Why would we want to get between the two sides of a fight that is, in part, between Hezbollah and al Qaeda?

Quote of the day: Benjamin Rhodes, the deputy national security advisor, tells Dexter Filkins in this week's edition of the New Yorker that in considering intervening in Syria, "Here's what we wrestle with: there are huge costs and unintended consequences that go with a military intervention that could last for many years."

Another White House official tells Filkins, "The country is exhausted." I don't think that second comment is quite accurate. It is more that the country is tired of being involved on the ground in the Middle East and deeply skeptical of the efficacy of another try.

Filkins also quotes an academic expert who predicts that eventually all of Syria's Alawites will be pushed into Lebanon, with the eventual refugee flow doubling that nationette's population.

The vibe of the article is that the Obama administration increasingly is leaning toward intervention -- from the air, in aid and intelligence, but not with ground troops.

I find the concept darkly funny. I don't know why. I guess it is because I never want to go near Iraq again.

By Irving Lachow

Best Defense cyberwar correspondent

Last week, a front page story in the Washington Post began: "Syria's civil war went offline Thursday as millions of people tracking the conflict over YouTube, Facebook and other high-tech services found themselves struggling against an unnerving national shutdown of the Internet." Despite denials from the Syrian government, there is strong evidence that they were in fact responsible for this attempt at isolating the country from the global information commons. This was most likely accomplished by the state-run Syrian Internet service provider called Telecommunications Establishment, which appeared to have altered its routing tables to prevent both incoming and outgoing traffic from reaching its desired destinations. Although the timing of this action may have been sudden, the fact that the Syrian government would attempt to control rebel access to the Internet is not surprising. Egypt and Libya took similar actions during recent conflicts and Syria has been controlling access to the Internet on and off for many months.

Much like traditional warfare, the kind of cyberwarfare being promulgated by Syria is being driven by attempts to dominate the information sphere. For example, one of the first actions taken by the United States in its wars with Iraq was to dismantle their command and control systems. This provided the United States with freedom of action and reduced the ability of Iraqi forces to obtain accurate and timely situation awareness of the battlefield. Syria is trying to accomplish similar objectives. Limiting the rebels' access to the Internet and mobile communications is akin to blinding their command and control systems. By forcing rebels to rely on local Internet services provided by Syrian companies, the Syrian government can closely monitor rebel communications to obtain intelligence and situation awareness. In addition, the Syrian government can use the Internet to plant false information and undermine trust within the ranks of rebel leadership -- a classic psychological operations tactic for creating fear, uncertainty, and distrust within enemy ranks.

In response to the Syrian government's actions, the Syrian rebels have been using satellite phones -- equipment supplied to them by supporters that include the United States -- to maintain their lines of communication and connectivity to the Internet. The rebels may also be able to tap into the wireless networks of neighboring countries when they operate close to the border -- a fact which shows how difficult it is to implement a full Internet blackout in a country, even one as small and centrally-controlled as Syria. They are also continuing their efforts to influence outside parties by using videos, pictures, and other social media tools to tell their side of the story. As in many conflicts, the battle here is not just over territory but over who controls the narrative.

Events in Syria, Libya, and Egypt have demonstrated that the Internet has become a critical tool for combatants engaged in civil wars and uprisings. It provides command and control, surveillance and reconnaissance, and serves as a means of influencing supporters, opponents, and neutral third parties alike. At the same time, the fact that the Syrian government reestablished Internet connectivity just a few days after implementing a nation-wide blackout makes it clear that national leaders cannot simply shut off access to the Internet without repercussions. The Internet has become a tool of influence and warfare, but it is also a driver of commerce and social connectivity. Internet service providers can function as businesses that enable economic and personal freedom and they can chose (or be forced to) repress free speech, monitor "enemies of the state," and disconnect an entire country from the global communications grid. The Internet may be the ultimate dual-use technology. We will be dealing with that fact for decades to come.

Dr. Irving Lachow is a senior fellow and director of the Program on Technology and National Security at the Center for a New American Security.

Knock yourselves out, fellas!

By Gary Anderson

Best Defense office of Syrian non-intervention

Syria's situation today is essentially the same as the one in El Salvador in 1991 -- and that is not necessarily a bad thing.

In El Salvador, the rebels had gained control of significant portion of the country, and were even operating openly in the major cities. As in Syria today, both sides in El Salvador had committed atrocities among noncombatants, although in both cases the government had created the most by using paramilitary death squads. In both cases, the opposing sides had reached a stalemate with only bloody attrition on the horizon. Why do I say that this is not necessarily a bad thing? Because the civil war in El Salvador turned out all right. An American brokered series of negotiations led to a coalition government which in turn resulted in fair elections. El Salvador today is a democracy, albeit an imperfect one. Contrast that with the carnage of Lebanon or even Iraq where America intervened militarily. Regime modification, rather than the carnage and anarchy of regime change, is still possible if we give diplomacy a chance.

