I've been reading the commentators, right and left, who want the United States to get involved in the war in Syria. I believe they are sincere, and want to do the right thing.

But even so, after reading what they write, it still doesn't feel like my war, or our war. Maybe I am missing something. But right now I don't see it.

By "An African-American Academy Grad"

Best Defense guest respondent

Mr. Goldich, as an African-American, a former football player at the Academy, and a Marine Infantry Officer, I take great exception to your article, especially point number two. Your comments are totally out of line, misinformed, without merit or factual basis, and frankly, borderline 'racist.' You could have crafted a more plausible argument based on well-researched facts vice editorial commentary.

I, like many other African-Americans who have played football, had great service records, graduated, and have gone on to serve our great nation with distinction. We did it by not hiding behind a football program, but by holding and being held to the same standard as every other midshipman. If you want to attack the institution, at least get your facts straight and mount a coherent argument, but don't bring race into the argument. I get it, you used the disclaimer of 'all too many,' but you know that was a weak attempt at implying that all blacks that attend the Academy are academically weak and have bad behavior. I will admit, I wasn't the smartest midshipman, but I met the standard and I graduated on time. The day I graduated, my shipmates to the right and left of me were not African-American. So maybe they should not have been admitted into the Academy either due to their lack of academic prowess and shady behavior.

Mr. Goldich, don't diminish what many of my shipmates and I worked so hard for because of a loosely supported argument that is borderline racist because you failed to do the proper research to mount an articulate argument. It is 2013 and people are still writing crap like this that actually feeds into this stereotype . I get it, you have the right to write whatever you want. I respect that, but this is the very reason we, as a nation, cannot progress.

Mr. Ricks, I read your blog everyday because you post some really thought provoking pieces. However, I think an apology is in order for what was posted on behalf of Mr. Goldich. It was extremely offensive. He could have excluded point number two and still he would have been off base, but it would have been more palatable. Most of your articles call for action of some kind, on behalf of those the article is directed. I want to see if you are in fact fair, just, and hold yourself to the same standard -- or will there be silence on the net?

By Robert Goldich

Best Defense department of third rail issues

Gee, what a surprise -- Naval Academy football players doing something bad. This is not the Navy per se at all. It is the result of a perfect storm of rotten policies, all directed at making the Academy football team able to compete in Division I and win games generally. I wrote about this in a lengthy CRS report I did in 1997 on the service academies, but there are no indications that things have changed at all, except possibly to get worse. These policies, and a geographical factor, include: 

• Turning the Naval Academy Preparatory School into an institution designed to enable academically weak athletes to scrape by at the Academy, a terrible turn from the original intent of the institution (all three academies have them), which was to give a leg up for deserving enlisted personnel who obtain an Academy appointment. This really stinks. 

• Using football as a method for recruiting African-American midshipmen, all too many of whom have both academic and behavioral problems that would keep anybody but football players (regardless of race) out of the Academy, but are accepted into the Academy because of a culture that says the athlete can do no wrong. There is a really repulsive racist aura, that of the bigoted stereotype of physically strong but mentally weak black men, operating here. Furthermore, it discredits affirmative action to recruit minority midshipmen based on their potential to be good officers, not primarily good football players

• Whole battalions of retired admirals and captains floating around Annapolis and the whole DC metro area who exert enormous pressure on the Academy to excel in football in the all too typical rah rah culture of alumni from schools where football is a metastatic part of the culture (think Penn State).

• One factor for which neither the Navy nor the players can be blamed, and which extends far beyond the football business: the geographical placement of the Naval Academy right in the middle of a fairly large town which is a party place and beach/sailing resort, creating many more opportunities for off-base partying and lots of alcohol consumption. The contrast with West Point and the Air Force Academy, both of which are much more geographically isolated and distant from anyplace with fleshpots, is obvious.

• Letting football players have all kinds of special privileges at the Academy, which creates in the minds of many a sense that they are untouchable. This includes time off from various onerous duties that other midshipmen must perform and pressure on professors to let the slide by with low grades.

