While Tom Ricks is away from his blog, he has selected a few of his favorite posts to re-run. We will be posting a few every day until he returns. This originally ran on July 29,2011.

By Eric Hammel
Best Defense guest columnist

Over the past year, I've worked the vast security implications of global climate change into a few comments on The Best Defense, but they haven't taken hold. I cannot fathom the prevailing so-what attitude as the FEMA-grade weather disasters mount toward becoming serial and routine occurrences. It's here now, for all to see.

Tens -- perhaps hundreds -- of millions of heat, drought, flood, and famine refugees are probably going to be shaken loose within a decade. (Some estimates say half of humanity -- 3,000,000,000 people -- will have to move or die just from heat-related causes.) Thanks to topsoil erosion via drought and helped along by deadly, unstoppable tornado clusters and unlivable ambient temperatures, the bulk of farming in North America will shift northward and most likely will become restricted to a narrower band in the upper Midwest and on into higher Canadian latitudes-assuming there is sufficient rainfall there. Sea-level rise from melting glaciers on land will soon be poised to shake loose uncountable refugees from drowned coastal regions, where most of the world's people live. If the warm North Atlantic conveyor current is halted or recedes southward due to desalinization via the Greenland freshwater ice melt, the Canadian Maritimes, New England, and northwestern Europe will probably experience unbelievable winters and might (this is counterintuitive) freeze over.

Global famine is going to force the use of our military as a police force organized to feed unknowable masses of people (until cold reality sets in as reserve food stocks evaporate). I believe that North America's first up-close brush with famine-motivated mass migration will take place in northern Mexico and on into the U.S. border states. (Refugees fleeing in the wake of the collapse of Mexico's central government could precede drought- and heat-related dislocations. Are we prepared to handle such a dress rehearsal?)

The only force on Earth with the inherent capability to police, process, house, feed, and move refugees on a mass scale is the U.S. military, but, though its reach is global, its capacity and stamina are nonetheless limited, probably to one or two major disasters at a time, not the overlapping rolling meta-disaster climatologists predict. (Remember, the only components of the Katrina effort that worked at all were the military responses, beginning with Coast Guard helicopters.)

The implications for military use alone in the looming weather-related crises are mind-boggling, but no one appears to want to face up to them with an action plan, a doctrine, a list of precepts. I find it worrying to the nth degree that there is absolutely no public discussion. Have the relevant agencies studied it all already-and thrown up their hands? I already know from a series of phone calls to relevant local and state agencies that there is no actual integrated plan in place to respond to high-impact earthquakes in major California population centers. The "plan" is to play it as it lays. And I sincerely doubt that a repeat of Katrina would be met with an effective plan based on lessons learned.

Can we bring this out of the shadows, and least in this venue?

Eric Hammel has written more books about the U.S. military in Vietnam, Korea and World War II than most people have read.

While Tom Ricks is away from his blog, he has selected a few of his favorite posts to re-run. We will be posting a few every day until he returns. This originally ran on June 14, 2011.

I asked the author of Doonesbury to respond to your comments on his Sunday strip. Here it is:

By Garry Trudeau
Best Defense guest columnist

As I'm old enough to recall the stereotypes that formed around Vietnam veterans, I'm well aware of this danger. The purpose of my stories has been to participate in the national conversation about the costs of war. JPWREL and VICTOR are correct that the majority of warriors return home without invisible wounds, but it is by no means an "overwhelming" majority. There are an estimated 600,000 veterans (out of 2.2 million who've served in OEF and OIF) who are suffering from either stress disorders, MST, or the effects of TBI. The proportion is considerably higher than in previous wars because of multiple deployments and the aggregate number of consecutive days that participants are in a high-conflict environment, thus in a rolling state of stress and hyper-vigilance.

This is a substantial cohort whose continuing care represents a major challenge to our country. I have tried to represent the sacrifices of the wounded -- both physically and mentally -- across a broad continuum of affliction and recovery: B.D., the amputee, who learns to manage his PTSD well enough to reach out to Melissa, the helicopter mechanic, who recovers from her MST enough to actually re-enlist; Leo, whose TBI leaves him with Broca's Aphasia, but whose resilience propels him into community college, a job at a studio, and a healthy romantic relationship; Ray, who recovered from physical injuries in the Gulf War, led a normal life at home, only to endure multiple deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, leading to the collapse that recently sent him home. All different journeys, all different outcomes.

