Friday, April 6, 2012 - 10:39 AM

The new issue of Prism has a fascinating article about American command arrangements for the Libya operation earlier this year.
The authors, three souls who toiled in the lower depths of the Joint Staff's J-7, write that, "the decision was made to retain AFRICOM as the supported command, with USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, USTRANSCOM and U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) in support."
Sounds simple, but wait: AFRICOM doesn't have any forces, so EUCOM became "de facto force provider." It is almost as if EUCOM were acting like a service. (Which would make it our sixth service, after the Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, and SOCOM, which already effectively has its own civilian-led secretariat, in the SO/LIC bureaucracy.)
It gets even more complicated. Many aircraft were flying from bases in EUCOM's area of responsibility, so EUCOM "retained OPCON of these forces." What's more, EUCOM had other fish to fry, so reported Adm. Locklear, "We were responding to OPCON pleas of the provider to make his life easier rather than the OPCON needs of the commander." It's like a waterfall running in reverse.
Also, it turned out that AFRICOM lacked the ability to actually run an operation. (Interesting side fact: Half its staff is civilian, and it had never rehearsed to run anything.)
Final bonus fact: The U.S. military has apparently come up with the worst acronym I have heard in a long time: "VOCO." The article's authors quote an Army brigadier as stating that in the Libyan operation, there was "Lots of VOCO between all levels of command." It stands for "verbal orders of the commander." But hold on: Aren't all orders are verbal, unless the guy is pointing or something? What the poor general meant was "oral orders of the commander." That would be "OOCO." I'd prefer "Unwritten orders of the commander," which would be "UOCO," but that is too hard to pronounce. It could make you poco loco in the coco.
And remember at this point we haven't even gotten into the command arrangements with the other 14 nations in the anti-Qaddafi coalition (AQC).
Wikimedia
Monday, April 2, 2012 - 10:25 AM

Describing the evil effects of revolution, Thucydides writes, "Words had to change their ordinary meaning and to take that which was now given them." (P. 199 of the Landmark edition)
That's an insight that strikes me as true, and that I don't remember seeing before. Though Orwell's wonderful essay on the language of politics makes a similar point. (If you haven't read that, you should. You have my permission to take off the rest of the day to study it.)
Wikimedia
Wednesday, February 29, 2012 - 10:22 AM
Come hear Marc Lynch talk about his new book on the Arab Uprising, then stay and have a glass of wine with your habibis whilst you get your copy signed. But you have to register first.
Tuesday, February 28, 2012 - 10:48 AM

By Greg McGowan
Best Defense department of think tank affairs
The United States Institute of Peace recently held a briefing on the challenges of reconstruction in the post-authoritarian nations of the Arab world. Here's the scorecard:
Tunisia: While hardly a free society under longtime dictator Ben Ali, Tunisia did have some degree of institutions and civil society in place. Tunisians must now build on this preexisting framework to reconstruct their government apparatus on a level playing field. Already, they have made some promising strides in this direction. Legitimate general elections last October saw the Islamist al-Nahda party (banned under Ben Ali) earn control of the Constituent Assembly that will draft the country's new constitution. Democratic processes began to crystallize soon thereafter, when secularist and leftist parties joined with the Islamists in a coalition government. It appears that with respect to governance, Tunisia is on the right track.
Many concerns will have to be addressed, however. Stimson Center President and CEO Ellen Laipson noted that for the first time in decades, secularists are no longer protected by the exclusivist policies of dictatorship; they must learn how to operate in a more open, representative political environment. This means engaging and finding common ground with Islamist parties whose views will undoubtedly conflict with their own. Tunisian women are particularly worried, fearing that the social equality they enjoyed under Ben Ali will be jeopardized by the new Islamist-dominated coalition.
Egypt: This is a harder case. The SCAF, Egypt's "transitional" military government, has proven oppressive, unreliable and staunchly unwilling to relinquish power. The military government's ongoing detainment of U.S. and other foreign pro-democracy activists is troubling, and underscores anxieties from Cairo to Washington over the trajectory of Egypt's revolution. Ambassador William B. Taylor, Special Coordinator for Middle East Transitions at the State Department, had some stern remarks on the subject: "The Egyptians have a big responsibility now to fix the current problem. Everything we do on assistance to Egypt depends on solving this NGO problem."
Egypt is a test of deconstruction. Hosni Mubarak dismantled Egyptian civil society, with his administration swallowing up most of the country's institutions. He used the Emergency Law to suspend the constitutional rights of all Egyptians, scaring his population into silence and using his security forces to arrest, detain, torture and murder Egyptians with impunity. Now the SCAF is preserving the old order. Before any genuine progress can be made, this paradigm must be deconstructed and a new understanding must be built between Egyptian state and society.
Majid Saeedi/Getty Images
Friday, February 17, 2012 - 10:03 AM