The absence of one or two of these would probably tamp down these offenses, but there are so many negatives that it's hard to avoid incidents of this nature.

Robert L. Goldich retired from the Congressional Research Service in 2005 as its senior military manpower analyst. Currently he is consulting and drafting a book on the history of conscription.

By Jim Gourley

Best Defense all-star guest columnist team

This week's revelations of improprieties committed by the West Point Rugby team catalyzed diverse and heated arguments. Passions reached their apex when propelled by references to how harshly the cadets were punished and the transparency of the institution's administration of justice.

Tom himself was challenged on the dual proposition that the cadets should have lost the privilege of graduating on time with their classmates and that not conferring this punishment indicated that West Point is somehow failing in the character-development component of its mission. In his words, there is perhaps a mentality of "boys will be boys" rather than "We turn boys into men, and insist that they be gentlemen." The most fundamental and vital principles of the discussion were subsequently lost in the hail of slings and arrows -- specifically, the development of character in a group of young men who are now serving as front-line leaders in an Army that is still very much at war.

The official West Point statement on the matter is as innocuous in its characterization of the offenses as it is sterile in its description of the punishment. On the surface, it's fodder for both conspiracy theorists and detractors of the service academies. But we too easily forget that official statements are supposed to be no more than a surface treatment. As people who have lived the service academy experience know, still waters run deep. Those depths conceal a current of shame that runs through the character development and disciplinary systems. By this I do not mean that the service academies hide something that they feel ashamed of, rather that shame itself is a force so potent and entrenched in the system that it may well qualify as the greatest unspoken tradition of these institutions. There is no greater exhibit of this than the iconic punishment of "walking tours," forcing cadets to march in dress uniform with their rifles in public.

What most people outside of the academies don't realize is that, for every case in which a cadet or midshipman is discovered to have broken with the institution's principles, there are several more in which no wrongdoing is found. Some investigations even find fault with the accusers for making specious allegations. "Revenge accusations" and witch hunts are not common occurrences, but they are not uncommon, either. The standards of conduct and the threshold of suspicion are so sensitive that one need not hold a civil engineering degree to make a mountain out of a molehill. Investigations are therefore necessarily thorough and extremely uncomfortable processes. Compounding matters is that the guarantees of confidentiality in these schools are constructed of wicker. To paraphrase Churchill, rumors are able to get from the barracks to the chow hall before the truth can put its dress greys on. In institutions where the scripture of character is written in such absolutist verse, the court of public opinion can be less forgiving than a firing squad. For a first classman preparing to graduate, it ruins what ought to be a rare celebratory period in a cadet's life. Much care is and absolutely should be taken in these investigations as a measure of damage control, because damage is an unavoidable consequence of the process.

Though not clearly present, these intangibles nevertheless represent a genuine danger to the mission of character development. The sense of dread that your graduation is threatened, the public humiliation of being investigated, the awkward phone call home to your parents warning them of the situation and their consequent disappointment and worry contribute to an overwhelming sense of shame. It becomes a dynamic unto itself in these cases, and consequently must be considered as carefully as the existential circumstances by those in authority. Much has been written about the principle of shame in military culture, but of recent notoriety and also exceptionally relevant to this discussion are Steven Pressfield and Nancy Sherman. They take dynamically opposing views of shame. Pressfield is a zealous advocate of shame's utility in successful military units as "the shadow version of honor." He believes it is the stick of a loss of face to be used when the carrot of esteem fails. Sherman also sees a relationship between the two, but characterizes shame more as honor seen through a glass darkly. The polarity of their views highlights the unifying idea of crucial relevance. Whether you believe shame is a force for good or ill, its power cannot be taken for granted. It is a punishment unto itself, and can lead to other forms of self-castigation.

This leads to a more constructive view of the punishment as described in the context of character development. The postponement of graduation was suggested without an explanation of what end it would serve. A punishment should necessarily be instructive and inform better future behavior. According to the press release, the guilty parties received thorough attention. Like "hell," an "intense respect rehabilitation program, involving self-assessments, reflective journals, and role-model interviews, supervised by a mentor" is just a phrase. The reality is much worse. To be sure, no weekends were spent outside the cadet area in the making of these boys into men. Adding a delayed graduation on top of that is excessive, and ensures the wound inflicted by shame never heals properly. It makes for bitter graduates. In effect, you punish their receiving units more than them.