War changes everyone, and most veterans can manage that change without become impaired or dysfunctional. Their stories are important, too, but by focusing on their less fortunate brothers and sisters, I mean to keep front and center the sacrifices they have all made in our names.

The New York Times came across some Haditha documents dumped in Iraq. I read the article but I didn't see anything new. My Washington Post colleague Josh White covered all that stuff pretty thoroughly several years ago.

More thoughtful are the comments below from Col. Teddy Spain. I knew him back in Baghdad in 2003, when he commanded the MPs in the capital, and I wrote about his experience in my book Fiasco. He's a good soul. Recently he and I have been talking about the end of the war in Iraq. Here are his thoughts these days.  

By Col. Teddy Spain, U.S. Army (Ret.)

Best Defense guest columnist

Americans will be debating for many years to come the wisdom of the political decision that took us to war with Iraq in March, 2003. I served as the Commander of the U. S. Army's 18^th Military Police Brigade during the ground war and first year of the occupation of Iraq. I am deeply concerned about what happens after America departs. I don't think we have achieved what we set out to achieve.  I'm concerned Iraq cannot secure itself and we will see an increase in Iranian influence. The soldiers of my brigade understood the importance of a credible Iraqi police force and worked heroically to stand up a functioning Iraqi policing system.  Not enough emphasis was placed on the development of the Iraqi police and rule of law during the first year of the war. From my past experiences, I don't feel the Iraqi police will be ready by the end of this month to assume the burden of protecting Iraqis from the variety of influences who will be trying to undermine Iraq's recovery and pursuit of democracy. The Iraqi police will be the target of their wrath in an effort to send a clear message to frightened Iraqis that even the police cannot protect them. I find it hard to believe we will not have to return at some point in the future, and perhaps lose even more soldiers, than if we were to keep a larger presence there now.

Being a commander in combat is a heavy burden.  Parents, brothers, sisters, and countless others entrust you with the care of their loved one.  As a commander you constantly balance mission accomplishment, with the welfare of your soldiers.  You understand soldiers will die, and you do everything in your power to ensure it makes a difference when they do.  When we pull out of Iraq in a couple of weeks, will that undermine everything my soldiers fought and died for?  Not to mention the ones sitting at home without all of their arms and legs?  I've been asked many times since I've retired what my biggest concern about Iraq is.  I always answer without hesitation that I'm concerned that my 13 soldiers died in vain. That concern will grow at the end of this month.  Many politicians talk about the cost of war in dollars.  I had millions of dollars worth of equipment destroyed in Iraq and never lost one minute of sleep over it.  However, every day of my life I think of those 13 soldiers and ask myself if there is anything I could have done differently to have brought them back home alive. I come up empty for an answer every day.  If I ever conclude they died in vain, I hope it's not because yet another politician pulled us out of Iraq before we finished the job we were sent there to do.

By Steve Inskeep

Best Defense guest columnist

A few years ago, two friends took me out for a boat ride in the waters off Karachi.  We worked our way around a coastal peninsula, all of which was controlled by a single real estate developer. That developer was the Pakistani army.

A row of McMansions lined the water. Several upscale apartment towers clustered together, near a club that advertised "six-star" facilities, and a golf course equipped with stadium lights so that players could avoid the heat of the day and play in the evening in the ocean breeze. And most of the land was still awaiting development.

This stretch of prime real estate, roughly the size of midtown Manhattan, was just one of many sections of property throughout the city to be developed by the local Defence Housing Authority. It's so closely linked with the army that the commander of V Corps, which is headquartered in Karachi, is also the president of the housing authority. This would be the rough equivalent of, say, placing the current commander of the U.S. Army troops at Fort Hood, Texas in charge of downtown development in Houston.

That peninsula illustrates the way that Pakistan's army has taken many of the country's prime economic opportunities for itself. Military involvement in economic activity started in understandable ways -- for example, soldiers had a chance to obtain plots of land upon retirement, following a practice with precedents back to ancient Roman times -- but has grown until the military operates factories and construction companies as well as developing real estate in partnership with multinational corporations. When the army, in the face of protests, allowed free elections and surrendered control of the president's office in 2008, it held onto its economic power, just as it maintained its grip on foreign policy.

The military has, in other words, kept many privileges that it would be unlikely to have in a fully democratic state. And when I try to understand the disturbing news from Pakistan in recent months, the army's privileges come to mind.

