Navy Capt. Henry Hendrix has just written one of the best papers I've seen in the last several years by an active duty officer. In it, he challenges some of the central beliefs of his service. "After 100 years, the [aircraft] carrier is rapidly approaching the end of its useful life," he asserts.

Hendrix, the current director of naval history, says the current aircraft carrier is too expensive, inefficient, and of doubtful survivability. It is now in danger of becoming, like the battleship during the mid-20th century, "surprisingly irrelevant to the conflicts of the time."

"If the fleet were designed today," he observes, "it likely would look very different from the way it actually looks now -- and from what the United States is planning to buy."

He would like to see unmanned combat aerial vehicles, more than mere drones, capable of flying off both big carriers and the smaller "amphibious" carriers.

What would the equivalent of this paper be in the Army? Has it been written? Any smart colonels out there challenging sacred cows?

By Alexander Sullivan

Best Defense department of psynology

Contrary to some of the more sensationalist appraisals of China's rise in world rankings, David Shambaugh argues in his new book, China Goes Global: The Partial Power, that despite China's undeniable achievements, it has succeeded in becoming a global actor but not a global power. Hence the word "partial."

Shambaugh, a George Washington University political scientist, introduced his book last week in a February 13 talk at Johns Hopkins SAIS. He focused less on China's "vertical" rise -- its skyrocketing GDP and increasing military sophistication -- than on the extent of its "horizontal" expansion of its influence to the rest of the planet. He analyzed China's current global presence along five vectors: diplomacy, global governance, economics, culture, and security.

China has expanded its reach in most of these areas: It is the world's second largest economy and possibly the largest trading nation; it has relations with over 170 countries; it sits at the main table in most global multilateral fora; its official media outlets are opening new bureaus abroad; and it just launched its first aircraft carrier to lead its navy ever farther out in the Western Pacific. But according to Shambaugh, all the government's efforts along these lines have yielded precious little in the way of real power, as understood by people like Joe Nye -- that is, influence exerted to make actor A do thing X.

On the face of it, Shambaugh's conclusions are not unwarranted. China remains a "lonely power" with few genuine friends in the world. Increasing assertiveness in the East and South China Seas has helped roll back diplomatic gains made in its neighborhood since the Asian financial crisis, and even in African and Latin American countries where Chinese investment dollars (untrammeled by governance guarantees) had gained fast new friends, the picture is becoming less rosy.

One of Shambaugh's most interesting arguments is that while China's economic statistics are worthy of admiration, its "multinational" corporations have abysmal international brand recognition and an overall poor track record of breaking into overseas markets, calling into question whether China's corporate sector is really as much of a global business player as it is assumed to be.

He acknowledged that China has tremendous latent potential as a true global power and that its capacities will likely increase. What provoked by far the most interest during the Q&A session was one of his explanations for why China has so far failed to convert its potential into power, namely that Chinese elites are divided over China's identity in the world and the values it should represent. The lack of coherence among decision-makers in China, he said, has been one of the biggest impediments to their effective exercise of power. Absent consensus, the one thread that runs through it all (yi yi guan zhi) is poorly disguised, narrowly defined self-interest, which inevitably provokes counterbalancing by other international actors.

 By Jim Gourley

Best Defense commenter of the year

Last week Tom requested suggestions for new blogs to add to his daily reading list. I thought there were some interesting recommendations from readers, but after investigating each one I went back and clicked through the different windows in succession to gain a little more perspective.

Looking at them in aggregate provoked questions. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts, so what world view would the range of sites produce? How does the news feed presented by these sites differ from what Tom is probably already reading? Grouping the sites by their emphasis implies that view would be primarily technology-based, lightly seasoned by some current events in specific regions with dubious commentary. There is very little context. By and large, it lacks breadth and depth. The spectrum of information is narrow and the range of subjects too one-dimensional to provide necessary background.