The effect of shame undoubtedly went even further. The impression made upon them by their officer leaders and how they handled the punishment will be indelible. That may be the most important lesson they learn out of all of this, because they will assuredly face the burden of administering punishment to future subordinates who commit grave offenses. How will they balance punishing the act and improving the person, and how will they negotiate these dilemmas in environments where reputation is as vital as body armor and shame mows down formations as easily as a mortar round? That should be the greatest measure of the institution's success or failure in "making men out of boys," for what other purpose is there in making them into men if not to maintain good order and discipline in a fighting force through a considerate application of justice? For those who were admonished, this was a profound -- indeed, the penultimate -- moment in their character development. It was the last influence West Point had on how they were shaped into leaders. How they were shaped into men will greatly inform the methods by which they go about shaping the boys (and girls) given to them: America's sons and daughters.

Jim Gourley is a 2002 graduate of the United States Air Force Academy . He now works as a journalist and writer. His first book is due out in July.

Interesting news for all those Marines who were perplexed by the lack of fallout from last year's attack on Camp Leatherneck: The inquisitive Rajiv Chandrasekaran reports that Maj. Gen. Gurganus is under investigation (begun in mid-May) and that his promotion to three stars is "on hold."

By Andrew Bell and Kurt Sanger

Best Defense office of command climate change

The commandant of the Marine Corps recently issued a letter to all Marines regarding command climate. He wrote, "There is a disturbingly frequent correlation between Marines who act poorly and units with poor climates." The correlation has been identified in many of the high profile, negative incidents involving the military over the last decade in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as those involving sexual assault. It is also often present in underperforming units. The focus the commandant has placed on the issue will hopefully diminish all types of incidents.

A major obstacle presents itself in this area, however. As often as leadership raises command climate, the concept is poorly defined and its meaning is not uniform throughout the military. It is discussed in many publications, but there is no doctrinal definition. There is a different answer to what command climate is for virtually every servicemember.

Even were there a common understanding, there are no DOD-wide metrics through which unit performance and climate are correlated. In an informal survey of service academies and professional military schools conducted last summer, we found that there are no separate courses on developing command climate. If it is addressed academically, it is done in the context of leadership studies.

Command climate is not exclusively a product of leadership, and the two concepts must be examined independently to be properly understood. Focusing on leadership ignores group dynamics, the influence of non-leaders and non-traditional leaders, and the development of "sub-climates" in small units. What is acceptable in a platoon could differ from what is acceptable in a squad or fire team; those differences are shaped by more than unit leaders.

This is not to diminish the role of the leader in creating a command climate. He or she will have more influence than anyone. However, an organization that expects its climate to be controlled by its leader without accounting for other variables does not fully understand climate, especially when the organization has leaders who frequently change duty stations, or may get injured or killed. A leader has failed when the unit cannot thrive in his or her absence.

Every organization has a climate, whether it is an infantry platoon, a high school baseball team, or a kindergarten class. The climate helps define what behavior and actions will and will not be acceptable to the members of the organization. In the armed forces, it is generally accepted that a healthy command climate is necessary for an effective and efficient unit. A good one can be a cost-free force multiplier; a poor one can cause servicemembers to make catastrophic decisions. For this reason alone, command climate requires careful study and attention by the military.

To emphasize the importance of command climate and its hidden impacts, research of the military's experience in Iraq and Afghanistan shows that healthy command climates mitigate the effects of post-traumatic stress and improve resiliency. While the links between climate and effectiveness seem obvious, the connection between climate, PTS, and resiliency demonstrates that climate has second order effects. This should elevate the urgency with which command climate is examined so that it can be designed deliberately instead of allowing it to grow of its own accord.