The army, one of the world's largest with well over half a million troops, maintains its pre-eminence less through violence than through public opinion. It remains the nation's most trusted institution, and also influences a great deal of the media coverage that Pakistanis consume. But this past spring, after the U.S. raid that killed Osama bin Laden, the army's prestige was tarnished. The army faced rare public criticism -- if not for somehow allowing bin Laden to hide near a military academy, then at least for allowing U.S. Navy Seals to fly in and out undetected. Nawaz Sharif, a former prime minister who was the army's darling long ago, repeatedly criticized the army and demanded inquiries.  Some of the pressure even came from within the army itself: Najam Sethi, a distinguished Pakistani journalist, spoke of unrest among junior army officers.

Read on

By Rebecca Frankel

Chief Canine Correspondent

The first time I spoke to former Marine dog handler Mike Dowling I asked him about his working dog, Rex. He chuckled and declined; explaining the brief time we had on the phone that day just wasn't enough to do Rex justice.

Next week the seasoned and still-working German Shepherd will officially be given his due tribute in Sergeant Rex: The Unbreakable Bond Between a Marine and His Working Dog. The forthcoming book, written by Dowling, chronicles the team's tour in Iraq in 2004, most of which they spent in Mahmoudiyah, better known as the Triangle of Death.

Dowling was one of the first of the initial 12 Marine handlers sent with their dogs to Iraq in 2004. Prior to their deployment there hadn't been a U.S. dog team on the front lines in a combat zone since Vietnam. They were, as Dowling tells me, the guinea pigs. Neither Dowling nor Rex had seen combat before. "I didn't know how unprepared I was until I got there."

While Dowling was confident in his and Rex's strong working dynamic he had doubts about how quickly they would adapt to the unforgiving working conditions and the chaotic violence churning around them. "I didn't know how effective we would be in a combat environment, specifically in an environment with 125 degree heat, with strays and shit and trash everywhere. I didn't know what to expect so I didn't know if I was prepared or not."

Prepared or not, the pair was thrust into the thick of it almost immediately. Dowling and Rex's first mission - which makes for one of the most gripping scenes in the book -- was a veritable gauntlet through hell, replete with a pack of wild dogs, razor-edged barbed wire (that would slice through Rex's underbelly), and a Shawshankian ditch of human waste.

Despite the unknowns of IED detection and patrol work in Iraq and the aversion Rex had shown to firefights in training, that night was a success. "Rex knew that it was training when it was training," Dowling told me. "But when we were in combat, he knew we were in combat because he could read it in my eyes and was very obedient. It gave me this incredible sense of calm and confidence in us as a dog team to preform well."

Read on

By David Palkki

Best Defense department of dictatorial archives

I'm grateful to Tom for inviting me to present a few highlights from The Saddam Tapes: The Inner Workings of a Tyrant's Regime, 1978-2001, which Cambridge University Press just published. I had the good fortune to co-edit this study, with Kevin Woods and Mark Stout, at the Institute for Defense Analyses for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy). Our book is based on a review of several thousand audio files (and a smaller number of video files) that U.S.-led forces captured from Saddam Hussein's regime. The recordings cover several decades' worth of Saddam's meetings with his cabinet, Revolutionary Command Council, generals, tribal sheikhs, visiting dignitaries and others. 

The book is intended more as an invitation to scholars to conduct research using digital copies of the original records (and translations) at the Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC) than as an effort to compile definitive conclusions or policy recommendations, yet certain patterns and insights have surfaced as a result of our efforts. In this blog I'll touch on three. 

--First, Saddam was not in America's hip pocket during the 1980s. In fact, he was far more antagonistic toward and skeptical of the United States, even at the height of U.S. support for Iraq during the 1980s, than scholars have acknowledged. The United States was behind the Iranian Revolution, Saddam privately asserted, "to scare the Gulf people so they can have a [military] presence and arrange the situation in the region." After Iran-Contra revelations made clear that the United States had clandestinely armed Iran and provided it with military intelligence on Iraq, Saddam complained to his inner circle that the Americans were still "conspiring bastards."  From Saddam's perspective, the entire episode was intended to harm Iraq (not to help the Contras or free U.S. hostages). He referred to the incident as "Irangate," held at least seven meetings to analyze the significance of the revelations, and described U.S. behavior as a "stab in the back."  In May 1988, Saddam instructed his advisors, "We have to be aware of America more than the Iranians" because "they are now the police for Iran, they will turn anything they find over to Iran." In September 1988, just after the war had ended, Saddam expressed conviction to his advisers that the United States was behind a recent attempt on his life.

