As the chickens come home to roost in London, Joe Nocera captures well the symmetric nature of the Murdoch scandal.

It couldn't happen to a nicer bunch of guys. There has always been a rough edge in good journalism, but these people have acted like thugs -- a point seemingly lost on the editorial page of the Wall Street Journal as it comments on its owners. I agree with pretty much everything Nocera writes. As with other major scandals, I am struck not only by how we never know what is going to happen next, as Nocera says, but also, how in retrospect each step seems inevitable. 

I've popped him in the past, so I want to pause to note these commendable words from Sen. John McCain:

I disagree with many of the president's policies, but I believe he is a patriot sincerely intent on using his time in office to advance our country's cause. I reject accusations that his policies and beliefs make him unworthy to lead America or opposed to its founding ideals. And I reject accusations that Americans who vigorously oppose his policies are less intelligent, compassionate or just than those who support them.

Our political discourse should be more civil than it currently is, and we all, myself included, bear some responsibility for it not being so.

Also, the New York Times yesterday had the best newspaper article I've read on the Stuxnet bomb. I hope to have some expert commentary on it later this week.

With President Obama caving the other day on continuing the tax break for the super-rich, it is a good time to ask whether the wealthiest 1 percent is hijacking our political system. This is worse than abandonment -- it feels more to me like an attack on our system.

Think this has nothing to do with national security? Au contraire, mon petit choux. It has to do with the long-term health of the system. I remember reading, I think in Thomas Carlyle, that one cause of the French Revolution was not high taxes (the British actually taxed their people more) but because the wealthy in France made sure they didn't pay their share, and so the state shifted a heavier tax burden on the middle and the poor.

When the rich withdraw from the concerns of the general public and the poor don't have access to decent educations, that is a problem for all Americans, especially fans of American exceptionalism. I have a lot of issues with Condoleezza Rice, who I don't think has been brought to account for her role in the biggest mistake in the history of U.S. foreign policy, the invasion of Iraq. But I do agree with what she said last Friday at the Council of Foreign Relations in New York City about public education in this country: "When I can look at your zip code and tell whether or not you're going to get a good education, something is really wrong."

I'm not calling for a class war. I'm wondering whether one has been underway for many years.

My CNAS colleague Connor O'Brien recently wandered over to the W Hotel to see what congressional Republicans have up their sleeves. He wandered back with this report. 

By Connor O'Brien

Best Defense Capitol Hill deputy bureau chief

The other day I went to see what Rep. Buck McKeon, the presumptive next chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, might have to say about things will change on his watch.

The California Republican was a bit coy. The theme of his talk at the Foreign Policy Initiative's 2010 Forum was leadership. He quoted Gen. Omar Bradley, saying that, "Leadership is intangible, and therefore no weapon ever designed can replace it." HASC, as he sees it, needs to restore leadership where President Obama and congressional Democrats have failed. This includes setting a timeline for drawing down troops in Afghanistan, losing focus on Iraq, cutting missile defense programs, and mishandling the War on Terror.

Mr. McKeon committed to working in a bipartisan manner and promised that HASC would not wade into partisan "gotcha" oversight, but the verbs he used in describing his agenda were telling, as  he vowed to "expose," "expedite," "challenge," and "focus," among other things. But he made few concrete statements about anything outside of the normal oversight power that is given to any congressional committee, other than calling wartime cuts in defense spending "a red line for me and a red line for all Americans." Mr. McKeon even acknowledged that his committee's ability to call Gen. David Petraeus to testify on Afghanistan could be limited by the executive branch. "Well, we can ask," McKeon said, "But as I said, we only have one commander in chief, and if he commands Gen. Petraeus to be busy doing something else, he may not show up."

Leadership is intangible, but the final outcome of defense policy is not. Republicans are no doubt committed to strengthening national defense through expanding the budget, exposing poor practices in the defense bureaucracy, and making a long-term military commitment in Afghanistan, but his committee's ability to change the status quo remains to be seen. The same was true of the 110th Congress, where a Democratic majority elected on an anti-war platform ultimately failed to end the Iraq War. With a Democratic Senate and, if necessary, a presidential veto standing in the way, Mr. McKeon and House Republicans have their work cut out for themselves. Still unresolved is the stance newly elected deficit-hawk Republicans will take on defense spending, a divide Sen. John McCain predicted earlier in the day at the FPI hoedown.