Command climate is a vital element for individual, unit, and organizational effectiveness and well-being. It is a subject that deserves examination by security theorists and practitioners. As we continue to advance the concept of command climate development as a separate field of study, we hope to be joined by the service academies and professional military schools in this worthy effort.

Andrew Bell is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at Duke University and a predoctoral research fellow at the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at George Washington University. He has served as an active duty Air Force officer and is a major in the Air Force Reserve.

Kurt Sanger is a major and judge advocate in the U.S. Marine Corps, and is an incoming National Security Law LL.M. candidate at Georgetown University. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Defense or any other organization.

Here, in its entirety, is the statement sent to me this morning.

The following captures the actions taken by United States Military Academy (USMA) Leadership from point of notification of a derogatory email chain generated on the Men's Cadet Rugby Team through the adjudication of punishment under the Cadet Disciplinary Code:

In April 2013, United States Military Academy (USMA) Leadership was made aware of an inappropriate email chain internally circulated within the Cadet Rugby Team. USMA Leadership immediately appointed an Investigating Officer (IO) with orders to investigate pursuant to Army Regulation 15-6 an email chain, the culture of the Men's Cadet Rugby Team, any actions or behaviors that would suggest a hostile team environment or culture of disrespect towards women, or any other potentially inappropriate conduct/culture.

The IO completed the investigation in May 2013. Cadets on the team were found to have violated the Cadet Disciplinary Code for Unsatisfactory Behavior, Error in Judgment, Failure to Perform a Duty, and a violation of the General Article for actions which tend to reflect discredit on the Corps of Cadets and the United States Army. Maximum allowable punishment under the Cadet Disciplinary Code was administered. Further actions taken included temporary disbandment of the Men's Cadet Rugby Team. The investigation did not find any evidence of sexual assault and there was no evidence or indication of inappropriate pictures of female cadets. All Cadets were required to complete an intense respect rehabilitation program, involving self-assessments, reflective journals, and role-model interviews, supervised by a mentor. Having completed the prescribed punishment Class of 2013, Cadets graduated.

An extensive legal review was conducted and found no legal objection to the investigation. The intent of this program was not only to punish the offenders, but to address the cultural issues with their actions and the incompatibility of these actions to the Army Values. 

I called Lt. Webster Wright, the chief spokesman for West Point, with some follow-up questions. He said that the brunt of punishment landed on the 14 members of the team who were about to graduate. They all graduated and are now commissioned officers of the U.S. Army. I asked why their commissionings weren't delayed by three months, which has been done in the past, and he said that was considered but rejected. This makes me wonder if the message sent was "boys will be boys," rather than, "We turn boys into men, and insist that they be gentlemen."

The disbandment of the team is of uncertain duration. The investigation into "the atmosphere of the team" continues, and it is possible that the team won't be allowed to play next season, Lt. Col. Wright said: "We'll have to see how they do in the remedial training,"

I also hear through the grapevine that West Point received a query about this situation from the White House on Friday, and responded yesterday (Tuesday) morning.

The headline on the local news story proclaims, "Celebrating 100 years on guard in Sault Ste. Marie."

I wonder what the 49th Field Artillery Regiment was guarding against? I know it adjoins Michigan, but what if Minnesotans were trying to sneak into Canada to find work in the wheatfields? I can see how the combination of Prince, Jesse Ventura, and Michelle Bachman could be scary. But that towed artillery piece would look good in a Prince show.

And who can forget the Algonquin Rifles from which the regiment is descended? One of the great names, along with the British army's old Royal American Regiment.

By Donna McAleer

Best Defense guest columnist

Senators Kirsten Gillibrand (NY) and Claire McCaskill (MO) have become the faces and voices of outrage and action over the crisis of sexual assault in the military. The reason why two civilian female senators who never wore a uniform have done so is because, as members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, they had to. Why? Because on this crime issue, the military's senior command has failed.

That is one of the most difficult sentences I have ever written. As a West Point graduate and former Army Military Police Officer, as much as I would like to deny it, as bitter as that sentence is, it is the truth. 

