That seems a bit extreme, even for Pyongyang. But a South Korean press quotes a South Korean government source as saying that:

"Thirty people have been confirmed to have died or gone missing until recently. About 10 partners of inter-Korean talks with the South were executed by firing and about 20 others were said to have died in traffic accidents."

"As of now, the North has no partners to talk with the South. There will likely be major change in inter-Korean relations."

Hmm.

Hmmmmm.

(HT to D "House" M)

I think it is pretty clear that the NoKos aren't going to change their behavior unless compelled to do so. So I was struck by this quick note from an expert that laid out some possible steps to do just that.

By Dean Cheng
Best Defense guest columnist

I think there are a range of actions that could be taken, if there were the fortitude to do so.

On the military side, a steady stream of exercises on Korea's east and west coasts, to tie down NK forces, force them to maintain them at a high alert, and prevent them from going into the countryside to help with the spring planting and/or dealing w/ natural disasters.

Deployment of UAV detachments and other advanced capabilities into the Korean peninsula, again, to maintain the pressure, and be able to respond promptly to the next North Korean provocation.

On the non-military side, clamping down on Department 39 activities throughout the region and globally. Pressuring banks that deal w/ the NKs to cease and desist. (The Chinese, who are loath to do much on the NK peninsula directly, WERE willing to cooperate against the Banco Delta Asia group when the US gave them the stark choice of US or NK business.) We should increase efforts to get all the UN P-5 guys (especially the PRC) to live up to the UN sanctions that THEY HAVE ALL AGREED UPON to impose since NK is still pursuing nuclear and missile efforts.

Raising the issue of NK with both Chinese PLA officers during the Gates visit (and stopping the delusional idea that the PLA is somehow divorced or apart from the CCP on such issues), and with President Hu Jintao during the Hu state visit to the US. Making it clear that the US will both NOT be bullied out of the Yellow Sea (the gyrations about the George Washington battlegroup are, frankly, shameful and unworthy of the US as a major power) AND will stand by its ROK ally.

And that's just the first set of steps …

Dean Cheng is a research fellow at the Heritage Foundation for Chinese political and security affairs.

Finally, I'm ending my Week of General Shelton Posts with a couple of things in his memoirs that struck me as revelatory. Which is only to say that I hadn't heard about them before, and for 17 years I covered this stuff full-time.

First, he reports, a bit mysteriously, that late in the Clinton administration, the president's authorization codes to use nuclear weapons strike were lost. He doesn't really explain what happened or who knew about it, except that the guy who was supposed to make sure once a month that an aide to the president had the codes kept getting the runaround, and putting up with it. It turned out that an aide to the president had misplaced the codes, and had no idea where they were. The situation only came to light when it was time to collect the old codes and replace them with new ones, and the aide apparently confessed. Shelton tells the story a bit oddly -- I had to read this section a few times. I am guessing that the story is about the nuclear "football" that a military aide carries. It made me wonder what happened to that aide. Also, what would have happened if the president had decided to launch a nuclear strike? (392-393)

Second, Shelton reports that when he was chief of the Special Operations Command before becoming chairman of the Joint Chiefs in 1997, the CIA learned that a ship was coming out of North Korea carrying "an illegal weapon." (He isn't more specific, but I am guessing it is some sort of missile or missile-related technology.) And the ship was going to pass through the Panama Canal. So, he says, part of SEAL Team Six went in and was able to "'immobilize' in a special way without leaving a trace." (279) I was glad to hear this -- you always hope that this is the sort of thing Special Operators do, but obviously you never hear much about it. In fact, I was sort of surprised that Shelton felt able to disclose it. But keep it in mind the next time an Iranian missile launch mysteriously fails. Hmmm…

If you buy the book, I'd advise starting about halfway through. Every quotation I have used from the book this week has come after page 250.

For a long time I have been content to let North Korea slowly implode on its own timetable. But if they are going to get all hostile and sink other nation's ships, maybe it is time to put them on 24-hour lockdown. Or maybe the French could just start greenpeacing NoKo ships in random world ports, especially ones carrying luxury goods for the Korean monarchy.