Bottom line: Don't expect too much out of the HASC in the next two years.

"By virtually all measures, the world is a far more peaceful place than it has been at any time in recorded history," writes Christopher Fettweis in a provocative essay for the April-May 2010 issue of Survival that I finally got around to reading yesterday.

With Colombia now moving toward peace, there are hardly any wars underway in the western hemisphere, notes Fettweis, a political scientist who used to teach at the Naval War College and now slings international relations at Tulane University. Europe is at peace -- and barely has any militaries anyway. The Pacific Rim has two billion people and no fighting, quite an achievement. Asia's only conflict last year was the nasty little Sri Lankan civil war, which is over. The wars that are occurring are long-term affairs on low boil, such as the Israeli-Palestinian standoff, the Yemeni fighting, and, of course, the United States' messes in Iraq and Afghanistan.

So why are Americans so fearful, so conscious of threats? He blames, in part, the manipulative nature of current television news. "Fear is an essential component of the business model of both CNN and Fox News, a necessary tool to keep fingers away from remote controls during commercial breaks. Voices of reason tend to spoil the fun, and may inspire people to see excitement elsewhere. News outlets win by presenting stories that are more frightening, angry and simple than those of their competitors. … "

One of the victims of this system, he goes on to argue, is poor old reasonable President Obama: "Only in a deeply pathological society is reason a synonym for weakness."

The Fettweis article irked me a bit, with his easy assertion that as the U.S. defense budget went down in the 1990s, world peace increased, so there must be an inverse relationship between the two. But I try to make sure I read to the end stuff that does that to me.

I also was struck that his was a liberal critique on the state of American society. For the last 40 years, since the ‘60s, tearing down the way Americans live has been a very successful conservative political line. I wonder if liberals are now picking up that angry approach again. I think Baby Boomers as a class are pissed. They came to maturity during Woodstock, when they were going to show the world how to live and love. In maturity they would smoke a little weed, sit on the beach, and hold forth. Instead, they find themselves old, mocked by technology, threatened financially, having to work longer than expected -- and al Qaeda wants to blow them up. So I think we are in for some very cranky years of politics.

Well, at least I feel better now.

Last year CNAS, the little think tank that could, had the nice idea of bringing together smart young national security types from across the spectrum -- civilian and military, Democratic and Republican, executive and legislative, human rights pros and intelligence officials. The idea was that many of these people would be working with (and against) each other for decades, so why not get them together to begin building relationships and finding common ground? The other day CNAS announced the current crop, a nice mix of people from the State Department, CIA, White House, defense industry and Capitol Hill.

Now comes another outfit, the Foreign Policy Initiative, promoting its own "Next Generation." First, I say, get your own damn idea. Second, their next generation, as a colleague points out, is basically a bunch of kids from AEI and the Heritage Foundation and some fellow travellers, such as an aide to Donald Rumsfeld. Where's the fun in that? I mean, doesn't the conservative cadre all know each other already? So despite stealing the name, the FPI program looks to be essentially the opposite of the spirit of the original CNAS one.

Speaking of CNAS, my officemate, Robert Kaplan, has a new book out, Monsoon, that is getting this sort of review:

It is worth noting that Mr. Kaplan has become one of the leading lights in national security circles, which helps explain why this work is addressed to the nation's power brokers. Both his "Balkan Ghosts" and "The Coming Anarchy" were read widely in the White House, even if the results were not what the author intended. Together with "Warrior Politics," this represents Mr. Kaplan's most policy-orientated work.

Nevertheless, one would be hard-pressed to find a reader who won't enjoy it.

There seems to be a rebellion brewing in the VFW against its old-school PAC, which has shunned a lot of tea partiers while endorsing Nancy Pelosi and Harry Reid. VFW's leadership says in a red-faced statement, "We are requesting the chairman and the directors of the Political Action Committee immediately rescind their endorsement actions."

"These members of the board of the PAC look like they rode with Pershing," one critic tells the enterprising Adam Weinstein. On the other hand, they may just be pragmatically acting in the long-term interests of vets, instead of going all romantic and panting after the latest thing.

