Posted By Thomas E. Ricks

Proven provider John McCreary observes that the U.S. government and al Qaeda apparently are on the same side in calling for change in Syria:

Syria-al Qaida: Al-Qaida's new leader Ayman al-Zawahiri praised anti-regime protestors in Syria in a video released Wednesday claiming the United States is seeking regime change in Damascus, U.S.-based monitors said. Calling the pro-democracy activists 'mujahideen,' or holy warriors, Zawahiri hailed their efforts in "teaching lessons to the aggressor, the oppressor, the traitor, the disloyal, and standing up against his oppression" in a video the SITE Intelligence Group said was posted on extremist online forums.

Comment: For perhaps the only time on record, The US and al Qaida apparently are supporting the same policy end state for Syria: regime change. That bizarre coincidence cannot be good for Israeli security or regional stability.

Zawahari sees the conflict as a Sunni fundamentalist vs. Alawite struggle, not as a movement for plural political rights, women's rights and liberal freedoms against a repressive regime."

JEWEL SAMAD/AFP/Getty Images

Posted By Thomas E. Ricks

The smart money says this is an indication of a split between the Pakistani military/ ISI on the one hand and the Pakistani civilian officials on the other. I don't quite follow that, but it won't be the first time I didn't understand Pakistan.

Wikimedia Commons

EXPLORE:AL QAEDA, PAKISTAN

He also was a critic of the ISI.

I take it the State Department is still arguing that we should continue to play along with Pakistan because there we have no other choice. I think we do have a choice.

BANARAS KHAN/AFP/Getty Images

EXPLORE:AL QAEDA, MEDIA, PAKISTAN

Posted By Thomas E. Ricks

Sen. John McCain knocks down the idea that torture -- specifically waterboarding -- was essential in getting bin Laden:

Former attorney general Michael Mukasey recently claimed that "the intelligence that led to bin Laden … began with a disclosure from Khalid Sheik Mohammed, who broke like a dam under the pressure of harsh interrogation techniques that included waterboarding. He loosed a torrent of information -- including eventually the nickname of a trusted courier of bin Laden." That is false.

I asked CIA Director Leon Panetta for the facts, and he told me the following: The trail to bin Laden did not begin with a disclosure from Khalid Sheik Mohammed, who was waterboarded 183 times. The first mention of Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti -- the nickname of the al-Qaeda courier who ultimately led us to bin Laden -- as well as a description of him as an important member of al-Qaeda, came from a detainee held in another country, who we believe was not tortured. None of the three detainees who were waterboarded provided Abu Ahmed's real name, his whereabouts or an accurate description of his role in al-Qaeda.

In fact, the use of "enhanced interrogation techniques" on Khalid Sheik Mohammed produced false and misleading information. He specifically told his interrogators that Abu Ahmed had moved to Peshawar, got married and ceased his role as an al-Qaeda facilitator -- none of which was true. According to the staff of the Senate intelligence committee, the best intelligence gained from a CIA detainee -- information describing Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti's real role in al-Qaeda and his true relationship to bin Laden -- was obtained through standard, noncoercive means.

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Here is an elaboration on some of what I said yesterday on ABC's This Week . (Also on the show was Lawrence Wright, who has this terrific piece on Pakistan in the new issue of the New Yorker.)

I think we need to have a short-term plan that temporarily keeps us close to Pakistan, followed by a much different long-run strategy that cuts us loose from this wreck of a state.

In the short run, our goal should be to collect our winnings. Pakistan screwed up, bigtime. We have them off balance, and the blustering of their officials isn't helping their cause. Over the next several months, we should aim to use this situation to get the terrorists and information we want. 

And then get out. In the long run, we should back away from Pakistan. They believe they have us over a barrel, that (as Steve Coll has observed) they are too big to fail. They have nuclear warheads and they stand on our supply route to the U.S. troops in Afghanistan. So I think we need to accelerate the troop drawdown in Afghanistan, and move from a large footprint of conventional troops to a smaller footprint of Special Operators and support units conducting counterterror missions. (But note Petraeus' pushback over the weekend: "Targeted military strikes don't produce security on their own.")This reduced force of perhaps 20,000 troops could be supplied by air and through Central Asia. Expensive, yes. But cheaper than giving billions of dollars annually to Pakistan and seeing it spent on its nuclear program and corruption. We also should encourage ties between Afghanistan and Central Asia.

With our military posture in Afghanistan shifted, we then could move to a purely transactional aid plan with Pakistan: "For doing X, you get Y amount of money." No more money for promises, and certainly not $4 billion a year for being a frenemy. In the long run, our interests are much more with India, anyway. If Pakistan wants to retaliate by allying with China -- knock yourselves out, fellas.  

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President Obama on 60 Minutes: "And you know, there were big chunks of time in which all we were doin' was just waiting. And it was the longest 40 minutes of my life with the possible exception of when Sasha got meningitis when she was three months old, and I was waiting for the doctor to tell me that she was all right. It was a very tense situation."