Read on

The U.S. Embassy just tightened restrictions on movements of American personnel inside the Green Zone.

Meanwhile, when someone is right, I listen. Adam Silverman called Iraq right this year. Here are his thoughts now.

By Adam L. Silverman, PhD[1]

Best Defense guest columnist

A little over a month ago Tom wrote a column dealing with the US's rapidly approaching deadline to leave Iraq.  At the time I sent him some remarks, which he asked me to pull together for a guest column.  I agreed on the condition that I would have the time to tone down the tenor, if not the content, as this topic hits close to home for me - as I'm sure it does for many Best Defense readers, as well as many other Americans (and our coalition partners as well). 

As we are within final month in Iraq, we are once again beginning to see reports of new violence.  As I have written here at Best Defense, as well as other sites, I think this is likely to become the Iraqi reality once we draw down to just the military personnel assigned to the Embassy.  Part of the reason for my take is that the Iraqis have been communicating to us - in words and in deeds -- for several years that this is what is going to happen.  Even as the Sawha/Awakenings was first gathering press, it was clear in what little reporting there originally was on the movement, its leaders, and its goals that their long term intention was to strike at the Shi'a, specifically the exile Shi'a that we had empowered, once they were able to do so (as in once we were gone).  I interviewed dozens of tribal and religious leaders, (local) elites, notables, non-elites, and internally displaced Iraqis.  The vast majority of them, both Sunni and Shi'a, had grave concerns over the government we helped to empower, as well as the members of that government and their ties to Iran and how this all related to the average Iraqi.

The Shi'a exile dominated government of Iraq, especially Prime Minister Maliki, has made no pretense of indicating it wanted to roll up the Awakenings' members.  From a very heavy handed Sons of Iraq (SOI) transition that failed to foster and promote societal reconciliation and civil society reformation to cracking down on both the Awakenings and the SOI, Maliki has demonstrated that his goal is consolidation of power.  One of the three Iraqis elected to parliament on the Iraqiyya list earlier in the year, then suddenly faced with an arrest warrant by Maliki's government in order to change the electoral outcome was an Awakenings and SOI leader (full disclosure -- he was also the subject of one of my social history/tribal study interviews, which you can read at the link).  Add to this the fact that the Kurds still have plans of their own for Kirkuk, let alone an independent Kurdistan, and post U.S. presence Iraq looks to be unsettled and unpleasant for a long time to come. 

When it comes down to it, and what I think has so many so upset, anxious, and out of sorts regarding the looming US departure from Iraq, is that it did not necessarily have to be this way.  To paraphrase the Best Defense reader and commenter who asked about accountability in regards to Don't Ask, Don't Tell -- at what point do journalists, let alone the American people, hold those who made wildly inaccurate assessments, predictions, estimations, and gave absolutely horrid, hugely uninformed, gigantically incorrect policy advice responsible for the strategic failure that is Iraq?

Read on

By "Petronius Arbiter"

Best Defense department of Army affairs

Training

• Increase course length in both officer and enlisted IMT. This is the critical time in officer and Soldier development. Purpose of doing so largely is Soldier and leader confidence; probably the most important ingredients of soldiering and competent units.
• Train the officer corps to know what their enlisted Soldiers and NCOs are trained to do. In doing this it will require officer involvement in NCO training. It will require officer involvement in NCO training development. We as an Army are a total anomaly in the military community in not having officers involved in training our NCOs. Other ground forces shake their heads in disbelief at this issue. It is difficult for an officer to hold an NCO to a standard if he does not know what the NCO is trained to or expected to be able to do.
• Restore "Crawl, Walk, Run" in the minds of all trainers in the Army. It is simple, easily understood and long standing great guidance on how to train. All training should be "multi-echelon" in order to better utilize all training time available. This phrase has taken a back seat for some reason. Restore to the training vernacular.
• Soldiers learn by seeing and doing, over and over again. "Performance Oriented" training is another time tested way to do training correctly.
• Limit (I say limit, not stop) actual firing of large caliber weapons systems. Simulations for all weapons systems are key. Rapidly expedite fielding of simulations for mortars, artillery, heavy machine guns, etc. There is great fiscal responsibility in doing this and doing so will also produce better trained fire support organizations. A mortar platoon simulations would probably pay for itself in first month of use; likewise the same applies with other large caliber weapons systems.
• Pathfinder and Air Assault produce similar skills. If so, consolidate the two into one course, determining what the skills, knowledge and experience are needed for the Soldier. You pick the badge. Or simply eliminate one or the other, your choice.
• Reinstitute calling CGSC, the "Staff College" or "Command and General Staff College." ILE sounds like a disease and definitely in not a descriptive term for that level of schooling.
• Bring back the bayonet. My guess is there were some in Afghanistan who had wished they had it. Bayonet training instills aggression in Soldiers. There are times, especially in STABOPS, where a weapon with fixed bayonets has a tremendous impact on people getting the right message. But, if you don't even carry a bayonet, it is real hard to instill that "cold steel" feeling in someone when you give the command "Fix Bayonets."
• Examine closely the relationship between constant roadmarching and disability. Does roadmarching make you better, more prepared or does it debilitate your body? Can you better prepare for roadmarch requirements by other, less abusive forms of fitness? I think so.
• Restore Soldier traditions; walking on left of superior, reporting criteria, stand at attention when talking to an officer, parade rest when talking to senior NCO, etc.
• Establish a Skill at Arms course that will make our junior Officers and NCOs experts in weapons systems, ranges and training. Take a lesson from the Brits on this one.
• Make Digital Training Management System (DTMS) work for the commander, not the commander work for DTMS. Fix it and they will use it. Don't fix it and they won't.
• Restore retreat formations to instill Soldier understanding of tradition. 