By Elbridge Colby
Best Defense guest columnist

In a recent Washington Post op-ed article, those paladins of muscular interventionism Danielle Pletka and Thomas Donnelly argue that American conservatism calls for placing the advancement of freedom abroad at the center of our foreign policy. This is surely a policy that is stirring and vigorous and one that calls upon traditions deeply rooted in U.S. history. But is it conservative?

The answer has to be no. Of course there is no single "conservative" foreign and defense policy. But there are certain fundamentals of a conservative approach, fundamentals consistent with a conservative approach to domestic policy or the law or social life. Condensed, the conservative approach is animated by a deep sensibility for and humility in the face of the limits of what can be achieved by government and other organs of social rationality; by the central importance -- but difficulty -- of preserving and advancing liberty, order, prosperity, and good values in a complex and imperfect world; by an awareness of the often unpredictable dangers of excessive ambition; and by a profound sense that government is the servant of the people's interests, and thus should never risk its citizens' lives or resources lightly.

The Pletka and Donnelly article does not stem from these principles. Instead, their expansive policy approach emphasizing the paramount importance of promoting freedom abroad and the need to make an enormous expenditure of resources and lives in service of that goal very much resembles the aggressive liberal internationalism that President Kennedy eloquently summoned in his 1961 Inaugural Address, when he said that the United States would "pay any price, bear any burden, support any friend, oppose any foe in order to ensure the survival and the success of liberty." Conversely, whereas Pletka and Donnelly see the United States' interests as almost boundless, a conservative approach would see not all interests as vital and would be willing to make the tough choices to distinguish the vital interests of the United States from the peripheral; whereas they dismiss the deleterious impact of the fiscal burdens of wars and large defense expenditures, a conservative approach would view these huge outlays with great concern; whereas they laud the ready willingness to spend American blood for international leadership, a conservative approach would emphasize that no government should risk the lives of its citizens save in cases of necessity.

So what would a truly conservative foreign and defense policy look like? Such a policy would focus on separating the wheat from the chaff of what is truly important for protecting and advancing the vital interests of the United States rather than focusing on objectives, which, while worthy, do not have a significant impact on those interests. This would follow Dwight Eisenhower's guidance, given at the outset of World War II, that we should distinguish the essential from the merely important. (In this interconnected world, no one can credibly argue for old-school pre-World War II isolationism, both because it would be unsafe and because it would impoverish Americans financially and culturally.) This would mean giving priority to dealing with the grave threats to our security and to shoring up our long-term international position as well as our domestic fiscal and social health as opposed to seeking to expand (often vainly) the domain of liberal democracies and maximizing U.S. power and leadership today.

So, under this logic, the United States could focus on deterring and containing Iran rather than insisting on near-term regime change in Tehran, as desirable as that may be. And Washington could concentrate on minimizing the terrorist threat from Afghanistan and Pakistan rather than aiming for the wholesale political, economic, and social transformation of the region. And we could emphasize our historical support for democracy and free markets, but see their spread as a good among goods (and often in conflict with other goods) but not the sole good and prioritize its promotion accordingly. The Pentagon could focus its modernization efforts on shoring up the capabilities we need to deter the gravest threats, such as with new nuclear delivery forces; to enable our continued dominance of the high-tech battlefield, such as with appropriate conventional strike and missile defense assets; and to combat the most serious terrorist threats, such as with advanced UAVs and persistent surveillance capabilities -- rather than on those capabilities suited for spreading freedom abroad, such as those designed for long counterinsurgency campaigns. And we could press our allies to shoulder far more of the burden of our collective security than they traditionally have, including, for instance, a Japan that increasingly perceives itself as under threat from China.

Such an approach would have a distinguished pedigree to look back upon: to Washington and the Federalists opposing the commitment of the infant United States to the cause of revolutionary France, Eisenhower relying on our nuclear superiority to deter Communist aggression while sharply curtailing defense expenditures and avoiding unnecessary interventions, Nixon calling upon our allies to take up a greater share of regional defense in the early 1970s, and Powell and Weinberger enunciating a doctrine underlining that American military might would not be used without the greatest seriousness of purpose. Even President Reagan, whose rhetoric often suggested a broader conception of the United States' role in the world, in practice husbanded U.S. power and was extremely chary about intervening abroad. In all of these instances, American leaders distinguished what needed to be done for the nation's security and what did not, firmly and vigorously defending our way of life but seeking to avoid costly, unnecessary involvements.