In the case of El Salvador, the United States had backed the repressive government for a decade during the Cold War in fear of losing El Salvador to the communist bloc because the government seemed like the lesser of two evils. That changed with the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold war. At that point, the Salvadorian Junta decided to take American diplomatic advice and negotiate with the rebels. The window of opportunity opened in briefly, and both sides took it in hopes of avoiding more meaningless bloodshed. That fleeting window may be open in Syria today; but unlike 1991, we are not diplomatically engaged to be able to exploit it. By insisting on the total destruction of the Assad regime, we have abrogated any chance that we could take a meaningful role in encouraging a negotiated settlement of the conflict due to humanitarian concerns. 

The real humanitarian disaster would come with a total government collapse and rebel victory because there are "at risk" minorities in the path of the mostly Sunni revolution. The Christians and the Shiite Alawites risk the fate of Iraq's Sunnis and Christians in the wake of the decapitation of the Sunni dominated Saddam Hussein regime. Like Iraq's Sunni minority, the Alawite minority in Syria will likely be targets of a revenge seeking Sunni majority. Realists in the Assad government, such as the recently departed Prime Minister, are probably now looking for an emergency landing and negotiations may be their only alternate runway.

As much as I hate to admit it, the Russians are probably right in trying to prevent an outright rebel victory. They see the unintended consequences more clearly than our neo-hawks who are urging military intervention. As always, the Russian reasoning is cold blooded and cynical, but those of us who are veterans of Lebanon, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan know the horror that can ensue when governance breaks down completely. The best chance for a negotiated end to the civil war would be an American-Russian-Turkish sponsored cease fire and peace conference. The Russians have leverage with the Assad government, but the rebels know that American and Turkish economic and diplomatic support is needed for any reasonable attempt to build a post-Assad government that has real legitimacy beyond the Sunni neighbors in the region.

What might a Salvador-like solution look like? First, it would require a cease fire that would freeze the opponents in place. Second, it would call for an eventual reorganization of the security forces with rebel units integrated into the army and paramilitaries disbanded; it would avoid the total disintegration of the security forces that led to the ethnic cleansing and near genocide that plagued post Saddam Iraq. Third, it would require internationally monitored elections. Assad himself would undoubtedly have to go, but the remaining leadership of the Alawite faction could throw him under the bus gently with an exile in Iran or South Lebanon. The realists in the Assad regime might make that sacrifice to avoid the kind of anarchy that would come with a breakdown of governance.

There is an argument that we should do something in Syria, if only to have some leverage in what comes after; there is a certain amount of sense in that argument. However, before that something becomes drone strikes or a no fly zone, we ought to give diplomacy one more chance. El Salvador avoided the kind of bloodletting that we saw in Afghanistan and Iraq after regime decapitation. If the United States backs off on the demand for total regime change, we open our nation can have a critical role in a negotiated settlement. The only thing that gets wasted in trying diplomacy is words.

Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps Colonel. He has served as a U.N. Observer in Lebanon and as a liaison officer in Somalia. Most recently, he has been a governance advisor in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I keep on seeing talk about how the Obama administration should do more to oust Assad.

I actually think the best way to get rid of Assad would be to remove the roadblock posed by the possibility that the ouster would be followed by a punitive repression of minorities (Christians, Armenians, and such) who supported the regime. But I don't know if such a removal is possible. Overall, to my surprise, I tend to agree with this Washington Times column by Daniel Pipes.

I wonder if eventually the borders of the Middle East will be re-drawn. I could see it, Iraq and Lebanon all being reconfigured. I am not sure what that would mean for the Kurds. It will be interesting to watch the role Turkey plays in all this -- as a relatively stable, prosperous member of NATO whose interests extend deep into the affected states.  

My first thought was that Syria shot down the Turkish F-4 because the Turks were probing Syrian air defenses. But then I remembered that the U.S. aircraft patrolling the northern Iraq no-fly zone flew out of Incirlik, Turkey, which meant that they zoomed along the northern Syrian border for years. We must have learned an awful lot about Syrian operations, and shared almost all of it with our Turkish friends, and other members of NATO.

So what more might there be to learn? Probably a probe to see how much deterioration there has been in Syrian defenses in the last year. But that would be a good use of a drone, no? (And are we sure there was a pilot in that F-4?)