By Stacy Bare
Best Defense high altitude columnist

I have one of the greatest jobs in the world. As the Sierra Club's military family and veterans' representative, my job is to ensure that military families and veterans are getting outside to explore and enjoy the land they helped to defend through their service in the Armed Forces.

Since 2006, the Club has provided over $50 million dollars to ensure that military service members, their families, and veterans have had an opportunity to get outside. Through programs and partnerships with organizations like the National Military Family Association's Operation Purple Camps ©, Outward Bound, YMCA-USA, and the Armed Forces YMCA, close to 50,000 participants have had multi-day experiences outside. This level of support helped to create a significant upswell nationwide in the number of other programs and organizations focused on providing an outdoor or wilderness experience to the military and veteran communities.

While it is true that outdoor recreation has been shown to greatly reduce stress and allows for renewed opportunities of camaraderie, a sense of mission, and physicality that may mirror many of the positive aspects of military service and can help tackle many of the issues associated with reintegration, post-traumatic stress, and depression. There's a great community of outdoor men and women eagerly awaiting the opportunity to share their loves and passions with our fighting men and women. Often times, we as veterans and service members simply need to just show up.

It is also true that America's Great Outdoors need the leadership, experience, and skill sets service members, veterans, and their families possess to make sure our public lands remain open and pristine to provide recreation and respite for all of America and to help pave the way for a healthier, more physically fit nation. There are many opportunities for leadership and employment, as well as recreation outside. Who better to fill those roles than the men and women who defended the land?

Read on

By "Petronius Arbiter"
Best Defense department of Army affairs

Support

• IMCOM should be completely civilianized as it is totally non-deployable. 6 General officers in IMCOM is somewhat disturbing. IMCOM GO in Korea is particularly disturbing with 22 installations and 17k Army personnel in all of 8th Army.
• Establish one Army Warfighting Lab under direction of TRADOC. Resource with a BG and appropriate fiscal and personnel resources to have an impact. Eliminate TRADOC battle labs, use resources saved to improve Soldier equipping and training. Yep, copy from USMC. It works for them only because it is a point of emphasis by Commandant, USMC. Yes, this is small growth in GO corps, but would well serve the Army and the ability to focus on the CSA needs and priorities.
• U.S. Army MEDCOM is a huge and geographically dispersed command. Maintain The Surgeon General as a LTG. But, there are 19 Medical Department (MC,MS, MSC, AN, VC) GOs on the rolls. If my memory is correct there were 6 at the height of the Cold War. Not to pick on the Veterinary Corps, but are there enough Vets in the Army to warrant a GO? Or is it all about hope?
• Reduce SJA GO-level positions. Return TJAG of Army to MG. There are 7 JAG GOs serving now. At the height of the Cold War there were 2 on active duty. There are no JAG commands, so why so many GOs? The TJAG makes policy and personnel management decisions, so why so many senior officers? Is this one of those decisions just to give "hope" to those to keep them in the service?
• Reduce Chaplain GOs back to normal of 2. There are 3 GO Chaplains now. Why does USAREUR have a GO Chaplain with only 4 brigades? There probably are not 40 Chaplains in all USAREUR. This is only a small issue in the grander scale but an indication of the real problem, too much hierarchy. Every GO has a staff and a staff is adding to a smaller "tooth to tail" ratio.
• Personnel living on post maintain their own quarters area. Specifically, post support contracts should not resource grass cutting. Save some money here. GOs provided for accordingly and they should be.
• Ensure that quarters areas are again divided by rank; enlisted, NCO, SGM/CSM, junior officer, field grade officer, senior officer and GO. Do not mix senior NCO and field grade officers. They are not the same. An NCO is an NCO and a field grade is a field grade. The Army is not an egalitarian society and can't function as one. Familiarity does breed contempt. This issue varies from post to post.

