al Qaeda

A French official who conducted investigations in Pakistan adds more weight to charges that Pakistani intelligence officers are in bed with the Taliban and even with al Qaeda.

In a new book, What I Could Not Say, to be published next week in France,  Jean-Louis Bruguiere says that he came away with the impression that some Pakistani officials don't even consider al Qaeda to be a terrorist organization, according to an article in the Los Angeles Times. He is quoted as writing, "The central government has lost control of certain elements of the army and the ISI, an intelligence service that no longer has the trust of its foreign partners." French investigators in Pakistan also were physically intimidated, he charges.

Bruguiere now works in Washington on terrorism financing issues, the newspaper said.

(HT to Barnett Rubin)

Kash if/Flickr

If the Taliban took over Afghanistan, would al Qaeda again have a safe haven? I think so. The time to drive a wedge betwixt the two was back in 2002-2003, after the American invasion, when both groups had fled Afghanistan in disarray, and were licking their wounds and reproaching each other as they hid in Pakistani frontier villages.

That thought is provoked by an article in today's New York Times and by a  series of interesting interviews with Taliban members recently carried by Newsweek. After the U.S. arrived, notes one Talibaner interviewed: 

The Arabs were disappointed the Taliban hadn't stood and fought. They told me they had wanted to fight to the death. They were clearly not as distressed as the Afghans. This was understandable. The Arabs felt they had lost a battle. But the Afghans were much more devastated-they had lost a country."

The groups began rebuilding, the same Talibani recalls, by using raids and even funerals as recruiting and fund-raising tools. After one cross-border raid against an American outpost, he recalled:

We carried the stiff and bloodied bodies of our martyrs back to Wana. Thousands of locals attended their funerals. ... As the news traveled, a lot of former Taliban began returning to Wana to join us.

Another Taliban member says they benefited from American violence and the abuses of the Kabul government:

The Afghan Taliban were weak and disorganized. But slowly the situation began to change. American operations that harassed villagers, bombings that killed civilians, and Karzai's corrupt police were alienating villagers and turning them in our favor. Soon we didn't have to hide so much on our raids. We came openly. When they saw us, villagers started preparing green tea and food for us. The tables were turning. Karzai's police and officials mostly hid in their district compounds like prisoners.

As the old John Hiatt song laments, this is the way we make a broken heart. Or rather, this is the way we allowed a medieval bunch of Afghan hillbillies to re-group while we distracted ourselves with an unnecessary war in Iraq.

Meanwhile, someone tried to blow up the Indian Embassy in Kabul today. I wonder who doesn't like Indian influence in the Afghan capital?

SAEED KHAN/AFP/Getty Images

I've long thought that we have underestimated how active Iranian operatives are in Iraq. I was reminded of this when I saw an article about how a truckload of 75 IEDs (aka roadside bombs) was intercepted recently southwest of Baghdad. That's a lot of bombs!

Also the article asserts that the shipment was going to al Qaeda in Iraq. This is not good for two reasons: 1. Iran helping al Qaeda -- I've heard of this before, but not heard a lot about it lately, and 2. AQI still exists? 

JOHN MOORE/AFP/Getty Images

I don't read Pashtu or Urdu, so this new website of translations of articles in those languages is helpful. Warning: It also can be a huge sinkhole for your time. (Hat tip to the Kings of War)

One thing that strikes me reading it is how predictable Taliban rhetoric is. I've always found the same with al Qaeda's commentary -- just poorly written, and I've read enough so that I don't think it can be blamed entirely on the translators. Can readers of Arabic tell me if al Qaeda sounds as bad in the original?

I've been looking over the Army's new manual for stability operations, which the University of Michigan just reprinted with an all-star lineup of introductions by Michele Flournoy, Shawn Brimley, and Janine Davidson.

I'm all for the idea. But I wonder if the very title of the manual is incorrect. After all, we didn't invade Iraq to provide stability, but to force change. Likewise in Afghanistan. And once we were there, we didn't aim for stability, but to encourage democracy, which (the thought is not original with me) in a region like the Middle East generally undermines stability. I mean, if all we wanted was stability, why not find a strongman and leave?

What we really are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan, I think, is instability operations. I don't think the U.S. military really has ever been comfortable with that mission, which was one reason we saw a lot of friction early on between the Bremer team trying to bring change and the Sanchez team simply trying to keep a lid on things. Personally, I think the mission of changing the culture of Iraq was nuts -- but that was the mission the president assigned the military.

I think a more intellectually honest title for the manual would be "Revolutionary Operations." Don't hold your breath.

As long as I am quibbling with official government usage, is "the interagency" even a grammatical term?

I was surprised and impressed to see two centrist Washington bigwigs -- former diplomat Thomas Pickering and former FBI director William Sessions -- call for an independent commission to look into U.S. government policies on torture and detainees.

It is in the interest of our nation's security that President Obama should immediately appoint such a commission. To move ahead, make our country safer and strengthen the leadership position of the United States, we must have a full understanding of detainee policies and their consequences. Only then can we prevent any mistakes of the past from being repeated.

I am beginning to think this might just happen. And that would be a good thing indeed. We probably need one more round of revelations to push it over the top. Given the nature of things, I expect that murder will out. 

Photo: Flickr user CitizenSheep

Author and journalist Ahmed Rashid has a good essay in the new issue of the CTC Sentinel  (published by West Point and consistently interesting) about Pakistan's failure to pursue a counterinsurgency strategy against the Taliban and al Qaeda. His conclusion is that Pakistan is a house divided against itself:

Until the Pakistan Army is able to re-determine its strategic priorities and its interpretation of the country's security, it will not be able to practice counterinsurgency successfully. The army's current national security doctrine is entirely focused on India. In sharp contrast, the civilian national security doctrine is focused on building the state in terms of improving relations with neighbors, increasing trade, advancing the economy, and providing mass education and development. The contrast between the two in how civilians and the military see the future of Pakistan has remained the principle contradiction that has bedeviled the country since its inception and has constantly pitted the army against civilian political forces.

Practicing successful counterinsurgency relies upon outlining proper strategic priorities and on making national security doctrine relevant to the needs of the population, rather than on the needs or desires of the army. Pakistan's biggest threat today comes from the Pakistani Taliban and their al-Qa`ida and Afghan Taliban allies. It does not come from India."

EMILIO MORENATTI/AFP/Getty Images

Thinking about the stock market chart I referred to the other day, I found myself wondering: Who has done more damage to the United States during the 21st century: al Qaeda or Wall Street bankers?