I read lots of blogs, none of them regularly and not all of them related to defense matters per se, but I tend to see value in unique cultural overlaps. I seek context, perspective, answers. Lately, I find the blogosphere giving me more questions than answers.

Spend enough time reading the tech blogs and you'll see that there are scores of unmanned weapons systems in development in the United States and throughout the world. Within fifteen years we may have a UAV that brings J.J. Abrams' new television series to life, warships with lasers, and bipedal battlefield terminators assistants. All of these blog posts follow the same thematic approach. They simply show us the technology. That's valuable information, but I only need to see it once.

Nowhere can I find answers to the immediate questions I ask upon reading these blogs. Why are we developing these technologies? What existing weapons programs that we're currently shoveling money into will be rendered obsolete by these new weapons? Where does the care and equipping of human service members fit into this? Exactly what threats and enemies are such weapons meant to counter, and what retaliatory developments do we anticipate said enemies to attempt? Do we have a plan or are we just building stuff?

Intelligence and strategy blogs have made the pivot to China well in advance of the defense department, it seems. The American political discourse about the Chinese threat was electrified during the presidential campaign and think tanks are moving apace with speculations of what a conflict with China would look like. But in all the debate over who would do best at "getting tough with China," I didn't hear a compelling argument for getting tough in the first place. Is China really our enemy? Do they have to be our enemy? Is the conventional wisdom more conventional (or perhaps convenient) than it is wise? I have no end of questions about what the American security establishment thinks of China because there is no clear explanation of how it thinks about China. Is there a blog for that?

The defense, intelligence and national law enforcement architectures continue to meld in ways both mysterious and disturbing. The DEA has operated in Afghanistan for a number of years. Predator drones have been used to track cattle rustlers in North Dakota. Part of President Obama's legacy will be a government that can wire-tap my phone without a warrant and assassinate me without due process. I see these developments and I have more questions. Are there still such things as American defense, intelligence and law enforcement establishments, or is it gelling into a monolithic "security establishment?" How long a shadow does it cast and do civil liberties and posse comitatus fall underneath it? Is everyone contributing to this emergent construct actually okay with the potential consequences, or are we just following orders?

Blogs are a relatively new species in the journalism environment, but already the conceptualization of them has become traditional. They were conceived as web-based forums for microbursts of data to help news organizations keep up with the increasing pace of information flow. It was believed that the in-depth analysis would be left to the more substantive print media side of the house. The value of print has already been challenged and found lacking, but so too should the idea that synthesis and analysis can maintain the old pace as developments continue to accelerate. Blogs can't just be places to collate data points any longer. They need to start connecting the dots that are rapidly accumulating. I think 'Best Defense' has succeeded in that endeavor, but Tom depends on good sources of information like any human being. There are more questions than ever. More blogs ought to attempt answering them. Those answers matter now more than ever, because the new pace to which blogs have contributed is not going to wait.  

Jim Gourley has been elected to the Best Defense all-star commenter team three years running. 

While Tom Ricks is away from his blog, he has selected a few of his favorite posts to re-run. We will be posting a few every day until he returns. This originally ran on March 26, 2010.

Earlier this week I ran into a friend who offered a correction on my comment that Iran has been the big winner in the Iraq war, gaining much influence inside its western neighbor and indeed across the region.

Yes, he said, Iran has certainly done well, and is more powerful than it was in 2003. But, he continued, the biggest strategic winner in the war so far is China. That's not only because the U.S. government financed the war with borrowings from China, but also because while we were distracted, Beijing has been a busy bee diplomatically, especially in East Asia.

I think my friend is probably right. Thanks a lot, W. (Sarcasm.)

Meanwhile, for all of youse who think this Google thing is just a PR move by that company, chew on this interesting roundup. On the other hand, I hear those who say we are crazy to let software engineers lead the way politically.

By Dean Cheng

Best Defense department of corporate intelligence

This past week, a remarkably disturbing case of arms export control violations came to light, and one which comes at a terrible time for the administration. 