By Zygmunt F. Dembek and Dean Cheng
Best Defense department of revolutionary affairs
This list is an attempt to compile the readings that provide insight into the philosophies and tactics of our enemies, past, present, and perhaps future. It is surprising that few of these books are required reading for those who aspire to be our nation's military and political leaders.
In no uncertain order:
My War with the CIA by Norodom Sihanouk and Wilfred Burchett:
Cambodian crown Prince Sihanouk describes his years of struggle in fighting U.S. government covert and not-so-covert operations, with assistance from neighboring countries, including China.
Ho Chi Minh: A Life by William Duiker:
The definitive biography of the son of a civil servant, and founder of the Vietnamese Communist party, who became president of North Vietnam. His 30 years in exile, and 50 year struggle to liberate Vietnam, are described. [Not sure I'd include biographies (as opposed to autobiographies), for this list. Which isn't to say that this isn't worth reading!]
Guerilla Warfare by Ernesto "Che" Guevara:
This 1960 treatise provides tremendous insight into a Latin American revolutionary's methods for overthrowing dictatorships (and democracies) by a small determined groups of guerilla fighters.
How We Won the War by General Vo Nguyen Giap:
North Vietnam's top military strategist describes how victory from occupying forces was won, from the founding of the Army in 1944 to the departure of the U.S. in 1975.
On Guerilla Warfare by Mao Tse Tung:
Mao's textbook on guerilla warfare is the result of his fighting the Japanese in China, and is a timeless reference to the organization and conduct of a successful guerilla campaign.
The Triple Agent: The Al Qaeda Mole Who Infiltrated the CIA by Joby Warrick:
A well-researched description of how the Jordanian double-agent Humam Khalil al-Balawi, while promising to help the CIA assassinate Osama bin Laden's top deputy, became a suicide bomber, killing seven CIA operatives, the agency's worst loss of life in decades.
Balik Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf by Zachary Abuza:
A technical treatise that provides great insight into the origins, organization, and operations of a primary terrorist group opposing the Philippine government. This writing can be obtained as a free download from the Army's Strategic Studies Institute.
Street Without Joy by Bernard Fall:
The 1961 classic about the hubris and blunders of French forces in Vietnam, leading to the fall of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. An epic book in many dimensions, the most important of which may be its omission from the readings of American military leaders during the 1960's and 1970's, facilitating a repeat of history.
Surrender to Kindness: One Man's Epic Journey for Love and Peace by Joseph David Osman:
Wisdom acquired by first-hand experience and shared by an Afghan-American on how to actually win "hearts and minds" in Afghanistan. Personally recommended by those who know Osman and of his work.
Commander of the Faithful: The Life and Time of Emir Abd el-Kader by John W. Kiser:
A thoroughly researched book on the life and tactics of a Muslim military leader who fought the French occupying forces in Algeria during the 19th century, and won their respect.
The Science of Military Strategy, edited by Peng Guangqian and Ya Youzhi of the Chinese Academy of Military Science:
Translation (in 2005) of a Chinese military textbook published in 2001. It provides a distinctly Chinese view of concepts such as deterrence and military strategy.
The Quranic Concept of War by S.K. Malik:
One Muslim perspective on war in the context of Quranic teachings.
Col. Zygmunt F. Dembek, Ph.D. (US Army Reserve, Ret.) is a senior scientist at the Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine (CDHAM) at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS). Dean Cheng is the research fellow for Chinese Political and Security Affairs at the Heritage Foundation. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government, nor of the Heritage Foundation, nor even, perhaps, those of Dennis "Oil Can" Boyd. Any reproduction of this broadcast without the express written consent of the Major League Best Defense is forbidden.
Wikimedia
Wednesday, February 8, 2012 - 10:14 AM

