American and good or pro-Iranian and bad). It's not a dichotomy of pro-Iranian or nationalist either.

It's not about whether Iraqis are sectarian or not. They are, though the vitriol and hatred have decreased. It's that they are not afraid of the other sect anymore. Fear is what led to the militias taking power and to the political and military mobilization along sectarian lines. There are attempts by some Shiite and Sunni parties to scare people again but in my conversations I feel it is failing. The fear is gone and the Iraqi Security Forces fill the security void, even if it's not pretty.

There is concern about Sunnis being disenfranchised or getting the shaft. But they have been disenfranchised since 2003. In part they disenfranchised themselves but anyway none of them expect to get unshafted. It's already done. The government is in Shiite hands and now it's a question of whether it will remain in the relatively good Shiite hands of Maliki, who provides security and doesn't bring down an iron fist on you unless you provoke him (sort of like Saddam), or the dirty corrupt and dangerous Shiite hands of Maliki's rivals -- Jaafari, Hakim, etc. I think these elections mean a lot more to Americans (as usual) and maybe to Iraqi elites than they do to Iraqis.

Besides, what can Sunnis do? Nothing, they're screwed and they have to accept it, and they have. The alternative is far worse for them. Sunnis in the region will not go to war alongside the Sunnis of Iraq. That moment came and went in 2006. Iraqi Sunnis don't even have a single leader who is charismatic and has real appeal, they're divided among themselves and these days your average Iraqi just isn't that into politics. I've heard it hundreds of times by now, they blame the religious parties, they say they got fooled and now they understand. Now that's not completely true, but the militias were able to mobilize people because of a security vacuum. These days it doesn't matter how remote and shitty the village I visit is, there are Iraqi Security Forces, and people have good things to say about them. Compared to the first three years of the occupation, Sunnis seem downright docile, maybe bitter or wistful, maybe angry, but their leadership is emasculated, in jail, abroad, just trying to survive, or just trying to make money.

Maliki will probably emerge the victor in the elections. His more sectarian and corrupt Shiite rivals are discredited and unpopular, but more importantly, he is an authoritarian ruler in the Middle East, he would have to be really incompetent if he couldn't stay in power. If Karzai could do it, then Maliki should be able to as well. Of course there is nothing uniquely Middle Eastern about this. In fact maybe looking at post-Soviet states is useful -- that is, the new ruler will not readily relinquish control, even if he has to bend the rules a bit, or operate outside the constitution. This has happened in Asia, Africa, and other places in transition. I hate to admit that I hope Maliki wins. He's the best of all the realistic alternatives. It's not like a more secular candidate is likely to win, so if it's not Maliki it will be Jaafari or Chalabi. Frankly this is a rare case where I hope Maliki violates the constitution, acts in some kind of authoritarian way to make sure he wins the elections, because the alternative is fragmentation, or a criminal, sectarian kleptocratic Shiite elite taking over, and then Iraq might unravel. For now it's still "raveling."

Speaking of Colorado, Defense Secretary Gates apparently wants to re-name the Iraq mess Operation New Dawn. I hate these Orwellian names.

Speaking of the Russians, I see where the Putin regime is expressing alarm over Iran's nuclear plans. Germany too. Maybe the Obama strategy is working...

When Matt Valkovic finished his tour of duty in Iraq, he got out of the Army, hung up his captain's bars, and became a "temporary ski bum." I asked him for his thoughts from the slopes of Colorado about the land between the rivers-or, as he put it, his reflections from the lift line on the Sunni/Shia fault line. Here they are. And remember that the guy in the chairlift next to you might just have finished a tour of duty.

By Matthew Valkovic

Best Defense chief Alpine sports and sectarianism correspondent

I've been home from Iraq for about five months after having spent a year with my battalion in the northwest Baghdad district of Kadhimiya. I'm also out of the Army (well, IRR to be exact) with plans to work and attend graduate school in DC. I'm lucky enough to be spending some down time in Colorado, living the ski-bum life, before jumping into a new job and a new life. Sometimes, though, riding up the ski lift, I think about where I was and what I was doing a year ago and then wonder what's going on today in my old corner of Baghdad. 

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