The Israelis clearly also know a lot about Syrian defenses. 

Meanwhile, Turkish jets conducted air strikes in northern Iraq. Interesting neighborhood. 

By "A Syrian-American"

Best Defense guest column

The Bashar al-Assad regime now faces itself with the dilemma of quelling a quickly proliferating armed insurgency that has fused with a popular uprising. Cities like Homs, Zabadani, Rastan, and Idlib have become modern day ghettos, sealed off by special task forces of elite units and paramilitary squads specifically recruited to cleanse neighborhoods and towns of those who dare to resist the Baathist diktat.

By many definitions, Syria has become ensnared in a full-fledged civil war. But beyond the narrative of internal strife, when one takes a careful look at a map of where the uprisings are taking place and the towns that have effectively ceased to recognize the government, a competing narrative emerges not of internecine conflict but one of national unity -- a whole country that has been brought together in opposition to the Assad family's self-declared right to rule.

The people in this archipelago of resistance cling to a hope -- perhaps foolishly -- that their cause will win the day. Like any illegitimate occupational force, the Assad loyalist army can only control the ground occupied by its Soviet-era tanks. Take out the saturation of paramilitary, heavy artillery, and special forces units in the cities, and the popular rebellion will reach critical mass.

For Syrians attempting to survive, there is no illusion of life under the Assad tyranny. The executions of captured defectors, and the past executions of leading non-violent activist heroes like Ghaith Mattar speak to the reality that there can be no reconciliation with the mass murderers of the Baath Party.

The delusions of dialogue and a negotiated settlement with the Assad apparatus have long faded. One cannot negotiate, let alone reason, with a government that makes mass killings its domestic policy. In every way, the ideology and the solution being employed by Bashar al-Assad and his confidants are neo-fascist in function and form.

Reaching the tipping point to this conflict will require a determined shove by the international community. There are broader regional interests in play, and a rebel victory can prove to be a damning blow to Iranian hegemonic aspirations that have claimed the lives of freedom-seeking Syrians in addition to the Americans who have fallen victim to Iranian-supplied weaponry throughout the region. The rebels now claim that they are fighting the same Hizballah and Iranian revolutionary guard forces in Syria that have wrought so much havoc across the world for the West.

Hundreds of civilians have needlessly died since U.N. Human Rights Commissioner Navi Pillay's presciently warned the U.N. General Assembly that the ongoing assault and shelling by Bashar al-Assad's forces against the city of Homs presented a "harbinger of worse to come." Among the dead are journalists who perished attempting to show the world just how real, and how tragically correct, Pillay had been -- and just how wrong the assembly of global leadership have proved in their stupor.

To further punctuate the consequences of paralysis, Pillay rightly cautioned the General Assembly that the failure of the U.N. to enact "collective action" was actually "emboldening" the Assad regime to escalate the violence against his own people. Since the U.N. human rights report presented by Pillay was published, the regime, sadly, has launched a second concerted campaign to retake rebel-held territory in the north while simultaneously pouring hundreds of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles into the strategic mountain town of Zabadani on the Lebanese border.

By the time you read these words, more cities will have come under siege. Hoping that the world will see them, the residents of the town of Ar Rastan, an essentially liberated town, have written in large rock formations the words "S.O.S," hoping that they would be seen from the sky. Their eyes turn upwards not just in the hope of salvation from the nightmare that many are now living, but in the desire for a lifeline that provides support beyond tired platitudes.

The U.S. State Department even published satellite imagery of the formations of artillery batteries and tanks that are pummeling cities en masse. Perhaps it was done to shame the regime and its allies. The real shame is now borne by those who watched those armor columns and the screaming 120 mm shells slam into the homes of the innocent -- and did nothing.

The imperative for bold American action has never been stronger. While the Qataris and the Saudis have openly called for the funding and material aid of the rebels, the Turks have made it clear that they are not willing to go all in without some degree of U.S. backing. As uncomfortable as it may be, an end-game in Syria will require a level of U.S. involvement, whether be it direct or through an indirect approach.

Moral clarity can be best guided by this realization: this regime has concluded that in order to control the ghettos that have risen against it, they must be razed. The late Hafez al-Assad did this to one city in the past, Hama, that rebelled against his authority in 1982. Today, the younger Assad faces many more situations, and is displaying an equal determination to destroy them all.

And so the world now has a front-row seat to the play-by-play gradual demolition of homes, neighborhoods, and of whole families -- their liberation cut short by a vengeful, cruel, and cynical regime. The aftermath, as it were, is already visible for all to see in horrid detail. Yet western leaders continue to balk at taking a bold position, fearing that supporting the rebels in any form could somehow enable religious extremists and Al Qaeda.