The Egyptian military appears to be on a collision course with the U.S. government. Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Dempsey is heading to Cairo to talk to the generals.
What makes it especially interesting is that Egypt appears to be calculating that President Obama and Congress won't cut off the $1.5 billion (that's a B) in aid that the U.S. provides annually. Given the mood of Congress, and Obama's visceral disdain for Third World tinpot generals, I think that is a bad bet.
It is interesting that two of our largest aid recipients (Egypt and Pakistan) appear increasingly to be acting as adversaries.
John Moore/Getty Images
Thursday, April 7, 2011 - 11:25 AM

With so much going on, Bahrain has been off the radar screen for many Americans, including this blog, unfortunately. To make amends for that neglect, here is a good report, and below is a column from a citizen of Bahrain.
By "a
Bahraini"
Best
Defense guest columnist
While the worst of the surge of brutality that lasted from March 15-23 has ended, the nightmare of living under the "State of National Safety" has only just begun, for every Bahraini who called for accountability, a representative parliament and an end to corruption.
As of March 31, 26 Bahrainis have been killed, one of whom was 15 years of age; 304 have been arrested, including 11 women; and 24 activists remain missing. These numbers conceal the real tragedy of a population paralyzed by fear, at the mercy of masked gunmen and riot police that man the many checkpoints and have a license to kill; and humiliated on a daily basis by state-owned television channels intent on "purging" and "cleansing" the island of its "traitors, trained by foreign elements." Many of the Bahrainis who are being targeted were active in the Pearl Square events and activities -- poets, artists, protest organizers and bloggers. Every night, houses and cars parked in the besieged villages are ransacked, and individuals detained overnight and/or arrested. Medical personnel who tried to help the injured during the crackdown have themselves been arrested, beaten and intimidated. Any Bahraini brave enough to venture through the checkpoints at the gate of the main Salmaniya Hospital with "protest-related" injuries -- from live ammunition, rubber bullets, tear gas inhalation -- is taken away to the Defense Force hospital. Such is the fear that even patients with regular ailments now avoid the hospital: whereas the average daily patient intake was around 1,000 before the crackdown, under the new military management, the daily intake has dropped to around 250 patients. Bahraini workers who went on strike before the crackdown -- at the aluminum plant, the refinery and schools- have been dismissed, and members of the teachers' union, who organized the school strike, have been arrested.
JOSEPH EID/AFP/Getty Images
Tuesday, March 22, 2011 - 10:19 AM

Here are two quotes of the day, both from Andrew Roberts' Masters and Commanders: How Four Titans Won the War in the West, 1941-1945 (about FDR, Churchill, Marshall and Brooke), which I was reading on my flight across the country on Friday while some of you hijacked the blog.
For those opposing intervention: "This Libyan ' fiasco' is the immediate problem. Winston is very depressed. He had built so many hopes on this offensive."-British war planner Sir John Kennedy, 1941
For those favoring intervention: "I thought of giving up cigars till we were back in Benghazi."-Winston Churchill, October 1942
Wikimedia Commons
Tuesday, March 22, 2011 - 10:13 AM

