Wanat

I forgot to mention that I was on Fareed Zakaria's Sunday CNN show the other day to discuss what happened at Wanat, the small battle in the summer of 2008 that strikes me as representative of the war.

Zakaria struck me as one of the smartest people I've ever met. Long-time readers of this blog may remember that I think he did the best foreign affairs interview I've ever seen with Obama, back when Obama was running for president. 

DMITRY ASTAKHOV/AFP/Getty Images

Just what did happen in Wanat, the firefight in Afghanistan in the summer of 2008 that left nine American soldiers dead? That is just what Centcom appears to be asking, according to this press release that just came in:

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

USCENTCOM appoints investigating officer to review 2008 Afghanistan combat action 

U.S. Central Command 

MACDILL AFB, Fla. (Sept. 30, 2009) - Gen. David H. Petraeus, Commander, U.S. Central Command, has appointed Lt. Gen Richard F. Natonski, Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Command, to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the combat action that occurred on July 13, 2008, at Wanat Village, Wygal District, Nuristan Province, Afghanistan. 

The new investigation will address issues that have arisen since the completion of the AR 15-6 investigation, and will also address circumstances beyond the tactical level.

The Army's study of what happened in the Wanat battle a year ago in eastern Afghanistan is even harder on senior U.S. military commanders than I was in my series on it back in February, saying that they didn't understand counterinsurgency doctrine and also that some of their statements about the fight were misleading at best.

The report, which is still in draft form, contradicts a few aspects of the accounts provided by some of the senior officers involved, implicitly raising integrity questions. That's especially significant because two officials at Fort Leavenworth have told me that the Army inspector general's office is investigating how the Wanat incident was reported and reviewed. I also hear that congressional interest in the situation is growing.

The report, which has not been released and was written for the Army's Combat Studies Institute by military historian Douglas Cubbison, finds multiple failures by the battalion and brigade commanders involved, Lt. Col. William Ostlund and Col. Charles Preysler. The core problem, Cubbison writes, is that the battle resulted from "a failure of COIN [counterinsurgency] manifested in a major combat action that although a marked tactical victory, became an operational and strategic defeat." Indeed, the report concludes that the unit's attempts at counterinsurgency were so badly implemented that they "were more likely to foster hostility than reciprocity from the local population."

That finding on the failure to properly carry out a counterinsurgency campaign is to my mind the most significant part of the Cubbison report. He flatly concludes that, in sharp contrast to their predecessors from the 10th Mountain Division, the commanders in the Wanat area mishandled their COIN campaign, both in the long term, over several months, and in the days preceding the Wanat fight. In sum, they alienated the population, failing to protect it and treating it as hostile. They then compounded the problem by instituting a "clear, hold and build" COIN operation without sufficient troops to clear Wanat, let alone hold it. "A single platoon in the open field near the bazaar lacked the capability of holding Wanat," the report finds.

Those errors came on top of the ones I discussed in my series, such as launching a major new operation even as the brigade was pulling out of Afghanistan, plus failing to ensure that the troops in Wanat had adequate building supplies or any drone aircraft for intelligence surveillance or even enough water. Cubbison also is more emphatic than I was about the fears the platoon in question justly had about their assigned mission.

The brigade commander, Col. Preysler, and the battalion commander, Lt. Col. Ostlund, come in for repeated criticisms. (I e-mailed a copy of this post to both officers yesterday, asking for their comments or responses, but didn't hear back from either.) Preysler, for example, has flatly stated that the Wanat outpost was never intended to be a "full-up combat outpost," or COP. "That is absolutely false and not true," he said after the fight. "So, from the get-go, that is just [expletive] and it's not right." The report finds that statement to be misleading, because, it notes, there were extensive plans for construction of a "permanent COP," with walls, housing and sewage control.

In addition, while Ostlund, commander of the 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment, part of the 173rd Airborne Brigade, has stated that he was carrying out a COIN campaign, with a focus on "living with the population," the report finds that statement to be inaccurate. "This was not the case in the Waigal Valley, where the paratroopers occupied only two COPs, and had almost no interaction with the population." The report finds the statement of one machine gunner in the unit to be more accurate: "We didn't interact with them...They didn't come near us and we didn't go near them." Underscoring the hazy grasp Ostlund and his subordinates had of COIN, the report says, they were precise about the number of engagements they had, and even the number of bombs and missiles fired, but were "unable to provide commensurate statistics" for their efforts to actually help the local population.