From the various accounts, it would appear that a subsidiary of United Technologies Corporation (UTC) was exporting software that was used in China's new Z-10 attack helicopter program. Worse, according to the U.S. Attorney for Connecticut, where the parent company is headquartered, this was not a case of technology diversion by the Chinese, but a case where the company, Pratt and Whitney Canada (PWC), deliberately engaged in violations of the Export Control Act.

The apparently deliberate nature of this violation makes it distinct from something like the Loral-Hughes problems of the late 1990s which led to the Cox Commission report on China-related security issues and the shift of satellites and aerospace technology to the Munitions List for export controls. In the Loral and Hughes cases, the really important technology wasn't even technology, it was "know-how," in the form of failure analysis in the wake of several failed Chinese space launches. The Chinese had very little understanding of how to conduct a proper failure analysis, which involves systems analysis, systems integration (almost in reverse), and a willingness to look objectively at problems, without allowing "guanxi" to divert criticism or blame. (Note that the latter aspect is not necessarily restricted to the Chinese, but they have had far more problems in this regard than we have.)

By contrast, the more recent case was not one of dual-use technologies, but clearly military ones. The Z-10 attack helicopter is patterned on the U.S. AH-64, Russian Mi-28, Eurocopter Tiger model, with a classic two-man fore-and-aft crew disposition. There is no mistaking it for a passenger helicopter. PWC  was apparently willing to violate U.S. export control laws, so as to gain access to the large Chinese civilian helicopter market. 

For the administration, which has been striving to modify and modernize the U.S. export control regime, the case may raise questions about how carefully this task much be approached. PWC's illegal exports occurred under the current system, one which has been patched and modified but not truly overhauled. Indeed, the administration's proposed changes would rationalize much of the current system, allowing clearer oversight rather than the current patchwork of sometimes contradictory lines of reporting and responsibility.

The UTC case demonstrates the continued need for export controls on advanced, sensitive technology, but it would be unfortunate if it discouraged, rather than encouraged, badly needed reforms to protect that technology better.

Word arrives from across the wide Pacific that the Chinese military conducted a bridge placement exercise at a Yalu River crossing, a hand grenade's throw from North Korea.

This article speculates that this is a move that signals that the Chinese are worried about refugee flows should Lil Kim's regime collapse. They'd need to bridge to insert troops to create a buffer zone along the border. And maybe also quietly collect those nukes (which is a mission I would support -- better they have them than some nut in NoKo).

Speaking of NoKo, a friend asks how FP can rank it 21^st on the list of most failing states. He thinks it should be much higher. I suspect he is correct.

Army Capt. D.J. Skelton in a good Stars & Stripes profile on losing an eye and part of the left side of his head. "So I spend the rest of my life bumping into things on my left . . . So what." He's heading to China as a foreign area officer.

Awhile ago one of the more astute grasshoppers recommended watching Red Cliff, a film by John Woo that came out a few years ago. When it arrived from Mr. Netflix I cooked up some chicken Penang curry, cracked open a Rolling Rock, and popped the DVD into the machine. My wife bailed after 10 minutes, but I enjoyed the whole nearly-three-hour shebang. I'd call it a Chinese David Lean's mix of Saving Private Ryan, Gone with the Wind, and Star Wars. Except with more battle scenes -- the last hour was just one big old firefight. (You'll see what I mean.)

I'd thank the grasshopper in question but I can't find the comment.

Just make sure you watch it with subtitles instead of the incompetent dubbing.

It is always nice to see a RAND document that actually come to some conclusions, however tentative. Maybe they are outgrowing the motto, "RAND -- Providing an intellectual hospice for the conventional wisdom."

