So observes my CNAS colleague Patrick Cronin, reacting to the AP's report that the U.S. government has agreed to limit its military presence in Pakistan to between 100 and 150 troops.

By J. Dana Stuster
Best Defense bureau of nuclear warfare

George Perkovich, director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, confessed to his audience, "Those who really know what's going on in Pakistan's nuclear complex aren't talking about it, and those who are talking, including myself, don't really know what's going on in Pakistan's nuclear complex."

He also said that when he was contacted for the event, he told Richard Weitz (full disclosure: Richard Weitz is a non-resident senior fellow at Center for a New American Security, where Tom is a senior fellow and I intern) he didn't think it should happen at all, saying "When Americans, especially, talk about nuclear issues and concerns, in particular about the security of nuclear weapons and fissile materials in Pakistan, that gets heard in many ways in Pakistan and almost all of them are not helpful." The discussion, he said, feeds a narrative in Pakistan, veracity aside, that the United States is only interested in self-preservation, its efforts are far from philanthropic, that it is anti-Muslim, playing favorites with India, and leading a concerted effort to denuclearize Pakistan, possibly with Israeli or Indian aid.

The discussion continued, despite the caveats.

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By Elbridge Colby
Best Defense containment bureau chief

In a widely-reported speech on Nov. 8 to the General Assembly of Jewish Federations of North America, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu bluntly reasserted his view that "[c]ontainment will not work against Iran" and therefore that "the only responsible policy is to prevent [Iran] from developing atomic bombs in the first place." Netanyahu left no doubt that he advocates the use of military force to achieve that goal. Nor is Netanyahu alone in promoting this view, not only in Israel and in the United States but elsewhere -- for example, the UAE's ambassador recently did so.

Without question, preventing an Iranian nuclear capability should be the objective of Washington and the international community, but is Netanyahu right that seeking to contain a nuclear Iran would be worse than taking military action to prevent Tehran from acquiring such weapons? 

Most arguments against using military force to stop Iran's nuclear program focus on the costs to us, but the truth is that a bombing campaign is not actually necessary. Rather, there is good reason to believe that Washington, Tel Aviv, and their associates can deter Iran from transgressing their vital interests even if Tehran gets a nuclear weapon. Why? Containment or deterrence requires, inter alia:

• A regime whose behavior can be substantially influenced by credible threats and which values certain things that can be held at risk of damage or destruction;
• That the demands of the deterring party are tolerable to the targeted country, given the scale of the threat issued;
• And that this threat is backed by real capability and will.

U.S. and Israeli containment of a nuclear Iran would satisfy these criteria. First, the Iranian regime is malevolent, but it is not crazy. The regime in Tehran is dangerous, but experience and common sense indicate that it is sufficiently rational to understand the calculus of cost and benefit. Second, Tehran is vulnerable -- that is, the Iranians have much that they value that the United States and Israel can hold at risk. Third, the United States, Israel, and their associates clearly have the capabilities to follow through on their threats; indeed, the military balance, especially at the higher levels of warfare, is drastically tilted in the West's direction. Fourth, what we would ask for is reasonable; the vital interests that Washington, Tel Aviv, and their associates would demand a nuclear Iran not transgress are essentially status quo and would not need to involve the forced transformation of the Iranian regime. 

Let's explore these points:

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Yeah, he did such a heckuva job on Iraq that now he is advising us on nuclear weapons policy. This would be like putting Brownie in charge of the Gulf of Mexico oil cleanup.

An Army officer mentioned to me recently that the thing that bothered him most about Feith on Iraq was not the policy but rather that Feith only came out to Iraq once or twice. I hadn't heard that before. 

Here's a response to my post yesterday wondering about an anti-Iranian pivot in Arab states. It is written by Yasser El-Shimy, a former Egyptian diplomat and a former colleague of mine at CNAS who is doing a doctorate at Boston University.   