By J. Dana Stuster
Best Defense Not-So-Felix Arabia bureau chief
"Yemen is not a surprise," former National Security Advisor Gen. Jim Jones, USMC (Ret.) began by saying at a recent panel discussion on "Yemen: The Next Egypt?" "As a matter of fact, what it is is not yet completely defined." On the brink of a potential coup, this remains true, and likely will for weeks or months to come.
Here in Washington, there are two major concerns about Yemen today: the ongoing threat from Yemen-based al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the governance of the embattled Gulf state. Yemen' s president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, has been the United States' ambivalent ally in combating AQAP, but his regime is collapsing under pressure from a popular opposition movement that has gained momentum from Saleh' s efforts to suppress it.
At the seminar, held by the Bipartisan Policy Center on March 1, Thomas Krajeski, senior vice president of the National Defense University and a former U.S. ambassador to Yemen, gave Saleh 50/50 odds of finishing his term, which has two years remaining before he has pledged to step down. Now, three weeks later, it is questionable whether Saleh' s term will extend through the end of this week. Since a violent assault on protesters in the capital on Friday, in which snipers shot at protesters from rooftops, leaving 52 dead as of Monday, Saleh' s government has been decimated by high-level defections. Most notable have been announcements from the leader of the nation' s largest tribal federation and the premier general in the Yemen Armed Forces that they have joined the opposition movement. Saleh has declared a state of emergency and the still-loyal Republican Guard, commanded by Saleh's son, have deployed tanks in the streets of Sanaa.
Washington' s concerns are linked. For the past decade, since the attack against the USS Cole at Aden in 2000, Saleh has been a reluctant ally in the war against al Qaeda. This commitment has been reaffirmed over the past couple years, since al Qaeda' s Gulf affiliates consolidated to form AQAP and began attempting a new spate of attacks, including the failed assassination of the Saudi head of counterterrorism, the "underwear bombing" plot, and most recently, the October 2010 attempt to detonate parcel bombs disguised as printer cartridges.
AHMAD GHARABLI/AFP/Getty Images
Friday, March 18, 2011 - 11:28 AM

That was a pretty fast turnaround for the Obama Administration on Libya. He, and his aides, are to be commended for not getting off balance and staying there. I have been pretty critical of them, so I want to be clear today that I think they have done the right thing.
Now, the sooner this no-fly zone gets up and running, the better. I think it would be good if Arab aircraft and pilots did most of the actually bombing and shooting. We can give them refueling and AWACs aircraft doing command and control. I know, a lot easier said than done. Running a no-fly zone is difficult and complex, especially when the enforcers are a coalition thrown together on the fly.
In particular, combat search and rescue of downed pilots could be tough to organize. I think best bet might be helicopters operating off carriers and/or amphibious ships. But if you are rescuing Arab air crews that might get complicated, so the best option might be having double helicopter teams -- that is, a Navy or Marine helicopter, and one from the nation of the downed flier. Again, much easier said than done.
I also think the rules of engagement could get tricky. Presumably the no-fly rules will include helicopters, which are hard to catch.
Finally, what do we do when Qaddafi puts anti-aircraft batteries in mosques, orphanages and chemical weapons depots?
In related news, it is good to see that Egypt is said to be supplying the rebels with weapons. What they need are AK-47s and anti-tank rockets. And some .50 caliber machine guns might also be handy. Plus, some secure communications equipment, especially we can intercept Qaddafi's electronic signals and then pass along the resulting targeting information to the rebels. The more Libyans fight for their own freedom, the better for them and for us.
Fire Horse Leo/ Flickr
Tuesday, March 15, 2011 - 11:12 AM

When it comes to Libya, I have been struck by the vehemence of views on both sides of the discussion in Washington. When Americans are so confused, it can't hurt to help someone from the region what they think. So I asked my friend Yasser El-Shimy, a former Egyptian diplomat now teaching in the United States, for his opinion. See if you can guess what he advocates:
By Yasser El-Shimy
Best Defense Maghreb bureau
Despite what American generals and defense officials have been telling us, Libya is not Lebanon (1982), Somalia (1992) or even Iraq (2003). The common concern voiced against U.S. participation in imposing a no-fly zone over Libya is the fear of "mission creep." The concern is legitimate, but it does betray a lack of understanding of the situation in Libya. Unlike previous American military interventions, the local population in this case is quite willing to carry out the hard task of ground confrontations. Washington could help oust one of the most repressive autocratic regimes in the world without sending a single soldier to the battlefield. The Libyan rebels in Benghazi, Tobruk, Misrata and other liberated cities are ready and willing to fight Qaddafi's forces, when they are supplied with weapons that can match Qaddafi's. What is more, given the personality cult that is Qaddafi's regime, if an airstrike could target him (and his inner circle), the regime would collapse before the dust has even settled.
Another common objection raised against intervention is the potential terrorist ties some of the rebels might have. Whilst we have no method of ascertaining every rebel's affiliation at this point, we know that a lingering civil conflict in Libya (certain to happen if Qaddafi clings to power) would create ample ground for radicalization and extremist recruitment. Al Qaeda in Maghreb (AQM) would surely exploit the deep resentment and grievances among the revenge-seeking population. Leading an international mission to save civilian lives, and help moderate figures come to power may well help prevent this scenario from taking place. Under no circumstances, however, should U.S. or international troops have a mission on the ground, as this may turn Libyan society on itself, and may become a quagmire akin to Afghanistan's.
The world needs to understand what is at stake in Libya. First, although hundreds, if not thousands, of civilians have perished at the hands of Qaddafi's brigades and mercenaries so far, these numbers would pale in comparison with the expected massacres, should Qaddafi be allowed to prevail. The Tripoli-trenched dictator would exact ruthless retribution against Eastern Libyans for what he views as their treason. Qaddafi has already promised to "cleanse Libya house by house." If the world decided to stand by while the unfair fight rages on now, they must be prepared to witness acts amounting to genocide on the sidelines later. An intervention then would be far more costly than it would be now, and unlikely to succeed.
PATRICK BAZ/AFP/Getty Images
Thursday, March 10, 2011 - 4:45 PM