By chance, last night I was reading some material on the failed hostage rescue operating in the Iranian desert in 1980. It was heartbreaking for all concerned, and politically crippling for President Carter. I think one of the unexpected side benefits of getting bin Laden will be that the U.S. military has greater faith in Obama as commander in chief-and Obama in his military:

Q: How much did some of the past failures, like the Iran hostage rescue attempt, how did that weigh on you? I mean...

PRESIDENT OBAMA: I thought about that.

Q: ...was that a factor?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Absolutely. Absolutely. No, I mean you think about Black Hawk Down. You think about what happened with the Iranian rescue. And it, you know, I am very sympathetic to the situation for other presidents where you make a decision, you're making your best call, your best shot, and something goes wrong -- because these are tough, complicated operations. And yeah, absolutely. The day before I was thinkin' about this quite a bit.

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But not for the reasons you might expect.

"Osama is not my problem. I don't care if he died here. I can't postpone my wedding because of his death," commented Suhail Nasir, on the eve of his marriage ceremony.

In the marketplace, Maqsood Jadoon added, "Why we should mourn Osama's killing? He was a CIA agent and helped America to organise this drama."

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EXPLORE:AL QAEDA, PAKISTAN

I asked Courtney Messerschmidt, AKA gSgF, to explain to Best Defense readers the emotional reaction of her fully crunked peers to the killing of bin Laden:

By Courtney Messerschmidt
Best Defense guest Ute correspondent

For those of us who were 10 or 11 years old on 9/11, the news of bin Laden's death is worthy of celebration. It is a tremendous moral victory for our nation and it validates what so many of us have learned in the past decade -- that America really is a magical nation -- the only one of her kind (more on this in a bit).

It's the triumph of good over evil. Sound passé'? Au contraire -- most of us reject moral relativism.

It's because for half of our entire lives we have lived with scary and creepy stuff like Taliban, al Qaeda, jihad, and the threat of terrorism on a mass attack scale from the indescribable horrors we saw live on TV that day -- with almost daily threats from various branches of aQ that they would gladly kill more Americans anyway and anytime they could.

Unlike the Soviet threat in ancient times -- al Qaeda had no embassies or diplomats at U.N. to double talk and speak of peaceful coexistence. aQ was always intolerant, and totally hot for murderous activities that targeted innocents by design.

9/11 was the pivotal day in our very young lives and OBL's timely demise seems to have closed a chapter that lasted forever.

This is significant.

1st off -- pretty cool to realize that OBL realized his death was imminent. Like il Duce, der führer, or S'Ddam -- the awesome knowledge that the end was at hand as America confronted him for a haj to the perfumed gardens of paradise. And like al Zarqawi in Iraq -- the last thing OBL ever saw was a po'd American about to kill him. Oh, that is sweet.

Equally hot -- of all the nations that aQ has attacked and tormented over the years -- only Great Satan had the brain power, will power, staying power, and fire power to hunt him down, choppering in less than 30 guys into a veritable Pakistani Army base with nearly 10 thousand troops stationed blocks away to visit death upon him. And in a fun, friendly 'forget you' way -- hauled off the body as booty and chucked it overboard from an American aircraft carrier (sovereign American turf -- no less) as shark bait.

Many think the war is over -- or almost over -- as the recent Yemen drone strikes hoping to kill al Awlaki indicate.

Others realize in a Churchillian way -- it isn't the end -- or even the beginning of the end, yet it may well be the end of the beginning.

So we celebrate the victory of good over evil via bin Laden's death repeatedly, without modesty or restraint. Not to put too fine a point on it -- when the 'funintended consequences' erupted on TV later in the week in the form of rowdy foreigners protesting America's righteous hit, we reveled in their dismay.

And when frightened teachers and the elderly gave us the old 'shame shame' meme for partying about the death of a mass murder engineer we joyously pointed out -- sometimes -- our enemies need killing. 

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By Sir Hilary Synnott
Best Defense guest diplomatic columnist

The notion that Pakistan has, in Western eyes, been a treacherous ally since 2001 is well-founded and not new. The world has recently been reminded of the conflicting interests and practices by recollections of Prime Minister David Cameron's declaration that Pakistan has been 'looking both ways' and by former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage's references to the duplicity he encountered when he was a frequent visitor to Islamabad in 2001-02, when I was High Commissioner there and had similar experiences.

But the revelation of the presence in Abbottabad, one of the country's most militarised cities, of the world's most wanted criminal 'on the run' for ten years, suggests a new and different order of magnitude of perfidy.

And international reaction will have been sharpened by the Pakistan establishment's astonishingly inept attempts at self justification: Prime Minister Gilani's accusation that any failing on the part of Pakistan reflected the failings of other countries' intelligence services; and Foreign Secretary Bashir's exhortations that we should put the episode behind us and look forward. This last is reminiscent of General Musharraf's attempts to deal with the reaction to his land grab in Kargil in Kashmir in 1999.