Sexual assaults are notoriously underreported crimes, although in fairness, not just within the military. With respect to the services, in 2010, the DOD estimated that more than 19,000 assaults occurred. In 2012, the estimate jumped 34 percent to 26,000, of which approximately 12,000 women and 14,000 men were assaulted. That amounts to 70 assaults per day. DOD derived these estimates from its bi-annual Workplace and Gender Relations Survey of Active Duty Members (WGRA).

Such data make it difficult to properly measure progress addressing the problem because of insufficient prior data. It is hoped these numbers indicate more confidence in a reporting procedure and not an increase in assaults. Regardless, the numbers are too high.

Nearly 10 years of data as reported by DOD Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office, particularly the last four, raise an alarming question: Is the chain of command and UCMJ working properly?

Representatives Loretta Sanchez (CA) and Louise Slaughter (NY) began addressing sexual assaults in the military more than 17 years ago on the House Armed Services Committee. Service Women's Action Network (SWAN), founded in 2007, has worked tirelessly with legislators on both sides of the aisle and victims to help victims of military sexual assault present their accusations without prejudice. Senators Kelly Ayotte (NH), Jon Tester (MT), Barbara Boxer (CA), and Patty Murray (WA), and Representatives Mike Turner (OH), Bill Braley (IA), Niki Tsongas (MA), and Chellie Pingree (ME) are among others continuing reform efforts introducing bipartisan and bi-cameral legislation to support victims and prosecute perpetrators.

Coalition building, bipartisan legislation, veterans-led initiatives, a force stretched thin by 12 years of war, a database of more than 230,000 women serving in various combat theaters, documentary films such as The Invisible War and Miss Representation, lawsuits, a technology-driven global economy that provides instant information, and a concomitant media barrage that increased awareness have brought this crisis front and center to the nation.

Here's the good: Senior service commanders have put in place regulations that better protect victims and attempt to reduce sexual assault crimes in the military. These include:

• Implementation of victim support programs

• Reform of the UCMJ rape provisions

• Strengthening of sexual assault investigation and prosecution functions

• Enhanced reporting and oversight at the departmental and congressional levels

In addition, the DOD-wide SAPR Strategic Plan focuses on prevention and reporting of sex crimes through training. The act included provisions for "guaranteed confidentiality between victims and victims' advocates, access to legal assistance of survivors, document retention, and expedited transfers from military installations if requested by victims." These parameters, authorized by Congress in 2011, enable DOD to establish increased parity with existing civilian jurisdictions. 

Last year, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta required a higher level of commander (colonel and above) to decide how sex assault cases are handled. And with additional provisions in the 2013 NDAA, Special Victim Units within each military branch for the investigation and prosecution of such offenses were established. On May 15, 2013, President Obama signed an order making a number of changes to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, or UCMJ, "that included downgrading the maximum sentence for rape in the military from a capital crime to life in prison."

Here's the bad: Absent is a focus on the perpetrator, institutional accountability, and prosecution of violent sex crimes. 

DOD has not developed and implemented a policy that creates a tangible, visible deterrent to perpetrators through consistent prosecutions or other severely negative consequences to one's military careers. I am confident the military can do this. Precedents exist. For example, a deterrence model was used by the services to effectively reduce drunk driving and illegal drug use. 

Despite existing data, many in the military have advocated keeping the disposition of sexual assault cases within the chain of command, claiming it erodes command authority. How?

Under the Military Justice Improvement Act, the legislation proposed by Senator Gillibrand, discretion on whether to prosecute sexual assaults and other crimes punishable by more than a year in prison would be given to military prosecutors (law professionals) instead of commanding officers whose background, and more importantly, responsibilities, necessarily give them little time to devote to such serious issues as sexual assaults, which degrade unit morale and cohesion.

The military has to recognize that solely focusing on the command integrity issue and expecting the present structure to result in adequate enforcement and prevention is delusional. 

The most telling examples happened earlier this year when two Air Force generals overturned the court-martial convictions of two officers -- one without comment! What message does that tell enlisted personnel or junior officers when in a situation where a superior is making untoward sexual advances? I'll tell you: It turns the concept of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" on its head.