One thing I learned as a reporter was that effective defense officials chose their words extremely carefully, especially when they emerged from meetings with allies over the use of force. So take a moment to read this comment, made by Defense Secretary Gates after a NATO meeting in Brussels today: "NATO will only act if there is demonstrable need, a sound legal basis, and strong regional support."
In case anyone missed the point, old Gates underscored it a couple of minutes later. "We are very mindful of opinion in the region, and that's one of the reasons that one of the three central criteria with respect to any action requires strong regional support. I think that a number of ministers made clear that we were -- we wanted to put ourselves in a position to assist the Arab League, the African Union or the U.N. in this endeavor, and very sensitive to NATO being responsive to those organizations rather than taking an initiative on its own."
I would say the American position is that it will support NATO action if one of those three entities agrees to take the lead. I suspect that the American position may "stiffen," as Churchill would say, if Qaddafi's forces start slaughtering people. That would be a change in the "demonsrable need" meter. Sound legal basis is easy to handle. So that leaves the regional support for action as the major variable.
This does remind me a lot of Bosnia '94. Makes me miss Holbrooke.
For those who want to do their own parsing of the SecDef, here's the whole transcript.
MANDEL NGAN/AFP/Getty Images
Thursday, March 10, 2011 - 10:55 AM

France's recognition today of the rebels as the legitimate government of Libya opens the door for NATO intervening in the civil war, I think.
That's not a bad thing. As I said the other day, there comes a point when action is necessary. I was worried that we would not move until there was a mass slaughter-and that might come too late.
But that emphatically does not mean that NATO should instantly move to a no-fly zone. Rather, there are a series of steps short of that to consider first. The point of departure should be that there are millions of Libyans willing to fight for their freedom. Let's first try to figure out how to help them. Here are the eight steps to take, in order:
--Supply anti-tank weapons, as soon as possible. Rocket-propelled grenades are not that hard to fire, once you know not to fire them from inside a room. They also can take down helicopters.
--Indeed, the biggest air threat presented by Qaddafi's forces comes not from fighter aircraft but from helicopters, which are harder to deal with in a no-fly zone, because they can take off and land anywhere. But giving the rebels a few RPGs, plus some .50 caliber machine guns, or their East Bloc equivalent, can be a powerful deterrent.
--Provide targetting and troop movement information, especially from signals intercepts.
--Get food into rebel-held areas.
I would hope that those four steps already are being taken. The French intelligence services actually have a very good reputation for being operationally effective, so I would expect that at least some of this stuff is going on. If not, time for President Obama to get on the phone.
In addition, we should ready the next four steps:
--Announce harsh penalties for any foreign mercenaries caught fighting for Qaddafi, but offer amnesty for anyone who stops fighting now and leaves the country.
--Take very public steps for a no-fly zone, like flying half a wing each into the U.S. base in Sigonella, Sicily (which would handle the western end of Libya) and the U.S. base at Souda Bay, Crete (from which the eastern end of the country would be patrolled).
--Prepare to announce a no-fly zone, but only do it if we are sure we can do it and sustain it for several weeks or even months.
--As I've said before, if we decide to actually put in people on the ground, like for a snatch-and-grab of Qaddafi, we then would want to do a no-fly zone simultaneously, just to make it more difficult for Qaddafi to move around and to pour sand into the gears of his command-and-control system.
As it happens, Defense Secretary Robert Gates is in Brussels today so he likely will have some interesting conversations on all this.
Getty Images
Monday, March 7, 2011 - 11:21 AM