So there will be a natural temptation to contemplate a wholesale shift in the United States' and others' relationship with Pakistan, perhaps the cessation of all aid, including the Kerry-Lugar-Berman packages for the social and educational sector.

This would be a mistake. While the status quo may no longer be acceptable and the U.S.-Pakistan relationship needs to and should be recalibrated, it will do no good to cut off hope for economic improvement and employment opportunities in a nuclear armed country with a population six times that of Afghanistan and an exploding demographic profile.

Rather, the United States should continue, resolutely, steadily and with no false expectations, to try to disburse assistance for social development. It should target and account for its military-related assistance much more carefully than hitherto. And it should close off Pakistan's access to big-ticket arms contracts, paid for from Pakistan's own sparse funds, which can only be used against India while, if possible, liberalising access to U.S. markets for Pakistani textiles.

Sir Hilary Synnott was British High Commissioner to Pakistan 2000-2003. He is author of Transforming Pakistan: Ways Out of Instability and a memoir of his service in Iraq, Bad Days in Basra.

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Posted By Thomas E. Ricks

Two shots and a splash of water, reports GSGF at WOI.

I have been struck all week at how people in their teens and twenties have reacted to the killing of bin Laden. A shadow that had hung over their entire conscious lives has been removed.

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EXPLORE:AL QAEDA

I see where Vice Adm. Robert Harward has been nominated to succeed John Allen as the deputy commander at Central Command.

Three things strike me about this:

--First, what a week for the SEALs -- Adm. William McRaven oversees the SEAL raid that gets bin Laden, and now McRaven's doppelganger becomes the first Special Operator (at least that I can remember) to get one of the two top posts at Centcom. Also, we have the christening of a Navy ship named for SEAL Michael Murphy.

--Second, it is interesting that Centcom has been led by a series of Navy Department officers -- Adm. Fallon before Petraeus, Marine Gen. Mattis after him, and now a Naval officer replacing a Marine officer as deputy.

--Third, with this following the move of Petraeus to CIA, I wonder if we are seeing personnel moves as part of preparation to turn AfPak over to Special Operators and CIA -- that is, moving away from conventional forces to a smaller but serious counterterror approach.

Bonus fact: As a teenager, Harward lived in Tehran and, like me at the time, knocked around Afghanistan. (He got deadly sick in Kandahar, and I did in Peshawar. The main thing I miss about being young is that resliency.) I expect he will be Centcom's lead Iran-watcher.  

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If I could short a relationship, it would be the United States with Pakistan. I think the jig is up. Of course, a collapse of relations with Pakistan means we would not longer be able to supply the U.S. military in Afghanistan through Pakistan. And that means the war there is likely going to end sooner rather than later.

I've never seen a bipartisan consensus emerge so quickly on Capitol Hill. Also, I think the leaders in both parties are trailing the mood of the rank and file. Here's Sen. Frank Lautenberg (D., NJ) on MSNBC: "they are among the largest recipients of foreign aid, $8 billion; over eight years, $20 billion. And proposed now, almost 4 billion (dollars). We don't have that kind of money to spend around with people who are not our friends."

Meanwhile, Rep. Peter King (R., NY) said on Fox that, "Pakistan should also realize that many members in Congress are raising serious questions, why should we be giving $3 billion every year to Pakistan if they can't capture the world's most notorious terrorist living right in their midst? Now, I believe we have to maintain a relationship with Pakistan. I want to do it. But it's becoming harder and harder to continue it under these circumstances. I don't know of anyone in the administration who believes what President Zardari is saying." Rep. Allen West (R., Fla.) went even further, saying that, "I'm not willing to open up the American taxpayer dollars to Pakistan any further."

And here's the pathetic response of the Pakistani ambassador to the United States, Husain Haqqani, to Andrea Mitchell on MSNBC :

If Americans are upset about having giving assistance and aid to Pakistan, there are Pakistanis who are also very upset that, despite all that Pakistan has done, despite the fact that we are the only country that has lost generals in fighting terrorism, despite the fact that our leader Benazir Bhutto was killed by terrorists, despite fact that we are as much victims of terrorism as Americans are, that there are people in America who think a Pakistani life is worth less than an American life.

So this is something that is at an emotional level. Let's not get into that.

Tom again: Too late for that, Mr. Ambassador. It gets emotional when 3,000 innocents are killed in the heart of our biggest city, and the perp hides out in an area of your country that had to be under the surveillance of your security apparatus. If you don't know why it is emotional, you should not be the ambassador to the United States. You've got to do better than that.  

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Posted By Thomas E. Ricks

What a brilliant resolution of the problem of what to do with the corpse.

Congratulations to all involved. I am told the mission was carried out by Navy SEALs working under the control of the CIA. The 40-minute operation, most it spent gathering intelligence, sounds like an extremely difficult task carried off well. It is a nice bonus that there were no American casualties. This is how a government official described the compound where the jerk was hiding:

When the compound was built in 2005, it was on the outskirts of the town center, at the end of a narrow dirt road.  In the last six years, some residential homes have been built nearby.  The physical security measures of the compound are extraordinary.  It has 12- to 18-foot walls topped with barbed wire.  Internal wall sections -- internal walls sectioned off different portions of the compound to provide extra privacy.  Access to the compound is restricted by two security gates, and the residents of the compound burn their trash, unlike their neighbors, who put the trash out for collection.