The report quotes one soldier's view was representative: "These people, they disgust me...Everything about those people up there is disgusting. They're worthless." This is not an attitude that tends to produce productive relationships.

These findings on COIN, by the way, sharply contradict the findings of the Army's 15-6 inquiry into the firefight, conducted by Col. Mark Johnstone, who recommended in Powerpointese, "Continue to interact closely with the local population as per current counterinsurgency doctrine."

Cubbison also writes that, "The highly kinetic approach favored by TF Rock...rapidly and inevitably degraded the relationships between the US Army and the Waigal population." To top it off, a helicopter attack on some trucks just a few days before the Wanat outpost was established wound up killing a good percentage of the doctors and other health care workers in the valley.

Also, while there was every reason to expect an attack on the outpost as it was being established, which had happened with previous outposts, Ostlund didn't appear to be focused on it. As a result, he and his subordinates appeared to neglect repeated signs that a major attack was imminent. "Until it had actually been the target of a major ACM [anti-coalition militia] attack, no senior leadership visited the new installation," the report states.

The report also states that assertions made by officers involved that UAV surveillance wasn't in place because of "weather issues" was "not accurate."

In addition, Cubbison casts doubt on Col. Presyler's assertion that, "The enemy never got into the main position." Rather, he finds, the "defensive perimeter was positively penetrated, and fighting occurred within the OP [outpost] perimeter." At any rate, Cubbison notes, overrunning the outpost doesn't appear to have been the aim of the insurgents, who instead seemed to have been trying to capture soldiers or their bodies. Two of the American dead appeared to have been dragged several yards, probably in a failed attempt to do so, he notes.

Cubbison also makes the important point that the platoon was saved from being overrun mainly by its own discipline and professional competence. They did just about everything they could do to establish the defenses of their outpost, despite being dehydrated from a lack of potable water. They were attacked just as they were doing a pre-dawn "stand to," in which every soldier, despite being exhausted from building walls and digging holes, was awake and fully armed and armored and surveilling his assigned sector of fire. As sergeants fell during the fight, junior soldiers were able to step into their shoes. He also marvels at the skill and courage of medical evacuation pilots and crews who picked up out wounded American and Afghan soldiers even as Apache helicopters were conducting gun runs 30 meters from the landing zone. Of the 20 evacuees, not one died of his wounds.

The report also is in awe of the bravery and persistence of the 42 soldiers and 3 Marines who fought at Wanat, as I am. I knew that some continued to fight after being hit several times. But I didn't know that one continued to pass ammunition even when he was mortally wounded.

I also think the Army deserves praise for having the honesty to have this report done. I am told that the final version will be released soon. Let's hope it isn't thrown out the back door at 5 pm on a Friday afternoon in August.

Spencer Platt/Getty Images

A friend who has read this series on the small but deadly battle at Wanat last summer suggested that we should consider one more issue-that is, what this incident might tell us about the war in Afghanistan.

I think the insights of this infantry veteran, who must remain anonymous because of his position, are important. Let him explain:

We are so very exposed in this land-locked country, with no infrastructure, not nearly enough enablers, not enough transport... it's frightening, really.

. . . [R]remind folks that this is an enemy that may in fact look more like Hezbollah in Lebanon 2006 than al Qaeda in Iraq. This is an enemy that apparently has no problem massing force in space and time, and is tactically proficient at understanding our weaknesses. My own view is that we have to employ a properly resourced COIN mission . . . while simultaneously ensuring that those folks out in the hinterland have all the enablers they need. A tough problem.

Not only are his points important but they get at a key problem that the battle of Wanat highlighted: the ongoing, long-running confusion between a counterterrorism mission and a counterinsurgency one. How do the two fit together? The U.S. military, embroiled in two such wars now simultaneously, in Iraq and Afghanistan, would do well to spend more time on that question.

That's all I have. I am sure there are more lessons here. What else should we understand about Wanat?

Photo: U.S. Department of Defense. 

Okay, I am down to the last couple of posts on this. We will soon return to our regularly scheduled programming. I apologize to those of you who have been bored, or think I have treated this like the 2008 version of Gettysburg. Rather, what I had in the back of my mind was some of the work Bernard Fall did on small actions in Indochina. I think we study the big stuff far more than the small stuff.

That goes for the institutional Army as well. How it handled the Wanat battle may be the most disturbing aspect of this incident. We've seen indications of problems with how the Wanat mission was planned, executed and supported, but no one in the Army seems particularly interested in exploring the issue.