No American institution is as historically respected, disciplined, honor-bound, and committed to assessments based on individual competences and character as is our military. While many I know and served with at all ranks are committed to live and uphold the core values of loyalty, respect, selfless service, and personal courage, others in leadership positions have failed to do so. Tradition and history will no longer suffice.

I have a daughter. Both my husband and I proudly served in the Army, and we have told our daughter of our experiences. I want my daughter (and all children) to consider serving in the military. But how can I ask her to enter the military knowing that her chances of being sexually assaulted are one in three, compared to one in six in the civilian world? Women in the military are more likely to be assaulted by another servicemember than killed in combat.

Sexual assault is a crime. It undermines cohesion, it degrades readiness, it affects recruiting, and it goes against the basic American values that the military defends. I recognize it will always exist, but our military has to do better.

Donna McAleer is a West Point graduate, army veteran, award-winning author, speaker, and member of the Defense Advisory Council on Women in the Military (DACOWITS).

Apparently it did. That's one of the many interesting conclusions Army Lt. Col. David Fivecoat offers in a terrific essay in the new issue of Parameters.

I don't agree with everything he writes, but nonetheless am really pleased to see Fivecoat's article, because it is exactly the type of work I hoped my book The Generals would provoke. I thought that Gen. Brown's articles in ARMY magazine might launch such a discussion, but that magazine shied away from engaging, without explaining why. Maybe it just isn't interested in the future of the U.S. Army.

Most of all, I am fascinated by Fivecoat's finding (on p. 74) that leading a division in combat seems to have hurt one's chances of promotion. That worries me. What does it mean? That discovery of his indicates that the Army of the Iraq-Afghanistan era is out of step from the historical tradition that, for an officer, time in combat is the royal road to advancement. I can't think of other wars in which service in combat hurt an officer's chance of promotion. It is, as Fivecoat kind of (but not quite) says, worrisome evidence that the Army for close to a decade persisted in using a peacetime promotion system in wartime.

In additional to breaking new ground intellectually, it is also a courageous piece. It is one thing for me, a civilian author, to question the quality of American generalship in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is quite another thing for an active duty lieutenant colonel to do so, especially since the Army's official histories have tiptoed around the issue of the failings of senior leadership in our recent wars. (I mean, did the authors of On Point II even read the articles Military Review was publishing then?) Fivecoat writes, "I agree with Mr. Ricks's assessment that there was plenty of good and bad generalship exhibited in both theaters."

A few final observations:

• I have to wonder if the specific lack of promotion of surge and post-surge commanders reflects the dislike of Petraeus by his peers, or, differently put, Petraeus not working sufficiently to support former subordinates (an accusation Joe Anderson made on the record in my book The Gamble).

• I also think Colonel Fivecoat lets today's Army off too easily on its lack of transparency. To me this reflects a bit of drift in the service, a loss of the sense of being responsible to the nation and the people. Being close-mouthed about its leadership problems gives the impression that the Army's leaders care more about the feelings of generals than the support of the American people.

• Finally, I have to question Fivecoat's assertion that minimizing disruption optimizes performance. It wasn't the case in World War II. Why would it be the case in Afghanistan or Iraq? It may be -- but it remains an unproven assumption, and to my mind, a questionable one. The opportunity cost of averting disruption can be large, because such passivity (or "subtlety," as he terms it) results in the apparent rewarding of risk-averse or mediocre commanders. What would Matthew Ridgway say about such a policy of minimizing disruption?

Bottom line: Go read the article.

By "A. Naval Officer"

Best Defense guest columnist

I'd like to offer you my thoughts on this based on my experience in command. Not many folks know this, but as LT, I lost my deployment roommate to suicide about two weeks after we came home from our first deployment. 