The main structure, a three-story building, has few windows facing the outside of the compound.  A terrace on the third floor has a seven-foot wall privacy -- has a seven-foot privacy wall.

Tom again: What suspicious minds are asking: Why did the Pakistanis give him up? And what did we give in return?

I also think this will strongly up the pressure on the Obama Administration to end its involvement in Afghanistan. Not just politicians but the man on the street is likely to say, Hey, we got him, mission accomplished, let's go home.

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Posted By Thomas E. Ricks

I was reading a detailed, thoughtful survey of Yemeni public opinion conducted by Glevum Associates, and was struck that Osama bin Laden is more popular with older Yemenis than with the youths. He is rated favorably by just 3 percent of the 15 to 25 year olds but by 17 percent of the 31 to 40 year olds.

On the downside, Yemenis are close to unanimous (99 percent) that the United States is a baleful cultural influence on the world. Indeed, they are a bit more irked by American culture than they are by American economic and military power. Almost as many (96 percent) think the West is at war with Islam. Those of youse who are tempted to agree should keep in mind Krepinevich's law of the disaggregation of enemies: Never have any more than you really need to.

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EXPLORE:AL QAEDA, ISLAM, YEMEN

Best Defense comment of the day comes from "Ironcapt" and should be filed under "dunno whether to laugh or cry":

I'll admit, at first, I shared Exum's concerns about the Boys from Benghazi being a little too close to the radical Islamist camp, with their track record of sending suicide bombers to Iraq. I think I may have overreacted. If these guys were hard core AQ types, they'd probably be winning more battles.

MAHMUD HAMS/AFP/Getty Images

EXPLORE:AL QAEDA, LIBYA

Posted By Thomas E. Ricks

As if there were not enough going on: Proven provider John McCreary sends up a rocket over an Asia Times report that bin Laden has been hotfooting it all over the Durand Line. Not clear whether the terrorist is policing up internal problems of his infernal organization, or winding up to try to reclaim the global spotlight. Let's hope it is the former.

Asia Times Online on 24 March published an article by Syed Saleem Shahzad, who is an insightful commentator on South Asian affairs, as well as the publication's Pakistan Bureau Chief. He has studied al Qaida a long time.  He wrote that US intelligence has actionable information that Osama bin Laden has been "criss-crossing" the Pakistan -- Afghanistan border region in northwestern Pakistan during the past few weeks.

Shahzad wrote that US officials are "stunned" by bin Laden's visibility and the frequency of his movements. Bin Laden's purposes are not known. Terrorist analysts reportedly think the new level of activity means bin Laden is planning another large attack, though the 9/11 planning was actually not done by bin Laden. The South Asia analysts think he is meeting with friendly Afghan warlords to bring the Afghan War to a favorable conclusion for the Taliban.

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Posted By Thomas E. Ricks

By J. Dana Stuster
Best Defense Not-So-Felix Arabia bureau chief

"Yemen is not a surprise," former National Security Advisor Gen. Jim Jones, USMC (Ret.) began by saying at a recent panel discussion on "Yemen: The Next Egypt?" "As a matter of fact, what it is is not yet completely defined." On the brink of a potential coup, this remains true, and likely will for weeks or months to come.

Here in Washington, there are two major concerns about Yemen today: the ongoing threat from Yemen-based al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the governance of the embattled Gulf state. Yemen' s president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, has been the United States' ambivalent ally in combating AQAP, but his regime is collapsing under pressure from a popular opposition movement that has gained momentum from Saleh' s efforts to suppress it.

At the seminar, held by the Bipartisan Policy Center on March 1, Thomas Krajeski, senior vice president of the National Defense University and a former U.S. ambassador to Yemen, gave Saleh 50/50 odds of finishing his term, which has two years remaining before he has pledged to step down. Now, three weeks later, it is questionable whether Saleh' s term will extend through the end of this week. Since a violent assault on protesters in the capital on Friday, in which snipers shot at protesters from rooftops, leaving 52 dead as of Monday, Saleh' s government has been decimated by high-level defections. Most notable have been announcements from the leader of the nation' s largest tribal federation and the premier general in the Yemen Armed Forces that they have joined the opposition movement. Saleh has declared a state of emergency and the still-loyal Republican Guard, commanded by Saleh's son, have deployed tanks in the streets of Sanaa.

Washington' s concerns are linked. For the past decade, since the attack against the USS Cole at Aden in 2000, Saleh has been a reluctant ally in the war against al Qaeda. This commitment has been reaffirmed over the past couple years, since al Qaeda' s Gulf affiliates consolidated to form AQAP and began attempting a new spate of attacks, including the failed assassination of the Saudi head of counterterrorism, the "underwear bombing" plot, and most recently, the October 2010 attempt to detonate parcel bombs disguised as printer cartridges.