One of the nice things in life is to have friends smarter than yourself. Over the weekend I had a long discussion with several of them about Libya, and came away persuaded that we need to do something in Libya, though probably not imposing a no-fly zone.
I think President Obama needs to sit down his defense secretary and the Joint Chiefs of Staff today and look each of them in the eye and then say this:
Don't tell me what I can't do in Libya. Tell me what you can do. Give me a list of options. And give them to me within 24 hours, because push may be coming to shove, and I don't want to see Qaddafi prevail. As Michael Singh warns, 'inaction also has its consequences.' Because why? Because we don't want to the lesson to Arab autocrats to be that all you need to do is shoot up the rebels and the West will turn tail. Also, Qaddafi may be regretting giving up his WMDs right now. We don't want the lesson for other bad actors to be that he should have held on to them.
To help the president nudge the JCS in the ensuing discussion, here are the options he should ask to be put on his desk:
1. Best option: Give the Libyan rebels the aid they need to win. This may be no more than some secure communications gear and a couple of thousand rocket-propelled grenades to deter Qaddafi's tanks and SUVs. (This may be already happening in some form.) Can we start flying discreet charter flights of stuff into some airports in the east? This needs to be ready to go ASAP -- like yesterday.
2. More aggressive, riskier option: It is not in the interests of the United States, or the Libyan people, to see Qaddafi put down the rebels. So if Option 1 doesn't work, what more do we need to do? I think here we want to think about direct action: Using Special Operations troops to corner and then capture or (if he insists) kill Col. Qaddafi. You do need tactical air on tap for this, both to finish off Qaddafi if he holes up and also to cover the extraction helicopters. This needs to be ready to kick off in 72 hours.
3. Third: And yeah, sure, let's look at what a no-fly zone would look like. This is my least favorite option, because it is a half measure -- which by definition is an act that is enough to get us involved but by itself is not enough to promise to determine the outcome. Still, is there any way to do it quickly and with less risk? I've heard things like stating "you fly, you die," and not conducting extensive air strikes, just popping whoever flies. I am doubtful of this. Sen. Kerry's simplistic "cratering" of runways is a non-starter -- it is very easy to quickly fill in holes. Imposition of an American-led no-fly zone effectively would be a promise to the Libyan people, and it should not be an empty promise that allows Qaddafi to get aircraft in the air even occasionally to bomb rebellious cities. But it might be worthwhile to throw up a no-fly zone if only as a cover for Option 2, because it would have the effect of throwing sand in Qaddafi's eyes. So the NFZ also needs to be ready to go in 72 hours.
MARCO LONGARI/AFP/Getty Images
Monday, March 7, 2011 - 11:08 AM

A friend passes along this interesting State Department email, filed over the weekend from Djerba, in southern Tunisia. It is fine, except I wish the writer had said "pro-Qaddafi" forces stedda "pro-Libya" :
Spent a few minutes chatting with the Egyptians in the camp outside the airport and also on board the aircraft in order to answer any questions the refugees may have and to put an American face on the mission as there were no Arabic speaking crew on board. A few points the Egyptians brought up:
All Egyptians felt very well taken care of. They said they had all the food, all the water and all the medicine they needed. They were very thankful to the Tunisian people and the Tunisian government and said they felt very welcome and had been handled with kindness. Egyptians can be seen walking around the airport with Tunisian Flags pinned to their suitcases or clothing. On Friday night, we witnessed a dueling cheerleading match where one group of approximately 200 Egyptians in a cordoned off block in the terminal started shouting cheers to Tunis and waving a single Tunisian flag. A second cordon of Egyptians one-upped the first by singing, waving dozens of Tunisian flags in a spinning dancing circle while they hoisted a Tunisian man in the center of the mass on their shoulders. That's probably my first Egyptian Tunisian Pep Rally.