Our "tired old soldier" now turns to his recommendations for how to improve the operational Army. I've been enjoying the comments he has provoked, especially in his Friday post.

By "Petronius Arbiter"
Best Defense department of Army affairs

Operational

• Re-examine the BCT. Is it effective? What does the exhaustive, intensive rigor and analysis performed by the analysis agencies really say? Are 2 battalions effective or should we add the third at the expense of fewer BCTs? Does the cavalry squadron have a function it can perform? What is best for the Army? But, more significantly what does the analysis say, not what do the Generals say or think without analysis? Modular BCTs can facilitate the ability to deploy but can they conduct the warfight in FSO?
• Re-encumber the divisions and the corps. It followed good military logic in a time when we had to separate divisions, BCTs and Corps in order to meet the requirements to deploy multiple headquarters to meet many real military needs. But, hopefully, those requirements are in the past. Time to get divisional supervision again on brigades and be able to bring to bear concentrations of fires, sustainment and support.
• Return to branch specific maneuver battalions. The Combined Arms Battalion is difficult (some would say impossible), at best, to train and to support. Few, if any, commanders or senior NCOs are versed or prepared to be responsible to train and understand the multitude of weapons platforms or systems that exist in those organizations. The problem starts here at the battalion level, not below. Here the old phrase, "you never know what you don't know," comes to mind.
• What does V Corps do in Europe? Is it a Corps Hq or not? Somehow V Corps and USAREUR just seem to be over supervision for 4 maneuver brigades that remain in Europe. Besides the center of gravity of activity has moved from the Western/Eastern plains of Europe to the Mediterranean a long time ago, and our military, not just the Army, just has not seemed to adapt.
• Restore unit designations that make sense and are understandable. We know what an artillery unit is and does. We don't understand what a Fires unit is and does. That goes double for Maneuver Enhancement, Maneuver Support, Maneuver Sustainment, Battlefield Surveillance Brigade, Sustainment, et al. There is no commonality in like-type organizations that make it simple to know what one is or does.
• Armor officers should not command Infantry forces just the same as Infantry officers should not command cavalry forces. Return Stryker Infantry battalions and brigades to Infantry commanders. Stryker battalions and brigades are our Army's largest and most complex formation of Infantry and as such should be commanded by experienced Infantry commanders who understand and comprehend the variety of weapons systems in those organizations. The issue is not that armor officers aren't good, they just aren't experienced enough to maneuver the dismounted force on the ground, or the weapons systems in an infantry organization. While we are at it, we should re-educate ourselves that a Stryker organization is an organization that provides mobility and some small firepower to a dismounted organization. That is why they were created. For sure, the Stryker is not a tank, or even a small tank. There will be a tendency of armor officers to treat them as a tank and the outcome will not be good.

I've bashed West Point and the rest of the professional military educational establishment quite a bit in this blog, so I welcomed this chance to let a CNAS colleague say a few nice words about the USMA.

By Peter Bacon
Best Defense guest columnist

Last week the program Parks and Recreation showcased one of the nerdiest extracurricular activities of all: Model United Nations. This activity, known for its geeky high school and college students and its focus on international affairs, offers some surprising insights into the state of civil-military relations and international affairs education in this country. I know -- I spent three years in college competing as a delegate.