Read on

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More evidence seeps out of how the Bush Administration led and even fanned a national panic after 9/11. Turns out, according to a very interesting article in the Sunday New York Times, that one of the people who claimed he had developed software to uncover terrorist threats likely was peddling hogwash.

"For eight years, government officials turned to Dennis Montgomery, a California computer programmer, for eye-popping technology that he said could catch terrorists," write the intrepid Eric Lichtblau and James Risen. "Now, federal officials want nothing to do with him and are going to extraordinary lengths to ensure that his dealings with Washington stay secret."

The U.S. government even acted on the things he told them, and the guy apparently made a bundle of our tax dollars-he and his homeys made $20 million off scaring the Bush Administration. His former lawyer now contends he is a "con man," the article says. But don't think you're gonna get a rebate-the guy is in bankruptcy and about to go on trial for allegedly trying to pass $1.8 million in bad checks in Las Vegas casinos. The casinos, they don't like that sort of thing.  

In this case, it appears to be French intelligence that concluded that the Americans were being played: "Mon cher monsieur Tenet, we are thinking very much what you have -- how do I say? -- un boule des cambres, another ball of curves." That is, in both cases, liars appear to have prospered by selling to the Bush Administration scary tales that they knew it wanted to hear.

The CIA apparently has never conducted an inquiry into how it got fooled by this guy. Maybe we should hire some of them casino guys to work at the CIA.

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The other day my CNAS colleague Soriana Crisan wandered over to the National Press Club to see what the terrorism big thinkers are thinking. She came back all gloomy, but what did you expect? I think next time we should send her to a Lady Gaga concert.

Here is her report:

By Sorina I. Crisan
Best Defense terrorism punditry bureau

Hey Tom, as you requested, here are some "high points" from the Jamestown Foundation's 4th Annual Terrorism Conference, held on Thursday, Dec. 9.

  • Bruce Hoffman, director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University, kicked off the proceedings by arguing that there is no "understanding of what terrorism strategy is." Today, al Qaeda is a networked transnational movement that is just "a shadow of its former self" but has been able to survive "because it has managed to adapt to a changing environment." He said we should employ a dual strategy of capturing terrorists and breaking the recruitment cycle by better reaching the youth demographic.
  • Read on

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Counterterrorism without counterinsurgency is alluring -- it seems cheaper and easier -- but it is usually pretty meaningless and in fact can be very counterproductive. People who advocate just doing counterterror generally don't understand that. This is one of the best explanations I've read of why the short, easy way just doesn't work, from a friend who can't be identified, but who is in a position to understand this.

If you work at the White House, please read this slowly.

By Mr. XYZ
Best Defense terrorism columnist

To avoid killing the wrong people, you need intelligence. Good intelligence demands you have very close contact with, and cooperation from, the very constituency the Terrorists are seeking to mobilize. These folks won't cooperate unless they have security of person and property AND believe you won't abandon them after the next presidential election. That means that you can't CT without COIN.

Oh you can try. Clinton made a sport of it -- firing several hundred million dollars worth of cruise missiles into the deserts of North Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. Predictably, fire weapons and fire weapons alone not only did not compel the enemy to surrender, it caused them to multiply.

No serious student of strategic aerial bombardment I know of still believes that bombing a civilian population -- short of nuclear weapons -- will do anything more (or less) than awaken a sleeping giant -- Pearl Harbor and 9/11 are perfect examples, but so too are the largely failed terror-bombing campaigns of the Luftwaffe of Britain (1940-41 and ‘44-45) and the British reply to Germany (1942-1945).

The reason terror bombing does not work, is it causes predictable outrage in the survivors. Even if you use precision weapons -- no, especially if you use precision weapons -- killing anyone in my family will make of me an implacable enemy. I say this because if you use precision weapons you purportedly have the ability to avoid killing the wrong people and yet you killed one of mine. Hence, you MEANT to kill my relative. And now, I will have to return the favor -- especially if I am from a Shame Culture.

Used alone, navies and air forces cannot, therefore, win against insurgents. Why? Because they are fire weapons -- and fire weapons alone can never compel the enemy to surrender. The enemy may choose to surrender -- as happened in Serbia in 1999 and Japan in 1945, but the decision is left to the enemy. True decision in war comes from shock forces -- Marines/ infantry. Once shock forces go into action the enemy must repel the attack or leave. If they can't leave or defeat the attack they must surrender.

If you're going to employ shock forces, you are now going to be in and among the population. If you are going to have a population that is at least neutral, if not supporting you, then you will need to understand their language, culture, and aspirations, and help to provide for their needs. You must also be prepared for a long and costly war, in both money and casualties.

Read on

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By Haider Ali Hussein Mullick
Best Defense chief Pakistan correspondent

I just got back from my third trip to Pakistan this year, where I examined the scope and scale of its counterinsurgency strategy and al Qaeda's response.

