[Here are Parts I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, and IX.] 

Ricks: We are almost out of time. Speaking of mutually shared decisions, the U.S. government is probably going to face one this year on Iran. How has everything we've been talking about shaped how we are going to be thinking about Iran down the road?

First David, then Michèle.

Crist: Well I think it's all interrelated -- issues in Afghanistan, issues in Iraq, all affect how we look at Iran and how we are positioned to be able to do something about Iran. I think it's all interrelated. Lessons I think have been institutionalized at least within senior leaders on some of the problems we had in Afghanistan and Iraq, especially second- and third-order effects. What are the consequences of different actions we take? What are consequences of conflict in general? Is regime change a viable option? Isn't it a viable option? If not, then how do we...? I mean, all that is in the background of all the discussions. And I think it's been very healthy in many ways.

Ricks: One of the issues that we've been talking about is the quality of civil-military relations and straightforward, candid, honest advice from generals to civilian leaders -- for which we have apparently just seen General Mattis quietly fired. [Ricks note: I should have said "pushed out early."]

Crist: On the record I won't comment on General Mattis's views.

I will say and I can say this with a certain honesty since I've helped draft many of the memos: He has been very candid on what his views of what needs to be done. I haven't seen anything like the Rumsfeldian approach to stifling alternative views, and so as a consequence while...And some people in the U.S. military -- maybe the political leadership isn't as receptive as they would like on authority issues and some other response...the dialogue is there, and frankly a lot of it gets to these ideas of what I have always thought of as one of the intangibles where you have breakdown in discourse between civilian and military leadership is as you say trust. And a lot of it is personality based. Just personalities of the individual players and how they personally get along, as well as concerns of political leadership.

Ricks: And you have seen a trusting, candid exchange?

Crist: I have from my level, absolutely. And I've sat in many -- not as many as Michèle and some of the others here -- but a number of meetings with senior leaders on both sides of it. And I have seen it be quite candid.

Ricks: My impression is that the Obama administration has been almost afraid of Centcom under Mattis and Harward -- the mad-dog symptom with two incredibly aggressive guys. But I see Michèle shaking her head. Michèle, jump in.

Flournoy: I would say of all the issue areas that I was exposed to in the deputies committees process, there was none where we took a more deliberate, strategic, questioning, and very candid approach than Iran. And it really started back -- this goes a few years back now when it was started up when Gates was still secretary of defense -- and I think the thought that was put into exactly what words the president says to describe our objective in Iran: Is it "prevent"? Is it "contain"? That was debated, the consequences downstream of choosing one versus the other, multiple senior leader seminars, war games looking at different options, going down the road of different scenarios, very close partnership with the military in actually setting the theater so that we are now communicating a degree of deterrence to back up the policy of sanctions and negotiations.

So I actually think on Iran, probably more than on any other issue that I've seen, it's been very strategic, very comprehensive. There's no idea that you can't bring to the table. There's no idea that hasn't been debated. And people may have very strong views and disagree. But this is not one where -- this was one where there was a real constant coming back to what are our interests? What are our objectives? How do we make sure we are applying rigor and not just going down the road towards confrontation with no limits or no boundaries or no sense of what we are trying to achieve?

Crist: I would add one more point in having looked at U.S. strategy for a long time on Iran. One thing that I found interesting that has evolved over the last few years that I haven't seen earlier is looking even beyond the nuclear issue. What is our long-term relationship with this country? Are we long-term adversaries? If so, how is that going to play out across the region? And how do we counteract that? And also, are there areas, I think, which despite the engagement piece, seemed to have died off, there has been a lot of thought given -- are there areas where there is mutual cooperation? And what will that lead to long term? Can we have maybe not rapprochement but some kind of détente with Iran?

Ricks: So can we start to get Putin to be aggressive again and drive Iran into our hands?

Crist: Yeah, it's tough because in my personal opinion we are for a host of reasons adversaries in the region. We have two different strategic views of what we want out of it.

But the issue is bigger than just the nuclear issue. The nuclear issue is a symptom, more than a cause, of our problems.

THE END... -- or is it?

Word on the national security street is that General James Mattis is being given the bum's rush out of his job as commander of Central Command, and is being told to vacate his office several months earlier than planned.

Why the hurry? Pentagon insiders say that he rubbed civilian officials the wrong way -- not because he went all "mad dog," which is his public image, and the view at the White House, but rather because he pushed the civilians so hard on considering the second- and third-order consequences of military action against Iran. Some of those questions apparently were uncomfortable. Like, what do you do with Iran once the nuclear issue is resolved and it remains a foe? What do you do if Iran then develops conventional capabilities that could make it hazardous for U.S. Navy ships to operate in the Persian Gulf? He kept saying, "And then what?"

Inquiry along these lines apparently was not welcomed -- at least in the CENTCOM view. The White House view, apparently, is that Mattis was too hawkish, which is not something I believe, having seen him in the field over the years. I'd call him a tough-minded realist, someone who'd rather have tea with you than shoot you, but is happy to end the conversation either way.