By Patrick Cronin
President, Best Defense Academy of Frenemy-American Relations

China appears well on its way to becoming America's next peer competitor. Over the next twenty years, a modernizing People's Liberation Army will challenge regional militaries and better keep foreign powers out of its near seas. As a result, according to a new RAND report, the U.S. Armed Forces will "become increasingly dependent on escalatory options for defense and retaliatory capabilities for deterrence."

In "Conflict with China: Conflict, Consequences and Strategies for Deterrence," James Dobbins, David Gompert, David Shlapak, and Andrew Scobell consider triggers for U.S.-China conflict and their operational and strategic implications.

The paper first examines "occasions for conflict" and includes situations involving the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, cyberspace, the South China Sea, Japan, and India. The scenarios, all judged to be plausible if unlikely, are listed in descending order of probability, with conflict over North Korea thought to contain "significant potential" for escalation.

Similar hazards entail the other potential confrontations considered by the authors. Thus, the discussion on cyberspace suggests how China's putative success in stealing others' electrons could precipitate kinetic action. For instance, a Chinese attempt to disrupt U.S. communications and intelligence could catalyze attacks on satellites and a blockade on China's vital sea lines of communication. The latter refers to an abiding Chinese concern over its so-called "Malacca dilemma," a reference to how closure of the critical Malacca Strait joining the Indian and Pacific oceans might cripple resource-dependent China. Such a scenario could well be casualty-free and yet bring about monumental economic loss and regional upheaval.

The 25-page report's sheer economy of verbiage is one of its strengths. While the authors no doubt could have amplified on the scenarios -- from the East China Sea to the Indian Ocean or Iran to Pakistan -- an exhaustive review of potential conflicts would have added little to the conclusions. Their main interest is to think through operational implications of current trends.  

Read on

I didn't realize China had the world's largest windpower generating capacity. How is that possible when we have Fox News?

Annals of the oligarchs. China sure is getting interesting. Funny how it allows its rich and powerful to act like a caricature of capitalism.

Yesterday was the CNAS annual conference day. Lots of interesting things said, much of it from the platform, some of it in the hallways.

Robert Kaplan, my well-travelled officemate, had several very interesting lines. One was that Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping might be the greatest man of the 20th century, for bringing hundreds of millions of people into a quasi-middle class existence.

He also suggested that Malaysia's shopping malls, with their mixture of Muslims, Indians, Chinese and Malayans, challenge Samuel Huntington's notion of the clash of civilizations.

CNAS, the little think tank that could, doesn't take corporate stances or insist on agreement, and we have some pretty lively debates. Here's an example: Patrick Cronin, senior director of our Asia-Pacific Security Program, here takes issue with what Abe Denmark, who directs our Asia-Pacific Security Program, asserted here last week, that we shouldn't be worrying about China as a threat because it is gonna get old before it gets rich.

By Patrick Cronin
Best Defense Asia bureau chief

There are good reasons for American national security planners to worry about China's rise. Its rapid growth may make Chinese political and military leaders both more confident and more assertive. Its military forces are moving beyond Taiwan scenarios to wider active defense strategies aimed at neutralizing U.S. power projection. Its diplomatic strategy runs counter to America's regional network of alliances and partnerships. Its quest for comprehensive and asymmetric power is making it a quiet leader in new domains, including cyber space and outer space. And its booming economy and tremendous savings are boosting its clout with regional neighbors and global actors alike.

In the face of these trends, it would be folly for the United States to ignore the potential threat posed by its biggest emerging rival, one governed by the Chinese Communist Party and thus a rival that retains far too much secrecy and too little accountability

Confidence in the continued preeminence of America is a good thing unless it leads us to distort reality. Internationally, U.S. students test low in math and science and rank first in confidence. Similarly, those Americans who would dismiss China's past three decades of accomplishment could be making a similar, but far graver, mistake. If one is looking to confirm a preconceived bias that the Chinese juggernaut cannot long sustain its breathless pace or rocket-like trajectory, it is a simple task to find evidence of: its social and political fragmentation; its failure to segue to a new economic model; its aging society; its resource scarcity; its environmental calamity; its lack of soft power.