Update: It looks like my theory will be tested somewhat, as North Korea just announced that it severing all ties to South Korea, and the SoKos are saying NoKo ships can't transit their waters. If the NoKos are really frisky, they may even lob something at a U.S. warship. 

John Byron, our chief contrarian correspondent, recently wrote about stopping what he sees as the runaway military welfare train. The North Korean navy recently has provided an counter-example of what happens when a military is starved for support. North Korean patrol ships are getting pushy in contested waters, apparently because the crab season is about to begin, and (according to proven provider John McCreary) Pyongyang's military mariners survive in part by crabbing and so in late spring start laying claim to crustacean-rich waters. I have this image in my head of the USS Harry S Truman cruising the Med with seine nets out. 

I've been around the block enough to have seen predictions of a North Korean collapse come and go. But this comment from proven provider John McCreary got my attention:

During the weekend, foreign diplomats, accredited in Pyongyang, claimed that large spontaneous rallies protesting the currency devaluation and replacement have been breaking out in the North Korean capital and other major cities. The Army has been put on a heightened state of alert in case of mass acts of disobedience.

yeowatzup/Flickr

My item on the bad blood between our ambassador in Iraq, Christopher Hill, and our top officer there, Gen. Raymond Odierno, provoked some interesting comments and e-mails, especially from those who encountered him on Korean issues.

This is one that was posted by Joel Wit, a longtime Korea expert who, according to his bio, "served as senior advisor to Ambassador Robert L. Galluci from 1993-1995, where he developed strategies to help resolve the crisis over North Korea's weapons program, and as Coordinator for the U.S.-North Korea's weapons program and as Coordinator for the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework from 1995-1999, where he was the official in charge of implementation":

As someone who follows Iraq only as closely as any foreign-policy generalist but who specializes in North Korea, I can tell you none of us would be surprised by the problems between Chris Hill and the U.S. military in that country. When he worked on North Korea issues at the end of the Bush administration, Hill was not willing to listen to anyone who knew the issues and had his own little team of groupies who worshipped the ground he walked on (or at least pretended to). While there are a number of reasons why we are in trouble with the North today, not the least of which is the North Koreans themselves, Hill wouldn't listen to experts or anyone else about how to deal with a country that he knew nothing about. Sounds like he is repeating his performance in Iraq. Lets hope the consequences arent as bad.

And this is a story I recieved by e-mail from someone in Washington intimately familiar with all this:

During the NK talks, he supposedly coached the North Koreans on what answers to give, so then he could go back and tell Washington they said the right language. The technique finally blew up at the end when he told Bush that if the president  took them off the terror list they would agree to a verification plan. He had none of this in writing but Bush and Condi agreed -- and then when the U.S. went back to North Korea, they denied they had ever agreed to what Hill said they had agreed to.

I have been told that the Obama folks, once they looked at the negotiating record on North Korea (after Hill was off to Iraq), they were absolutely appalled at what they discovered.

Meanwhile, Hill is telling people that he’s never met me. I guess he doesn’t remember a conversation we had in his office in the embassy in Skopje, Macedonia, in the late '90s.
 
Finally, Lady Emma Sky, the always-interesting political advisor to General Odierno, surfaces to report that she has "smacked [Tom Ricks's] bottom and told me I was totally wrong in my portrayal of the relationship of these two people."

TIM SLOAN/AFP/Getty Images

Let's ignore them.

Flickr user (stephan)

Why does North Korea remind me of Dick Cheney? I think it is because I wish that both would just go away, and also because the best way to deal them is to ignore them.

Here's a link to a guess on what Cheney is up to with his fear-mongering. I think trying to stave off the inevitable is a losing game. I would like everything to come out in a Truth & Reconciliation Commission. But if it doesn't, I think it will leak out over the years with a steady dribble of memoirs, lawsuits and incriminating documents surfacing. And there is a poetic justice in that sort of water torture. 

FILIPPO MONTEFORTE/AFP/Getty Images