At the college level, some of the best teams for Model UN are from our military academies. West Point's team is consistently rated as one of the best programs in the country; the other service academies that field teams, the Air Force and Naval Academies, always put up solid teams and delegates. In part, these delegates excel because they are instructed in leadership in the classroom and on the parade field. Nice uniforms, including the renowned cadet gray, also help make a good first impression. But most of all, these delegates excel because they know just that much more about the military-aspect of international affairs than the average college student. Civilian delegates understand the bare minimum of military culture and tactics: civilians will illustrate their basic grasp by making arguments in committee amounting to "bomb this, not that" or "move X troops here." Service academy delegates, meanwhile, will explain complex military and diplomatic operations to committees ranging from 30 to 300. Routinely, this means that civilian students fail to question any military-related policies of West Point or Naval Academy delegates. As a testament to this, most committees will give a military delegate a portfolio related to the military, such as Secretary of Defense or a military commander.

It's not hard to see why this happens: civilian students simply do not learn anything about this facet of our society. Foreign policy classes focus more on flighty theory than actual practice. History classes barely focus on hard military or diplomatic history. When I led delegates as an undergraduate, one of the things that I struggled with was teaching freshmen straight out of high school about general military capabilities simply because they knew so little about the topic.

The service academies, specifically West Point, are trying to correct this educational imbalance: West Point's Model UN team set up its own conference, dedicated primarily to educating civilians about the military. I had the privilege of attending the conference in April: the Cadets made a great effort to create realistic committees and instruct civilian students about the military. From panels and speakers to eating alongside cadets and learning about military culture and doctrine, the conference was, by the accounts of my teammates, both "fantastic" and "eye-opening."

West Point has hopefully set a precedent that will follow: directly engaging civilians, in an era when few ever interact at length with members of our military, may be the only way to get them educated about military affairs.

Here's a response to yesterday's query from a Marine staff sergeant about what today's job market it like. It is written by a Marine officer who recently made the leap to the civilian workplace.

By Sydney Farrar
Best Defense guest advice columnist

1. Learn to market yourself in the language of the business world. Many Marines and veterans struggle with transposing their experiences, i.e. billet accomplishment, into the language of corporate America. The military may not like to call officers and SNCOs "managers" but in the eyes of many in the business world that is exactly what we are. I know we are "leaders," but don't be afraid to use the "m word." As an example, for grunts it often takes some creative thinking to turn a range you planned and coordinated into business verbiage but it's more than likely that you overcame multiple "budgetary, resource, and manpower issues" just to pull off a single live-fire exercise. It matters. When you are writing your resume it might be worth the time to tailor a resume for each job you want to apply for. Don't just use a generic resume. Take the extra time to carefully read each job description, responsibilities, etc. and then tailor your resume for that job based on your experiences, deployments, and billets.

2. Do research and find out what companies are actively recruiting veterans. Most companies have recruiters and H.R. specialists devoted entirely to veterans. Reach out to them and find out about recruiting events. For officers MOAA has events that might be worth looking into. For junior officers membership is free. If you are thinking about a federal job remember you must use a federal resume. If you aren't familiar with federal resumes and/or job descriptions reach out to someone. USAJOBS.gov is still a cumbersome website but it is getting better.

3. Having a clearance is huge. It means a company spending less money than someone without one and the fact you can get to work faster is a strong selling point. Get a JPAS letter from your S-2 and be sure to include your security clearance level and dates on your resume. It is a must if you want to transition to the contracting or government consulting world.

4. While you are still in uniform use tuition assistance to take self-paced Microsoft Office certifications. It would look a lot better on a resume if you had a certification with Excel and PowerPoint that just listing you are "proficient." The business world revolves around Excel and PowerPoint and no matter how many rosters and live-fire confirmation briefs you made you probably aren't anywhere near as skilled as you think you are. Completing the certifications while still on active-duty can save you a lot of money. Also, look into courses for SharePoint, Photoshop, etc.

5. Try and get strong letters of recommendations from someone who can truly speak to your ability. Your company commander or battalion commander might not be the best person despite their rank. Also, if you list someone as a reference please make sure they are aware of it. Sounds obvious but you would be surprised. Companies do call your references so make sure anyone you list has your most up-to-date resume, billet, etc. information handy.  

Read on

There's a memorable line here: "I was able to graduate college not despite being a combat veteran, but exactly because I am one."

By Edgar Rodriguez
Best Defense guest columnist

Every year, Veterans' Day stirs up mixed feelings for me. On one hand, I am proud that our country takes a day out to honor those that have served in uniform. On the other hand, I am dismayed that too often praise for veterans feels empty and insincere. It is insincere because most Americans only have a vague idea of the struggles that veterans go through. This lack of understanding is particularly true in regards to combat veterans, a group that I am a part of. I fought in the Second Battle of Fallujah in 2004 as a Navy Corpsman attached to a Marine Corps unit. (Corpsman is Navy terminology for medic.)