Secretary Clinton was wrong when she suggested that supporting rebel forces could benefit al Qaeda. Yes, it is true that al Qaeda's leader Ayman Zawhiri declared his solidarity with the rebels and called on jihadis to support their cause. But in his distant Waziristan cave, the disconnected Zawhiri is a feckless general commanding phantom legions. There is no room for an Islamic Emirate in Syria. Liberation is not a slippery slope to rule by the clerics. The fighters are not looking to replace a mustached dictator with a bearded one. The Muslim Brotherhood is widely viewed in suspicion by the revolutionary councils and rebel fighters alike. It makes little sense to cede the ground to the jihadis in Syria when their program carries little credibility among the rebels and the majority Sunni Arab populace. It will be municipal elections and the desire to reawaken a civic involvement that is truly invested in their country's future that will occupy the daily concerns of Free Syrians -- not the resurrection of the caliphate.

The end of the Assad regime will not immediately usher in a grand new era of democracy and functioning governance, but the sooner the first steps are taken towards this transition, the more any negative fallout can be mitigated and safely contained. This will be good for Syria, the region, and more broadly Western interests.

To achieve their vision for victory, from Homs to Deraa, the revolutionary councils that guide the day-to-day insurrectionist activity and the rebel networks they support are looking to the U.S., EU, and the Gulf countries for aid. There is growing disillusionment of the timid international response and of the apparent lack of willingness by the West to support the revolution. According to rebel reports, even those Syrians who volunteered to fight U.S. forces in Iraq have expressed their support for receiving American aid to fight the regime.

Some Western commentators have opined that opposition groups on the ground are disorganized and incapable of overthrowing the regime. They are wrong. The capability to take on Assad forces exists and the possibility of a rebel victory is real, but this outcome becomes more realistic in the near future if enabled and supported with material aid.

The rebels have proven their bona fides; regime security forces even with overwhelming firepower took weeks before they could enter the Baba Amr neighborhood in Homs -- and that's just one neighborhood. As any rebel force does, the one in Syria fights and retreats and fights again as it gathers additional strength from its popular support. But there are no Benghazis here. Alone they can at best put forth a heroic stand that will lead to a prolonged stalemate. With aid, they can end the violence, and the Assad-sponsored killing fields, by ending the regime.

I think Lynch is right. (As you might expect.) It is not a feel-good position to take, but I do think his hands-off policy is rational.

Meanwhile, Jeffrey White calls for an indirect campaign, including arming the opposition.

These seem to be the two basic options being discussed.

Meanwhile, it has been a lousy week for journalists in Syria.

I've been wondering why I advocated NATO intervention in Libya but don't feel the same way about Syria. I had thought it was because I thought all Qaddafi needed was a good shove, while Syria is more complex.

But I got this note from Billy Birdzell, who was a Marine officer with Special Ops experience and two tours in Iraq who went off and got an MBA (and if you know someone in the DC area who could use that sort of background, let me know and I will forward the note to him). He wrote that, "Killing several thousand Syrians so they don't kill several thousand other Syrians only to leave the nation knowing that several thousand more will die is not protecting anyone."

That strikes me as pretty succinct. It's one thing to provide the means to help finish off a reeling dictator. It is another to wade into a civil war.   

What he said. Thas a bold statement.

Proven provider John McCreary observes that the U.S. government and al Qaeda apparently are on the same side in calling for change in Syria:

Syria-al Qaida: Al-Qaida's new leader Ayman al-Zawahiri praised anti-regime protestors in Syria in a video released Wednesday claiming the United States is seeking regime change in Damascus, U.S.-based monitors said. Calling the pro-democracy activists 'mujahideen,' or holy warriors, Zawahiri hailed their efforts in "teaching lessons to the aggressor, the oppressor, the traitor, the disloyal, and standing up against his oppression" in a video the SITE Intelligence Group said was posted on extremist online forums.

Comment: For perhaps the only time on record, The US and al Qaida apparently are supporting the same policy end state for Syria: regime change. That bizarre coincidence cannot be good for Israeli security or regional stability.

Zawahari sees the conflict as a Sunni fundamentalist vs. Alawite struggle, not as a movement for plural political rights, women's rights and liberal freedoms against a repressive regime."

I mentioned her a couple of months ago, in a comment about an extraordinary post about her father defending her from some security goons threatening to rape her.

Well, she has disappeared. And may be in the hands of security goons right now.

(HT to Mr. AS)