Years later, when I was about to take command, there was an unusual spike in the number of suicides in our wing. I remembered what happened when I was a LT, so I asked my wife to help me talk to the entire command about suicide. We had outside people come in and talk about the standard "warning signs" and all, but it personally wasn't enough. After the Q&A, I kept the entire command in place and opened up. I told them the story about my roommate, how he did it, when he did it, why he did it, who he left behind. I explained the emotions I went through, and I told them about emotions I watched my skipper go through. The second-guessing, the rage, the guilt. I told them that I never wanted anyone in the room to have to bear that pain, and I never wanted to be the one to tell a family member that their husband or wife or son or daughter took his or her own life. I explained that I felt 100 percent responsible to everyone in that room, not just because Navy regs told me so, but because it was honestly in my heart. I explained that if I was willing to open up that way to them, then I also had to be willing to follow through and that my office was open, my house was open, any time of day, for someone in need. I had a very strong CMC who felt the same way, and he helped to spread that level of commitment down, through the chief's mess. I didn't want it to become "intrusive." I simply wanted people to be willing to ask for help.

After that, I had sailors come talk to the CMC and me and open up. Not just about suicide, but about anything on their minds. We had others who we encouraged to speak with us when we went for a walk down the flight line or the across the flight deck on the ship. We also knew the "tough" guys well enough to break through their exterior when we could tell they needed help. We just felt like it was an important part of knowing our folks. I also saw it as my responsibility as "The Old Man" and as someone who had been affected by suicide earlier in my career. It was just how the CMC and I operated.

So I didn't really think about it much, until my wife brought up an old story almost five years after I was in command. A sailor came to me with some very personal issues that were obviously affecting his performance at work. They were issues that the CMC and I could not solve for him, but we helped him get help. Not just get help, but helped make sure he got the right help. Ultimately, it resulted in his separation from the Navy. I remember thinking, "He's a good kid" and that really it was in his best interest and the Navy's best interest. When my wife brought the story up again recently, it was in the context of suicide in the military. She said, "You know that you saved that kid's life, don't you?" When she replayed the scenario with me a few times, I realized she was right.

But I've found it is a different leadership challenge when it comes to preventing sexual assault, particularly during my last deployment, which was in the desert. We could try to connect with our sailors when talking about sexual assault, enforce a buddy system, explain how to watch out for each other and how alcohol can increase risk, conduct walkthroughs of spaces, and make sure exterior lights were on throughout the night. Senior executives from the Department visited us in theater and told us what steps we could take to try to prevent sexual assault and we took the advice on board. But in the end, all we could do is try because things were external to what we could influence and we lived in a dynamic, transient environment. A sexual assault could happen to any one of our folks, male or female. The criminal could be someone from outside the military, outside the command. Or far worse, inside the command. I never felt that "try" was good enough, but I also did not want to give the impression that we were already victimized by the fear of a sexual assault. I could only hope the phone didn't ring. It never did.

Even if my phone didn't ring, it didn't mean a sexual assault didn't happen on my watch. Restricted reporting, while it protects the victim, doesn't alert the unit commander. As much effort as we put into looking out for our shipmates, there may very well have been an unreported sexual assault or an assault reported using a restricted report. How would I ever know if we had failed? How would we ever know if we could have done something differently or if our own command climate was a factor? How could we position ourselves to prevent the next assault? How would I even know that a victim wasn't comfortable reporting a crime to me? Or why?

The author is a 23-year Navy captain. A former squadron commander, he has deployed to OIF and OEF aboard ship and boots on the ground. He is married to a mental health professional and is a supporter of military families.

The hits just keep on coming. Yesterday brought news that a sergeant first class at West Point has been charged with videotaping at least a dozen female cadets, some of them while they were in the shower or in other states of undress.

Bonus fact from reporter Thom Shanker, who broke the story: "The Army made no announcement of the charges against Sergeant McClendon, but it provided details after The New York Times learned of the inquiry from people with ties to West Point who said they were alarmed by the allegations and wanted to learn of the academy's plans to investigate and prevent future violations."

Amazing how the chain of command keeps on blaming those at the bottom. Maybe it is time to issue some mirrors to the four stars and three stars?

The commanding general of Ft. Jackson, S.C., was suspended on allegations of misconduct. Apparently it was an alleged zipper malfunction.

I wish someone would get suspended on allegations of incompetence.