Pletka and Donnelly have offered an ambitious vision of what the United States' purpose in the world should be. It is magnificent, perhaps, but it cannot be called conservative. In an age in which we must get our fiscal house in order, restore the sources of American prosperity, and face swiftly rising powers whose future courses are uncertain -- above all China -- a conservative foreign policy would focus relentlessly on investing our strategic effort, money, and time to serve our long-term vital interests most effectively. Distinguishing what is important from what is not and making the corresponding tough choices about commitments, spending, and our focus abroad is the heart of a conservative foreign policy. This is the essence of strategy. By contrast, confusing our own future with the fate of freedom in every corner of the world is an invitation to waste, disillusionment, and, quite possibly, disaster.

Elbridge Colby has served in several national security positions with the U.S. Government, most recently with the Department of Defense working on the follow-on to the START Treaty and as an expert advisor to the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission. The views expressed herein are his own and do not necessarily represent the views of any institution with which he is affiliated. Or of little Dustin Pedroia.

One blogger I consistently enjoy is Ta-Nehisi Coates. Recently he discussed the mass northward migration of black Americans, and apologetically ended, "It's not the Civil War -- but it kinda is." TNC, I think is more than "kinda!" Major combat operations ended in 1865, but we lost the peace, and so, I think, Phase IV of the war only ended 99 years later with the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

If he has the courage of his convictions, he should, because he says debt is our biggest national security problem.

Well, here's the answer, or at least part of it: Make the rich pay their fair share, or at least more of it. For the last 30 years, the top 1 percent of Americans have made out like bandits, hauling in 80 percent of the increase in American income. During that time, the national infrastructure has been crumbling, among other things, while the rich have retreated to gated lifestyles -- private schools, private security, and a general non-participation in the life of the society.  

Right now the wealthiest one percenters grab 24 percent of annual income in this country. That's even more than the 15 to 18 percent they hauled in during the robber baron era of the Carnegies, Rockefellers and Vanderbilts.

All this data comes from a fascinating new overview of income inequality done by my friend Tim Noah in Slate. Amazing that he can do this and put out all those children's albums, too.     

As long as we are talking about smart people I know, here is a list of the best recent books on education, taken from an Education Next poll. Friends of this blog should consider voting for Karin Chenoweth's It's Being Done -- a surprising study of how some schools in poor areas radically improved their quality, without necessarily having charismatic leadership.

A friend in Iraq writes:

The Sahwa movement is in real trouble, and that means trouble for Iraq's security. For the past few months and with growing frequency as of late, Sahwa leaders and rank and file members have been the targets of sophisticated assassinations. Some have been killed by gunmen armed with silenced weapons and others by bombs planted on their cars or homes. This violence is not random. These are targeted attacks aimed at a critical group within Iraq's social and security fabric. And the government doesn't seem to be doing much to stop it.

For background, the Sahwa -- or Awakening -- Movement, began in al-Anbar province in late 2005 when a Sunni tribe on the Syrian border got into a turf war with a neighboring al Qaeda-allied group. The tribe ran a profitable smuggling operation across the border, and its members decided working with U.S. forces (who presumably overlooked the smuggling) would get them the weapons and training they needed to clear their territory.

The idea caught on, and by 2008 there were a total of over 100,000 Sahwa forces -- also known as Sons of Iraq -- in nine of Iraq's most dangerous provinces. Many of these SOIs were drawn from the ranks of the very Sunni insurgents they were tasked by the U.S. with rounding up, an arrangement that made them highly effective but won them a long list of enemies. And of course it was impossible to ensure that every SOI had actually severed ties with the insurgency -- rumors of double agents persisted.

Problems for the Awakening Movement began in the fall of 2008 when the Iraqi government took control of the Sons of Iraq, promising to keep paying their US $300 monthly salaries while transitioning them into government employment or the Iraqi security forces. Both tasks proved easier said than done, and many SOIs claim the Shi'a-led government never intended to support their majority Sunni forces.