The bottom line is that al Qaeda's big plans for world dominance have failed, but its ability to keep the United States and allies on high alert is increasing. There are two primary reasons for this paradoxical situation: First, al Qaeda's very successful nine-year 'train the trainer' program, which multiplies its strength without expanding its numbers. Second, the August floods that devastated Pakistan are a game changer, a godsend for al Qaeda, diverting 30,000 Pakistani counterinsurgents and key enablers (helicopters, engineers, medics, etc.) away from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to flood relief and reconstruction activities. To overstretch armies, smart insurgents always pray for the opening of multiple fronts. The damage from the floods couldn't be worse -- 1/5th of Pakistan (size of New England) inundated, seven million people lost their homes, and $30 billion in total damages. The timing was equally terrible: The Pakistani surge was finally working, and troops were holding Swat and South Waziristan since 2009.

Today, the nuclear-armed Pakistani army is under great stress, and reluctant to go into North Waziristan, home to al Qaeda, the Haqqani network, and the Pakistani Taliban. The army is the police, National Guard, relief organization, reconstruction agency, and governing body in critical areas in the north and south, while the weak civilian government is perceived to be corrupt, inept, and aloof as it wrestles with the Supreme Court. Half of 180 million Pakistanis are under the age of 25 and facing high prices, unemployment and little opportunity. They watch the rich pay virtually no taxes and they find solace in U.S. and India bashing, and blissful ignorance about their actual enemies, which are the al Qaeda syndicate, corruption and poverty. Al Qaeda couldn't ask for a better home.

What's worse is that we don't have any good options in Pakistan, and President Barack Obama has made that clear again and again. But we can make our bad options better. If there were a 9/11-type attack post-marked Pakistan there would be retaliatory airstrikes against terrorist camps -- but Washington doesn't have a 'day-after plan'. We need a strategy that deals with such an attack and strives to balance terrorist interdiction (with or without Pakistani help amid imminent danger) with U.S. civil-military aid and outreach to the Pakistani people. Today we must maintain the Catch-22 of supporting nuclear-armed, comatose Pakistan, knowing that it won't wake up, walk on its own or hug us anytime soon. But we must combine that with a long-term roadmap to bring the countries together, to imagine the impossible by doing the possible. We must continue to assert our security interests, help Pakistan help itself, and make our partnership transparent to the Pakistani people. Hope is not a policy, but striving for a more effective partnership with a nuclear-armed country that is the second-largest Muslim nation, that is home to al Qaeda, and that borders Iran, China and India, is.

Read more here to learn about al Qaeda's post-9/11 metamorphosis, and how the United States can better partner with Pakistan to degrade al Qaeda and associates.

Haider Ali Hussein Mullick is a Fellow at the U.S. Joint Special Operations University, Research Fellow at the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, and the author of Pakistan's Security Paradox: Countering and Fomenting Insurgencies.

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Here's a guest post by Joe Quinn, who lost his brother and best friend in the 9/11 attacks, served a couple of tours in Iraq, and is now in Afghanistan.

By Joe Quinn
Best Defense guest columnist

Al Qaeda murdered my brother Jimmy nine years ago. Mohamed Atta and four other terrorists hijacked and crashed American Airlines Flight 11 into the 93rd through 99th floors of the north tower of the World Trade Center. My brother Jimmy worked on the 101st floor. Not a single remnant of my brother would be recovered.

My life came crashing down simultaneously with those towers. Images of my brother's demise relentlessly flickered in my head. Anger swelled inside of me, not because my brother died, but because of the thought that he was scared before he perished. I wanted revenge.

Due to my emotions (and engineering classes), I barely graduated West Point in the spring of 2002. After being commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant in the Army, I had one goal: to go to Afghanistan. 

In 2003, I requested to be sent to Afghanistan. The Army sent me to Iraq. In 2007, I requested to be sent to Afghanistan again. The Army sent me to Iraq again. After President Obama announced the Afghan "Surge" in December, I knew this was my opportunity. Nine years after my brother's death, I have finally accomplished my goal, as I am currently contributing to the fight here in Afghanistan.

I have recounted the last nine years of my life because my journey through these wars has been similar to yours. You were devastated by the events of 9/11. You wanted revenge, or at least some sort of justice, where you supported the invasion of Afghanistan. You were sidetracked by the Iraq War in 2003 and then again by the Iraq "Surge" in 2007. Nine years after 9/11, you are tired of war, but finally find your blood and treasure in Afghanistan.

My greatest fear is that we will lose the Afghan war because of the Iraq war. The American people are tired of war mostly due to the painful doldrums brought on by the Iraq campaign. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) also siphoned resources and attention away from Afghanistan, allowing an insurgency to rise and for the U.S. to never fully realize a plan for winning. What is winning? Winning is achieving irreversible momentum towards a stable Afghanistan, free from Taliban control, which will never serve as a base for terrorism.