Yet China almost surely will become the world's largest economy, and India may well eventually push America to being number three. While none of this guarantees that China can translate its rising wealth into influence, it certainly seems bent on trying to do so. Indeed, one indicator of this is how China has awakened of late to India's rise. Another indicator is its recent assertion of power in the South and East China Seas. Yet another is its return to double digit defense spending increases at the very time when the United States is talking about the need to trim its own defense budget.

Meanwhile, as we wait for myriad challenges to put the brakes on China's reemergence and to satiate its burgeoning appetite for power, we ought to be sure we understand the volatile and inherently renewable nature of U.S. power. This was President Barack Obama's point during his most recent State of the Union speech, when he referenced Chinese economic and technological advances and challenged this generation of Americans to realize its 'Sputnik' moment: the point at which Americans must wake up from their slumber and redouble their efforts to invest in what made America great in the first place. China and India were exceptional in that they suffered only one quarter of economic downturn during the global financial crisis; America continues to slowly try to climb out of its deepest recession, and now it faces uncertainty over oil markets and its key economic partner, Japan, faces its own unprecedented challenges.

China's gains relative to the United States matter because the character of war, though not its raw nature, has changed even during America's relatively brief tenure as a global power. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld boasted of transformation and then proceeded to violate Clausewitz's first axiom and embark on a war that he did not understand. But we can agree with Rumsfeld on the basic point he repeatedly makes in his memoir: weakness invites trouble. The question of how to measure strength and weakness is far more complicated than comparing orders of battle and even the technological advances in major platforms. Writing in the December 2010 issue of Qiushi Journal, the official publication of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, one analyst explained seven strategies to counter U.S. power, and they involved preparing across the full array of economic, information, diplomatic, and military instruments of power. They also involve imponderables such as the element of surprise. So, the character of war keeps changing, but net assessment also requires a frank look at our own vulnerabilities, and there are serious questions about our ability to preserve a vast military, operating globally, while seeking to ensure our own economic foundation, our own secure homeland, our own cyber and space security, and our own alliance and partner relationships.

In short, American confidence is fine provided it doesn't obscure the reality that China is a rival to the United States, at least as much as it is a potential partner. Let there be no doubt that China poses a potential threat to the United States. China will be able to challenge the United States in Asia far before it ever challenges it globally. The political goal should not be to wish away China as a potential threat, but to try to prevent China from becoming an enemy.

Indeed, as Abe Denmark pointed out in recent testimony to the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission, American strategies should encourage China to play a more responsible role in the world, but they must also continue to defend U.S. interests and hedge against potential Chinese aggression. It is possible for our technology and our integrated systems to remain a generation ahead of China's and still be vulnerable to a variety of asymmetric approaches that include cyber war, economic assault, and clever political-military maneuvering along China's periphery and far from our shores. Weakness in the face of a rapidly emerging, highly confident, and potentially savvy opponent who resorts to asymmetric and nontraditional means of warfare on his own periphery far from our shores is clearly asking for trouble.

This may be the most significant national security news of the day, even bigger than the Japanese meltdowns, but you won't see it in the Early Bird or most other defense-related news discussions.

News vaults over the horizon that China has surpassed the United States in manufacturing volume, ending a 110-year long run by the Americans. My initial thought was to remember that I read a few years ago that Great Britain effectively lost World War I when it was overtaken in goods production in the late 19th century by both Germany and the United States. (I am travelling and so can't look at my World War I shelf to see where I read that -- I want to say Corelli Barnett's The Swordbearers, but that doesn't seem right.) 

I asked my CNAS colleague Abe Denmark, who is both very smart and is in China right now, what to think of this, and he wasn't as worried. I hope to have more from him on this tomorrow.

Meanwhile, in other Asia-as-number-one news, I see that India has become the world's largest weapons importer, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.