Presidents should feel free to boot generals anytime they want, of course -- that's our system, and one I applaud. But ousting Mattis at this time, and in this way, seems wrong for several reasons:

TIMING: If Mattis leaves in March, as now appears likely, that means there will be a new person running CENTCOM just as the confrontation season with Iran begins to heat up again.

CIVIL-MILITARY SIGNALS: The message the Obama Administration is sending, intentionally or not, is that it doesn't like tough, smart, skeptical generals who speak candidly to their civilian superiors. In fact, that is exactly what it (and every administration) should want. Had we had more back in 2003, we might not have made the colossal mistake of invading Iraq.

SERVICE RELATIONS: The Obamites might not recognize it, but they now have dissed the two Marine generals who are culture heroes in today's Corps: Mattis and Anthony Zinni. The Marines have long memories. I know some who are still mad at the Navy for steaming away from the Marines left on Guadalcanal. Mattis made famous in Iraq the phrase, "No better friend, no worse enemy." The Obama White House should keep that in mind.

I'm still a fan of President Obama. I just drove for two days down the East Coast listening to his first book, and enjoyed it enormously. But I am at the point where I don't trust his national security team. They strike me as politicized, defensive and narrow. These are people who will not recognize it when they screw up, and will treat as enemies anyone who tells them they are doing that. And that is how things like Vietnam get repeated. Harsh words, I know. But I am worried.

I've long found Paul McHale, a former member of Congress and also a former Pentagon official, a clear thinker. Here he questions the Pentagon's "pivot" to Asia:

"Does it make sense for the United States Army to prepare for a protracted land war against China? . . . Should the Army really be focused on North Korea while paying insufficient attention to Iran? And if a post-2014 civil war in Afghanistan spills over the Durand Line and threatens the stability of Pakistan's government, are there any issues in Myanmar that trump the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Taliban?"

By Nathan R. Sherfinski

Best Defense diplomatic bureau

In an hour-long conference call hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations yesterday, Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Salehi discussed a range of issues including: nuclear ambitions, Syria, and anti-American sentiment. His tone was measured and notably non-inflammatory. 

Salehi, who received a PhD from MIT, described Iran as acting with rational manner in its foreign policy. He dismissed concerns that Iran's nuclear program is intended for anything aside from civilian energy purposes. Salehi stated that Iran having a nuclear bomb would neither make the region more stable nor make rational sense. "Iran's possession of a nuclear bomb would only invite attack and threaten other countries; it would not increase security in the region," he stated in response to a question on the issue. He contended that energy diversification was the sole purpose of Iran's nuclear program. Furthermore, he reaffirmed Iran's position as a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Regarding Iranian support for Syria, he reiterated strict opposition to foreign intervention of any kind and aimed to communicate Iran's role in resolving the conflict. "The Syrian people are entitled to democracy and freedom," he said.  He went on to say, "We [Iran] have been in talks with the opposition for at least a year." He contended that a political, not a military, solution is the key to the issue and that Iran puts strong support behind U.N. efforts to resolve the situation.  "We [Iran] are on the same wavelength with Brahimi, al-Arabi, and the quartet of countries," he stated. He did draw a red-line in Iranian support for the Syrian government. He asserted that, should the Syrian government use WMD, then Iran would pull its support for the government and any country that would employ WMD, "...loses legitimacy."

Salehi addressed the issue of anti-American sentiment, saying, "Iran has great respect for the United States." While he noted that Muslims must stand up for acts against the Prophet, he said that, "some went beyond what was expected." He contended his country is opposed to anti-Americanism or an "America-phobia," as he called it. He went on to say, "We [Iran] have no animosity toward the United States."

Nathan R. Sherfinski is a researcher at the Center for a New American Security.

I've long thought there was a good study to be done of Iranian advisory efforts in Iraq. They seemed to me a model of long-term, low-key influence. No big bases, but lots of effects.

Now maybe it seems that study should be expanded to Syria. An Iranian official, speaking about the  Qods Force (AKA the foreign operations wing of the Revolutionary Guard) said over the weekend that, "A number of members of the Qods force are present in Syria but this does not constitute a military presence." 

An Iranian foundation also has reportedly upped the amount of the bounty it has placed on the head of Salman Rushdie. Can you imagine if American foundations did stuff like that?   

Meanwhile, someone blew up a bomb on the July 14 bridge into the Green Zone and killed a bunch of people at the checkpoint. I've walked across that bridge a lot. It was my point of maximum vulnerability, when I was outside the Green Zone yet not back in the able hands of the Washington Post security guys. 

A friend points out that the Iranian government recently established the finely named "Supreme Council for Cyberspace." Even if they are closing the barn door a bit late.

Speaking of barn doors and snazzy wording, Paul Krugman, in discussing the bailout of Spanish banks, uses the neat term "doom loop."

The Navy is doubling the number of its minesweepers in the Persian Gulf. This is a good idea. Anyone who remembers the tanker wars of the 1980s knows that the first escalatory move by the Iranians would be to start tossing mines all over the Gulf. More here.