This oddly reminds me of the Army's reaction to the third Armored Cavalry's success in Tell Afar in northern Iraq in 2005-06. What was done there suggested a different path in Iraq-one that the surge eventually implemented-but the Army didn't seem much interested. In fact, Secretary of State Rice picked up on Tell Afar long before Defense Secretary Rumsfeld did, mentioning it in her speeches and congressional testimony.

The Army attitude was crystallized in its responses to a congressional inquiry on Wanat. Sen. Inouye's office asked how it came to pass that a platoon was sent into a light, remote, ill-prepared position, without overhead surveillance or observation posts, when there were indications of a large Taliban band operating in the area. The Army's answer is non-responsive: It explains why the move was made, rather than how it was made.

I've been told lately that the Army's Infantry Center has conducted its own "after action review" of the Wanat battle, including a new series of interviews with soldiers from the unit. (Is it significant that they decided not to rely on the 15-6 report? I don't know.) I am glad this was done. I'd be interested in reading that review, if anyone has a copy.

By the way, I think it is just a coincidence, but I've also learned in the last few days that the Army IG has been directed to look into Wanat.

Lesson that might be learned: Just because something important happens, don't expect the chain of command or the Pentagon to notice it and act on it. In fact, the more significant it is, I suspect the less likely it is that the institutional Army will act on its own. In other words, the more troubling the mistakes, the more likely external forces will be needed to get the attention of the brass, especially when the situation points to lapses in strategic thinking or by senior leadership.

Photo: U.S. Department of Defense

By this point, we've seen that the company commander, the platoon leader, and the platoon sergeant all had misgivings about the deadly Wanat mission in eastern Afghanistan last summer. They feared that the enemy had been tipped off, that the mission was inconsistent with counterinsurgency doctrine, that they didn't have enough people to execute it properly, that it was coming too near the end of their unit's deployment, and the commanders and staff above them were distracted by the turnover to the replacement unit.

This is from the sworn statement that the officer who was the best friend of Lt. Jonathan Brostrom, the platoon leader at Wanat, gave to an Army investigator:

He told me he did not like it. . . 1^st Lt. Brostrom told me he wasn't sure why they were trying to do this mission so close to the end of the deployment . . . . [He] was surprised and disappointed at the same time that they were trying to push this mission. I asked who ‘they' was and he couldn't tell me if it was coming down from BDE [brigade], BN [battalion], or just his company commander, but he knew he wasn't fond of the idea and nor were his men. 1^st LT Brostrom expressed concerns to me about the number of men he was taking with him for the mission. . . . and that he was also concerned about the terrain surrounding the area. When I asked him about the terrain he said it was like Bella [another outpost], but he would have no OPs [observation posts] up above him.

The lack of those higher observation posts would allow the enemy to creep to the edge of the new American outpost at Wanat during the night of July 12-13.

Brostrom also told his friend that he had raised his concerns with his company commander, who had taken some steps to mitigate some of the problems. The friend was so worried that he spoke to his own company commander, telling him, he recalled, that, "I didn't like the fact that it was only one platoon and there was no plan to insert Americans onto the high ground to establish OPs, especially with how much enemy activity had gone on the prior missions." The two officers agreed that Brostrom's company had competent leaders, so assumed that the company's officers "would have the same concerns and identify and mitigate the risks."

On the morning of July 13, this officer would be part of the reinforcements sent to relieve Brostrom's beleaguered platoon. His friend was dead by that point.

The lesson: Yes, commanders need to show a spirit of confidence. But they shouldn't let that "can-do" spirit prevent them from taking on and weighing the honest doubts of those being sent on the mission. That doesn't appear to have happened here.

U.S. Military/ SPC JORDAN CARTER

It is striking that the Taliban fighters seemed to know exactly what was going on when they attacked the American outpost in Wanat, in eastern Afghanistan last summer, in a fight that the Army's chain of command doesn't seem to want to talk about, but which some of those with knowledge of the incident have encouraged me to look into.

The enemy had a battle plan ready before the Americans came on the scene. According to the military's internal investigation that I reviewed, the company commander was asked at dinner the night before the attack if there were UAVs operating in the area -- an interesting question to hear from an Afghan local.

As the Taliban began the attack, they turned on an irrigation ditch, so the sound of rushing water would cover the noise of their footsteps and whispers. Their attack was well-coordinated, "a lot of fire all at one time," according to the company commander's statement. They got close enough to locate in the dark Claymore mines meant to defend the American position, and gutsy enough to turn around the mines. When they attacked, they first concentrated on the heavy weapons -- a big mortar, a .50 caliber machine gun and an anti-tank rocket launcher -- that could do them the most damage. And they fought close, so that it was difficult for fixed-wing aircraft to fire at them. They seemed to know they had at least 30 to 45 minutes before attack helicopters would be on the scene.