Those accusations gained traction in the spring of 2009, when Iraqi security forces arrested numerous Sahwa leaders and members on charges ranging from murder to extortion to links to Sadaam Hussein's Ba'ath Party. A March arrest in Baghdad's Fadhil neighborhood developed into a dramatic standoff between Iraqi Army forces and SOIs loyal to the accused, and fighting continued for two days. However such public accusations against the Sons of Iraq soon tapered off.

Now the biggest threat to the Sons of Iraq is assassination. The Guardian spoke with a Baghdad Awakening leader who put it in stark terms:

We are being hunted down. It has never been worse. I have been targeted by roadside bombs six times in the past four months."

Read on

Interesting comment on US-China relations from Defense Secretary Gates in Singapore over the weekend:

Last fall, President Obama and President Hu made a commitment to advance sustained and reliable military-to-military relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China.  The key words here are "sustained" and "reliable" -- not a relationship repeatedly interrupted by and subject to the vagaries of political weather.

Regrettably, we have not been able to make progress on this relationship in recent months.  Chinese officials have broken off interactions between our militaries, citing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as the rationale.  For a variety of reasons, this makes little sense:

• First, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are nothing new.  They have been a reality for decades and spanned multiple American administrations.
• Second, the United States has for years demonstrated in a very public way that we do not support independence for Taiwan.  Nothing - I repeat, nothing - has changed in that stance.
• Finally, because China's accelerating military buildup is largely focused on Taiwan, U.S. arms sales are an important component of maintaining peace and stability in cross-strait relations and throughout the region."

Zakaria has more on Beijing's new arrogance.

(HT to AD)

One of the role of political journals is to police their own side. For example, the Nation and the New York Review of Books should call out leftists who play fast and loose with the facts, or who cozy up to the likes of Castro. Likewise, the National Review and the Weekly Standard should blow the whistle on erring rightists who, for example, play footsie with fascists. (You listening, William Kristol?)

Unfortunately, this happens all too rarely. I mention it because the Wall Street Journal editorial page today carries a column that slaps down the talk that Supreme Court nominee Elena Kagan was anti-military during her time as dean of the Harvard Law School. "Outside observers may disagree with the moral and policy judgments made by those at Harvard Law School," writes her predecessor as dean, Robert Clark. "But it would be very wrong to portray Elena Kagan as hostile to the U.S. military. Quite the opposite is true."

I've taken a few pops at the WSJ edit page in the past, so it is only right to congratulate them today.

Meanwhile, invoking the spirit of Roman Hruska (who in 1970 defended a Supreme Court nominee thusly: ''Even if he were mediocre, there are a lot of mediocre judges and people and lawyers. They are entitled to a little representation, aren't they, and a little chance? We can't have all Brandeises, Frankfurters and Cardozos.''), David Brooks criticizes Kagan for not being more like an op-ed columnist.

One of the major points of consensus at the Chapel Hill conference was that retired generals need to get out of the "potted plant" role of endorsing presidential candidates.

Today, said Army Col. Matthew Moten, a West Point historian who is on sabbatical at Chapel Hill, "a small but vocal group of retired flag officers" are undercutting the apolitical stance of the U.S. officer corps. Moten also made the interesting point that retired officers also are "part of the problem" in another area, that of protecting the professional jurisdiction of the military, because of the role some have played in provide security contractors, which as he noted are a form of mercenary. 

Retired Air Force Gen. Richard Myers, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs, was on the same panel, and said he generally agreed with Moten. "Being used as a potted palm at political conventions really does a disservice" to the military, he said. 

Retired Adm. Edmund Giambastiani, who was vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs, agreed that, "it's important for the retired guys to stay out" of politics.

Marine Gen. James Mattis, speaking earlier, also mentioned this, saying that "flag officers must remain apolitical." He also said that officers who retire because of qualms over policy or other disagreements should "shut up and go home to your farm."

Myers said the thinks that "we probably need" some sort of "guidelines for senior retired officers," but said he didn't think that such advice should be issued by the service chiefs.