After nine years of neglecting the Afghan war, we finally have a plan for winning, with the right resources, the right leadership and the right programs. At the end of August, the last of the 30,000 additional U.S. troops are finally in place. Undoubtedly, these additional troops will clear and hold large swaths of Taliban strongholds.

In General Petraeus, we also have the right leadership to orchestrate the Afghan war. Saying that General Petraeus will not make a difference in Afghanistan is like saying Michael Jordan would not make a difference in Chicago after coming out of retirement in 1994. Eventually the team will improve.

The right programs in Afghanistan have only just begun. General Petraeus made an immediate impact by partnering with President Karzai to begin the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program that will leverage local Afghans to provide village-level security. The Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) is another concept that has just been ratified, where the effects of the program will only truly be felt in the months ahead. The right resources, leadership and programs in Afghanistan have just begun. Winning the Afghan war has just begun. 

So after nine years, why are we still in Afghanistan? For me it's still simple. The men that killed my brother on 9/11 were five of 20,000 terrorists trained by Al Qaeda in a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. The Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan will only embolden Al Qaeda even more to perpetrate terrorist attacks like on 9/11. It's easy to forget the connection between Afghanistan and 9/11 after all this time. For me, it's impossible to forget. Perhaps remembering is the luxury of my family's tragedy.

In the end, I do not want revenge anymore. The truth is that the perpetrators that murdered my brother died that same day. I now have a new goal: to leave Afghanistan. To leave Afghanistan as a stable country, free from Taliban control, which will never serve as a base for terrorism.

Joe Quinn currently works in Afghanistan as a Counterinsurgency Advisor for the International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF's) Counterinsurgency Assistance and Advisory Team (CAAT). He graduated in May from Harvard's Kennedy School of Government.

 

army.mil

There are certain events that are made for certain reporters. For example, everything in Anthony Shadid's career prepared him to cover post-invasion Iraq. Likewise, if you want to understand the guy who tried to bomb Times Square, you need to read the New Yorker‘s Steve Coll, the only person I can think of who has written books about the South Asian subcontinent, the Taliban and Islamic extremism terrorism, but who also understands New York City, and indeed co-authored a book about Wall Street.

Take it away, Steve:

Last week, before the Times Square incident, I was talking with a former U.S. intelligence officer who worked extensively on jihadi cases during several overseas tours. He said that when a singleton of Shahzad's profile -- especially a U.S. citizen -- turns up in a place like Peshawar, local jihadi groups are much more likely to assess him as a probable U.S. spy than as a genuine volunteer. At best, the jihadi groups might conclude that a particular U.S.-originated individual's case is uncertain. They might then encourage the person to go home and carry out an attack -- without giving him any training or access to higher-up specialists that might compromise their local operations. They would see such a U.S.-based volunteer as a ‘freebie,' the former officer said -- if he returns home to attack, great, but if he merely goes off to report back to his C.I.A. case officer, no harm done.

Francisco Diez/flickr

Posted By Thomas E. Ricks

Someone apparently pretending to be Americans killed 24 people a couple of days ago, many of them former insurgents. Iraqi officials are blaming al Qaeda. It all happened in the area south of Baghdad that American soldiers used to call "the 'Iyas'" -- my least favorite part of Iraq. 

This was followed by a series of embassy bombings in Baghdad yesterday.

I am not making this part of my "Iraq Unraveling" series because I am not persuaded that this outbreak has legs. We'll see.

ALI AL-SAADI/AFP/Getty Images

I didn't think this 2008 Indian movie was very good, yet I found it quite watchable. Remember Charles Bronson in Death Wish fulfilling the fantasy of revenge against street criminals of the 1960s and 1970s? Sure you do:

Paul Kersey: Any chance of catching these men?
Lt. Briggs: There's a chance, sure.
Paul Kersey: Just a chance?
Lt. Briggs: I'd be less than honest if I gave you more hope, Mr. Kersey. In the city, that's the way it is

This is a Bollywood fantasy of hitting back at al Qaeda, ISI and their buddies. So Netflix it, but just keep in mind that it is an illuminating cultural artifact, not a lasting work of art.

And thanks to the commenter who recommended it many months ago.

By Matthew Irvine
Best Defense
chief congressional correspondent

Gen. David Petraeus, appearing before the Senate Armed Services committee on Tuesday, offered up several of his greatest hits. Most notably, he introduced a new Afghan-centric remix of his 2007 classic, telling the panel that, "The going is likely to get harder before it gets easy... the enemy will fight back." Several senators sang back-up.  

Discussion of Iraq focused on the aftermath of recent national elections and the status of U.S. forces in the country. Asked by Sen. Jack Reed (D., RI) if he expects the new governing coalition to take many months to form, the CENTCOM chief responded, "Yes, we do." (Frankly, BG and L'il Wayne did that tune first, and better.)

During Sen. Lieberman's (I-Ct.) questioning, Petraeus detailed the possible addition of a seventh brigade headquarters in the northern city of Kirkuk beyond the August deadline while reaffirming the target force level of 50,000 troops by the end of summer.