In meeting people I often find that they cling to two stereotypes about combat veterans. One is of a broken-down drunk and the other is of the post-military Rambo-like figure that is inches away from losing control because he cannot readjust to American society. Often, they are surprised that I do not fit into these stereotypes making comments like "You don't look like a combat vet." Sometimes, people also ask strange questions ranging from the highly inappropriate "Have you ever killed anyone?" to the downright idiotic "What did you guys do on the weekends over there?" (Military personnel typically work everyday when deployed to combat zones).

But most of all, I have found that people are often genuinely perplexed that I have been able to be successful after leaving the military "despite" being a combat veteran. It is almost as if I am obligated to be doomed because of my combat service. I first encountered this attitude during the final months of my enlistment. After informing my Chief of my decision to leave the military he did everything he could to convince me it would be a mistake. He even went as far as making me see our Command Master Chief and speaking with him about my decision.

In my meeting with the Master Chief, he spoke of sailors that he knew that had gotten out with intentions of becoming successful but had their hopes dashed because they did not know how to function outside of the military, emphasizing that as a combat veteran I would be especially prone to failure. After sharing these sad stories with me he then went about offering me pretty much anything I could have wanted as long as I reenlisted, at the end saying, "Don't throw your career away Rodriguez. You could be a Master Chief!" I thanked the Master Chief for meeting with me, but I told him that I still intended to leave the military, leaving him noticeably disappointed. While I know that the Master Chief only had the best of intentions, I found it unusual and disheartening that he thought I could accomplish amazing things in uniform but at the same time accomplish nothing worthwhile out of uniform.

As disheartening as the meeting with the Master Chief was, I would later be grateful for it. The meeting prepared me for the array of uncomfortable situations I encountered after leaving the military. Once, during a doctor's appointment, the physician was surprised that I was a combat veteran and at the same time had no prescriptions for Zoloft or Prozac, saying, "Are you sure you were there?" Last year, during a research program at the University of Maryland, I attended a group lunch with two professors that I was working with. At one point one of them told me that if I had any issues that I should talk to his assistant. I told him that the program administrators handled all the administrative issues. To which he replied, "No, I mean if you have any veteran issues. Like if you go crazy or something."

In speaking with fellow veterans I have found that these sort of situations are not unique. These misunderstandings occur because the gap between veterans and nonveterans has grown to the extent that most Americans view veterans as an abstract idea instead of fellow citizens. Currently, veterans are 2.6 percent more likely to be unemployed than nonveterans and every day an average of 18 veterans commits suicide. I don't believe that a society that truly understands and does right by its veterans would have these sort of issues.

Society's lack of understanding makes the trauma of combat worse for veterans. As a combat veteran, I understand this intimately. Before Fallujah, I had intended to make the military a career. After Fallujah, I decided to leave. I left because while I was always proud to be a Corpsman, after Fallujah, I found that I had stopped enjoying it. Like many veterans, I signed up for the GI Bill upon entering the military, although I doubted I would ever use it. However, unsatisfied with the options left for me after the military I decided to use it and give college a shot. It didn't look like I had much of a chance of succeeding. There weren't any college graduates in my family and I myself barely graduated high school.

I started off at my hometown community college and while I did well, I found it academically unchallenging. I wanted something better so I transferred to another community college eventually transferring to the University of Florida. At the University of Florida I accomplished my goal of getting a degree, graduating with high honors with majors in Political Science and Linguistics. And I am proud to say that I was able to graduate college not despite being a combat veteran, but exactly because I am one. Combat is one of the most intense experiences a person can go though and it changes a person forever. But while combat is an intense and negative experience, it does not have to be destructive, it can it be constructive. If anything good can be taken from war, then that must surely be it.

In the past, when speaking to people about the struggles veterans face, I would sometimes say, "People are all about supporting the troops, so long as they don't actually have to care." And while that statement may seem mean and cynical, I thought it held a great deal of truth. I still do.

In my opinion, what veterans need are not acts of empty gratitude, holidays, or memorials. What veterans need more then anything is to know that they still have a stake in their own country after they've served. It is something simple, but it is also something profoundly important.

Edgar Rodriguez is a Iraq War veteran and a University of Florida graduate. He fought in the Second Battle of Fallujah in 2004 while attached to the ground combat element of the 31st Expeditionary Unit. He lives and works in Washington, D.C.