By Yasser M. El-Shimy

Best Defense Cairo bureau chief

A consensus appears to be emerging that the Islamic Republic of Iran is working day and night to construct a nuclear arms arsenal. Adherents to this belief cite Tehran's clandestine activities, such as the installation in Qum, evasive diplomacy and lack of cooperation with international inspectors. While Iran has, in fact, been guilty of all of the above, there is little evidence to suggest that once Iran reaches enrichment technology, it is going to cross the threshold. On the contrary, it has many disincentives not to.

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I thought the president's acceptance speech today for his Nobel Prize for Peace was surprisingly hawkish, especially about Iran:

... it's also incumbent upon all of us to insist that nations like Iran and North Korea do not game the system. Those who claim to respect international law cannot avert their eyes when those laws are flouted. Those who care for their own security cannot ignore the danger of an arms race in the Middle East or East Asia. Those who seek peace cannot stand idly by as nations arm themselves for nuclear war.

The same principle applies to those who violate international laws by brutalizing their own people. When there is genocide in Darfur, systematic rape in Congo, repression in Burma, there must be consequences. Yes, there will be engagement; yes, there will be diplomacy. But there must be consequences when those things fail. And the closer we stand together, the less likely we will be faced with the choice between armed intervention and complicity in oppression.

He's a contradictory man, this Obama. A couple of weeks ago he went to West Point to announce that he was reluctantly escalating the war in Afghanistan. I read that speech as an explanation and apology to his political supporters. Now he goes to pick up the Peace Prize and paradoxically defends the American use of force in the world. I read this speech as an apology to Martin Luther King, who was invoked six times in the speech, far more anyone else.  

AFP/Getty Images

I see where representatives of the governments of Israel and Iran have been meeting secretly in Cairo to chat about nuclear weapons. I was surprised, but good for them. 

doneastwest/flickr

This angle hadn't occurred to me: The head of the Israeli Space Agency says that the Obama's decision to scrap the deployment of land-based missile defense systems to Eastern Europe is good for Israel. He explains that Israel benefits when U.S.-Russian relations improve:

"Thus far, American attempts to stop the development of an Iranian nuclear bomb have not succeeded -- partially because the Russians have not cooperated with their efforts," he explained. "It is possible that because of this concession -- and it is a concession, even if the Americans said that it was not -- the Russians will be more helpful on Iran and will more support the American initiative." 

I also wonder if he believes that having Europe feel a pang of the vulnerability Israel feels about Iran might improve Israel's international position.

AFP/Getty Images

I said I was gonna ignore North Korea, and I still intend to. But I was struck by this comment by proven provider John McCreary in his NightWatch:

During the past 40 years North Korean leaders have been blustery but fundamentally risk averse. They have done nothing that would risk the total destruction of their state -- which means Pyongyang for all practical and symbolic purposes -- until now.... The actions in the past two days represent risk accepting behavior, defiance bordering on recklessness. This behavior began shortly after Kim Chong-il's stroke in August 2008. If Kim is ordering these actions, he has had a personality change, which can occur if dementia follows a stroke, according to medical authorities."

I'd be very surprised if Israel bombed Iran's nuclear facilities anytime soon, despite what a guy over at ForeignPolicy.com's cousin (or step-parent?) Slate is saying. He offers all sorts of complicated political analyses about why such an attack would be in Israel's interests.

I just don't see how Israel could physically do it as long as the Americans are in Iraq. Hitting Iran is a tough mission to begin with for Israeli aircraft. It would probably be impossible for Israeli aircraft to hit Iran without passing through Iraqi airspace -- and they could not do that without the Americans knowing and being able to stop them. Thus the U.S. government would be seen by Iraqis and others as an accomplice of the Israeli attack. The fallout of such a bombing would make life in Iraq very difficult for more than 130,000 U.S. troops, even before the Iranians embarked upon a course of retaliation that probably would include stepping up roadside bombings of U.S. forces.

Rather, I think the real danger time for Iran is when, if ever, we get U.S. troops out of Iraq. Then the coast will be clear for those Israeli refueling tankers and F-15s. What's more, we no longer will have 130,000 U.S. hostages in Iraq susceptible to Iranian violence, so the U.S. could join Israel in stepping up the pressure.       

xnir/Flickr