Identifying Pakistan's western Federally Administered Tribal Area as "al-Qaeda's principal sanctuary," Petraeus promised a long-term American commitment to Pakistani counterinsurgency efforts against the Taliban. "We are going to be a steadfast partner. We are not going to do to Pakistan what we've done before, such as Charlie Wilson's War."

For an encore, Petraeus discussed his latest side project, Yemen, which he has been working on with his label-mates, the Special Operations Command ... Seeing Yemen as an emerging terrorist operations hub, CENTCOM has been expanding aid to Sana'a. The likely name of the new album will be "preventive counterinsurgency operations." Expect heavy support from Petraeus's label,  which he said will "double U.S. security assistance to the country in the coming year."

Mark Wilson/Getty Images

Posted By Thomas E. Ricks

Stars & Stripes reports that someone wrote to the Pentagon suggesting that it parachute bears into Pakistan to track down Osama bin Laden.

It would be interesting to see, but somehow I don't think Pakistanis would appreciate it.

John Vetterli/flickr

Posted By Thomas E. Ricks

Here's a report from my CNAS colleague Matt Irvine, who trekked up to Capitol Hill on Wednesday to hear experts Richard Clarke, Juan Zarate, and Steve Coll tell the House Armed Services Committee what to think about al Qaeda.

By Matthew Irvine

Best Defense chief congressional correspondent

What the witnesses delivered was a long-term forecast reading: more of the same. The conflict against al Qaeda and its ideology will not be won when American forces leave Iraq or begin drawdowns in Afghanistan in 2011.

Read on

N7BJG/flickr

Posted By Thomas E. Ricks

Many threads to ravel together:

  • Writing in Asia Times Online, Pepe Escobar gives the bottom line on recent auction action in the Iraqi oil industry:
What the early 2010s will definitely see is the rise of a relatively wealthy, Shi'ite-controlled Iraq friendly with Iran and Lebanon's Hezbollah.

(I loves me the interweb: On the other hand, a quick search shows that Pepe was the guy who wrote from Peshawar in, oh, August 2001 (!) that Osama bin Laden was washed up and the United States was paying too much attention to him and to al Qaeda, which he said was "in tatters.") 

  • And Maliki was in Cairo today, which is interesting because the Egyptian government lately has become quite vocal about its worries about growing Iranian interference in Yemen and other parts of the Arab world. Let's see what comes out of this meeting.
  • Meanwhile, there are more complaints that Sunni Awakening groups are being screwed by the Baghdad government. From a report by the AP's Brian Murphy:

We have no [Awakening] checkpoints in the area anymore," said Sheik Shebib, who leads Awakening militias in the Arab Jabour area just south of Baghdad. "Now, al Qaeda is coming back and we are feeling more and more powerless."

  • And a Shiite cleric is warning of a creeping Baathist takeover.

(HTs to John McCreary's NightWatch and FP 's Blake Hounsell)

ESSAM AL-SUDANI/AFP/Getty Images

Posted By Thomas E. Ricks

My hawkish friends are picking on Obama's speech. It didn't stir them.

News flash, fellas: It wasn't meant to. He wasn't speaking to you all, or to me. In fact, he likely is mighty tired of listening to Afghanistan hawks, having spent much of the last three months with them. In defense intellectual terms, this homily was written for Andrew Bacevich and Richard Kohn, not for Eliot Cohen and Tom Donnelly and Peter Feaver, to name a few of the usual suspects.  

This speech was an ode to ambivalence, an aria of ambiguity, a rasher of reluctance. It was addressed to those who, like him, really didn't want to send more troops to Afghanistan. It was for those who care more about rebuilding New Orleans than Kandahar or Mosul. He was explaining to them why he was breaking with them. He had after great deliberation concluded that it was necessary to escalate.    

To really get this speech, I think you had to be someone who voted for Obama, who believed he was elected to end our wars, and was feeling terribly and personally disappointed with the president over the possibility of a surge in Afghanistan -- and the failure to close Guantanamo, and the lift the ban on gays in the military, not to mention the bailout of Wall Street fatcats. Hence the explicit discussion of the Vietnam analogy, and the review of the folly of invading Iraq in 2003. (But why deliver it at West Point, where ambiguity is not a core Army value? That probably was a mistake.)

Seen in that context, these are the three most important quotes in last night's speech:

First, there are those who suggest that Afghanistan is another Vietnam... I believe this argument depends upon a false reading of history."

 

I'm mindful of the words of President Eisenhower, who, in discussing our national security, said, 'Each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader consideration:  the need to maintain balance in and among national programs.' Over the past several years, we have lost that balance. We've failed to appreciate the connection between our national security and our economy."

And, given what I think was the purpose of the speech, this was the best line:

That's why our troop commitment in Afghanistan cannot be open-ended: because the nation that I am most interested in building is our own."

JIM WATSON/AFP/Getty Images

Thomas E. Ricks covered the U.S. military for the Washington Post from 2000 through 2008.

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