The obvious lesson: Keep in mind that the enemy is also learning and adapting, especially in Afghanistan, where guerrilla warfare is the national sport. This takes us back to the previous lesson: you probably need more soldiers than you think.

A second lesson: Get surveillance assets overhead before moving in, especially if you've been warned of an impending attack. If the weather is too bad for those aircraft to fly, consider delaying the mission.

U.S. Army/Sgt. Jeremy Clawson

Another major question arising from the Wanat battle in eastern Afghanistan that left nine American soldiers dead last summer is whether the soldiers in the fight were adequately supported. And a review of the investigation and interviews with key sources suggests there's lots to be concerned about here -- from potentially insufficient troop numbers to conduct this kind of operation to insufficient supplies of basics such as potable water and concertina wire.

This is a touchy subject because it goes directly to the actions -- or lack thereof -- of senior officers. At the same time, if the lesson learned here is that more backup was required, that's easily remedied in future situations, if people speak up, so it is especially worth examination. This issue breaks down into four key questions: Were there enough troops for the task at hand? Did they have what they needed? Was there sufficient aviation support? And was there adequate command attention?

Troops: On the face of it, it would appear that there were not enough soldiers assigned for mission. The platoon leader sensed this going in, telling his best friend in the battalion, according to that friend's sworn statement, "1st LT Brostrom expressed concerns to me about the number of men he was taking with him for the mission." One platoon may have been fine if there was no enemy action. But it wasn't enough to build the outpost while also providing deterrent security, including foot patrols. They probably needed two platoons for those two tasks.

Supplies: I am told they ran out of concertina wire. Also, they lacked earth-moving machinery big enough to fill 7-foot-high Hesco barriers, so they cut them down to just over 3 feet and then filled them. This is grueling work, especially in the Afghan summer. Daytime temperatures were more than 100 degrees. In their exertions, they ran low of potable water, which was rationed, and so went on a reduced work schedule, which in turn lessened the amount of defenses finished by the time of the attack. Most of the men were "mildly dehydrated" by the second day of building the outpost, one soldier stated. By the afternoon before the attack, "we continued to improve positions and were unable to do anything else due to the lack of proper equipment and Class 4 supplies," a staff sergeant stated.

Helicopters: I am told that aviation resources were stretched, that the unit had only a handful of AH-64 Apache attack helos, and that those were mainly devoted to escorting CH-47 Chinooks carrying troops and cargo and UH-60 Black Hawks flying around commanders. In addition, the attack was launched just as the Apaches were switching from night crews to day crews, with the arriving aviators needing to do preflight checks on their aircraft, debrief the old crews, get a weather update, and be briefed on the enemy situation. It took roughly an hour for the attack helos to come on scene and begin firing, I am told. "By the time they got there, the enemy was in retreat mode," said one person who has reviewed the data.

Staff and command support: The unit had been there for a year, and the brigade staff appears to have been busy with planning for redeployment and taking care of the RIP, or "relief in place," with the incoming unit. "They were distracted and didn't focus on this particular mission," said one veteran who has looked at the Army investigatory material. (There also was lots of intelligence that an attack was imminent, but I don't make too much of that, because in my experience there is always intelligence of that sort, so I don't think it means that much.) The platoon at Wanat could have used a visit by someone like the battalion commander or his XO to visit to ensure they were getting what they needed, from supplies to aerial surveillance.

The feeling that there was a distracted staff trying to do too many things at once originated with the platoon sergeant who likely was the savviest soldier at Wanat. "[It] is my own personal belief that this was the wrong time to start a new FOB," he said in his statement to an Army investigator. "The RIP was going on, so that was using up assets that could have been used."

There is lots to take away from this:

One likely lesson: Don't bite off more than you can chew. If you don't have the troops to hold, don't move in.

A second lesson: One or two little mistakes are tolerable, but more than that and they begin to accumulate into a dangerously big mistake. Blow the whistle before they snowball.

A third very simple lesson: Don't try to establish new bases at the end of your deployment.

A fourth time-honored lesson: Don't be predictable. Maybe move around the crew shift time. And make sure you have attack helicopters ready to go at the most likely time of an enemy attack, just before dawn.

U.S. Army