So I ran into a friend who knows a lot about U.S. policy and Iran. We sat down on a park bench and this is what he told me:

The worst possible thing to do is go to war with Iran. The key is the people -- and they are sick of the mullahs. Right now the pressure is working to separate the people from the regime. A limited strike would undercut all that.

Also, any attack would cause us to maintain a heightened, more expensive defense posture, and give them moral standing to retaliate.

So an attack is counter to all our long-term objectives. We are having more effect right now through economic pressure than ever before.

There is no doubt [that there is a huge divergence between U.S. interests and those of Israel]. We want to stop Israel from attacking so the issue is how to persuade Israel that we are serious about stopping Iran from having a weapon -- like a congressional finding that we will take all steps necessary to stop Iran. It means we will define red lines that can't be crossed.

But the bottom line is, I don't know a single person in government, civilian or in uniform, who thinks it is in our national interest to go to war with Iran now.

If we do go to war, it will not be small. Iran could reconstitute its nuclear program in  maybe five years, but if we go after its abilities to project military power, we'd open a 15-year window."

D'oh! Homer joins Barbie on the list of prohibited imports. He probably doesn't care because they don't sell Duff beer there.

Meanwhile, President Obama told NBC in an interview that, "I think we have a very good estimate of when they could potentially achieve breakout capacity, what stage they're at in terms of processing uranium. But do we know all the dynamics inside Iran? Absolutely not. And I think one of the difficulties is that Iran itself is a lot more divided now than it was. Knowing who is making decisions at any given time inside of Iran is tough. But we do have a pretty good bead on what's happening with their nuclear program."

Planning on attacking Iran? "Better pack a lunch," advises my friend, retired Lt. Col. Terry Daly, who knows a lot about war. His point was that airstrikes alone against Iranian nuclear facilities wouldn't do much. If you are going to attack Iran, you need to hit its ability to retaliate, and that means that pretty soon you have a big fat war on your hands.

I can't believe we are discussing this. I am hearing lots of depressing talk that there is a good chance that Israel will attack Iran sometime this year and that we will get sucked into the ensuing mess. In some ways, there already is a kind of shadow war under way with Iran -- Stuxnet, the drone intrusions, the recent explosions and assassinations, the sanctions.

But for all that, I just can't see Obama getting us involved in another Middle Eastern war. The American people certainly have no appetite for it. I think he almost certainly would lose reelection if a war broke out, because his base would fall apart and the left would go into opposition.

At any rate, an article by my CNAS colleague Colin Kahl that went up last night on the website of Foreign Affairs argues well that the "containment vs. attack" mindset is a false dilemma. In fact, he says, even if you attacked Iran, you'd still have to contain it afterward. So a series of airstrikes is not a substitute for containment, but a prelude to it.

"How does this end?" ask Elbridge Colby and Austin Long. Their answer: Not well. They advocate instead a policy of containment. I think they are right.

Also, someone killed another Iranian nuclear scientist. What do the little grasshoppers think of this assassination program?  I'd be interested in reading a history of targeted killings of weapons scientists and dealers. As I recall, the French killed arms dealers who were supplying the Algerian rebels during that war.

Wired' s "Danger Room" has a fun contest to guess Iran's next plot against America, such as "Build a giant horse, fill it with Quds operatives and leave it on the Tijuana side of the border." My favorite: "Finance Sarah Palin's campaign for President in the 2012 elections."

Not a good sign if the Kurdish militia is stepping to in the province as the Americans are heading for the exits.

By Joseph Sarkisian
Best Defense bureau of Iranian affairs

The Marine Corps University's recently published monograph titled, The Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran, brings to light an unconventional viewpoint on Iranian grand strategy. Its author, Michael Eisenstadt, dispels the myths surrounding Iranian policy while providing an in-depth analysis of the creative calculus the regime uses when making its decisions at home and abroad. It is this calculus that the United States must solve in order to achieve more effective engagement.

Eisenstadt makes the case that the Iranian regime operates in a very pragmatic, calculated manner as opposed to the image of an "irrational, 'undeterrable' state with a high pain threshold," that its leadership likes to portray. Being able to see past the rhetoric of holocaust denial, destruction of Israel, and fears of a nuclear apocalypse, which Iran intentionally uses to paint itself as a fearsome enemy, will be key to making tangible diplomatic progress.

In his view, the image of Iran as an irrational actor is overblown -- but the idea that Iran seeks to become a regional power capable of exerting influence over the entire region and becoming the guardian of Islam is real. Iranian defense planning is formed around this goal, as well as to deter potential adversaries and to achieve self-reliance from the outside world.

The argument that, "The Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) is an unconventional adversary that requires unconventional approaches in planning, strategy and policy" is underscored by the fact that the conventional method of sanctioning to change behavior has done nothing to stop uranium enrichment.

The unconventional approach suggested by Eisenstadt suggests a rewriting of the policy manual on Iran. The United States must spend less time countering Iranian hard power and more time countering its even stronger soft power, pay more attention to the effectiveness of Iranian psychological warfare, and brainstorm better ways to pierce the veil of Iranian ambiguity. Once more of these unconventional tactics are implemented, the end of the 32-year diplomatic stalemate may finally come within reach.