Here's another dispatch from Paula's vacation in Afghanistan. Speaking of which, here is Joshua Foust's critique of her previous post.

By Paula Broadwell
Best Defense southern Afghanistan correspondent

One of the commonly cited potential game-changers in Afghanistan is the Village Stability Operations-Afghan Local Police (VSO-ALP) program: a village-level security concept that aims to empower local Afghans to self-police and ultimately protect against Taliban infiltration and influence, especially in rural communities. The Afghan villager, after all, is the local expert on the surrounding geographic and human terrain; he should be "the perfect counterinsurgent." While Special Operations Task Forces (SOTF) have conducted village stability operations for several years now, what is gaining momentum is the role of conventional forces in accelerating the concept. I've had the chance to explore the evolution of this concept at the tactical level with 1-320th Field Artillery Battalion in the Arghandab River Valley. Although an artillery unit, 1-320th is fighting as a provisional infantry unit; it is also conducting effective counterinsurgency, of which the ALP is a critically important part.

Since mid-November, the commander of Combined Task Force 1-320th, LTC David S. Flynn, has worked to develop rapport with the local malik, or de facto village leader, from Charqolba in the Arghandab River Valley, known as "Ibrahim." Charqolba has been uninhabited since June, when the Taliban conducted an intimidation campaign and drove the villagers out. Nearly 50 percent of the village had been destroyed in the crossfire between the Taliban and U.S. forces. Like the others who fled, the Charqolba malik had moved his family to Kandahar City, but he was interested in reclaiming his home and his village.

Following the tough "clear and hold" fighting campaign in the RC-S over the fall, Flynn and his company commanders began to attend the local shuras several times a week to build relationships within the community. Flynn's rapport-building efforts were starting to pay off. On New Year's Day, he walked into the local shura room to meet the villagers who were already sitting on the bright red cushions they'd picked out when Flynn's team helped build it earlier that fall. Flynn's newest "best friend," Malik Ibrahim, had rallied six of his former neighbors, village friends who had also been evicted from Charqolba and who wanted to reclaim their homes. In addition, another local malik had come to scope out the ALP concept for his village nearby.

Flynn entered the shura with a big smile, moved toward Ibrahim, and offered his best Pashto greeting in a confident voice revealing his deep Massachusetts accent. Flynn worked his way around the circle, offering the same customary handshake and greeting. He was struck by the gentle manner with which Afghans greeted each other, no matter the circumstance. Just two nights earlier, Flynn had sat through a post-brawl shura led by a nearby village malik. "The malik had presided over five bloodied villagers who had beaten each other with shovels and picks over wood cut during a cash-for-work project. The dispute was resolved when the younger men approached the older man and kissed his hand. The kiss was returned by the elder with a kiss on the head, and all was well. This occurred after two hours of arguing and wrangling, but at least the show ended with pleasantries exchanged, Flynn summarized. But that day's shura was a much more sanguine setting. They weren't resolving a dispute; they were forging a way to reclaim their village and take a stand to prevent the return of the Taliban.

Ibrahim, the young malik and well-connected relative of important local police officials, was frustrated by the lack of progress in the previous shura meetings and had taken the initiative earlier in the week to convene many villagers at his home in Kandahar City to garner support for the ALP. He told Flynn that in addition to the six others in the room, he had identified 13 other villagers who were interested in starting an ALP program in Charqolba. It was a breakthrough, after only seven weeks of effort. Flynn knew Afghan initiative and leadership were critical and was elated when two of the men in attendance stepped forward to volunteer to spearhead the effort.

There was palpable energy in the room as the conversation progressed. Ibrahim told Flynn that the village of Charqolba had three mosques and that the villagers who had agreed to join the ALP all belonged to one mosque in particular. Some of the mosques had been damaged in the summer crossfire between the Taliban and Flynn's Top Guns. "I replied that we would work through the government and ensure that those people would be rewarded by a new mosque for their participation." The competition was on. If Flynn had learned one thing about Afghans, it was that envy was a motivating force for mobilization among villagers. He hoped it would galvanize interest from other villagers. Flynn told the Afghans that if they were truly committed, they should meet the ANA and his A/1-320th company at Charqolba the following Thursday (Jan. 6) to begin training for their duty as ALP.

Flynn's ANA partners were excited. His ANA partner unit had helped facilitate the shura meetings and would be involved in the training with the nascent ALP programs once underway. They knew they were too thin to cover all the villages in the AO themselves. In such remote rural areas, local police initiatives were going to be key to holding that terrain.

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In the new issue of Marine Corps Gazette, Ed Darack takes apart Marcus Luttrell's Lone Survivor, which purported to be a history of a botched operation in Afghanistan in June 2005. Darack, himself the author of Victory Point, a book about the same operation, does a good job of explaining why he thinks the Luttrell book, which was a bestseller, was off base. Most strikingly, Luttrell stated in his after-action report that his SEAL team was attacked by 20 to 35 fighters, but his book claims that the team faced hundreds. (In fact, Darack adds, video analysis and other intelligence indicates it probably was eight to 10 insurgents.) Darack calls the book "gripping, yet extraordinarily unrealistic."

Also, another book, Seal of Honor, about the same incident, refers to Marines from "Company C, 1st Battalion (Airborne)," a unit which Darack notes actually does not exist.

Unusually, Darack concludes his critique by listing the ranks, names, and positions of 12 Marines he interviewed.

By Rebecca Frankel
Best Defense Chief Canine Correspondent

Meet Basco, patrol explosive detector dog with the 627 Security Forces Squadron currently on assignment in Afghanistan. Basco and his handler, Sgt. Matthew Templet, have recently been on patrol with ANA soldiers in and around an abandoned village in the Zari district of Kandahar province. The following images are of Basco and his team as they attempted to root out lingering explosives in these now-empty villages turned into battlefields by the Taliban some three years ago.

Here Basco balks as Sergeant Templet tries to coax him down a tunnel near an abandoned house in Loya Derah village to search for explosives.

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By Rebecca Frankel
Best Defense Chief Canine Correspondent

There's some good news on our campaign to life the "don't pet, don't feed" ban -- even if it's not official … yet. Stars and Stripes reports that military bases in Afghanistan are "going to the dogs -- and cats."

It seems, the number of soldiers "smuggling" stray animals into their bases to "adopt and spoil" is on the rise. According to S&S reporter, Jon Rabinoff, despite strict regulations against adopting pets or "mascots" one could "pick any U.S. military base in Afghanistan and find yourself a heartwarming pet story worthy of an 'Animal Planet' feature."

These dogs and kittens who have been smuggled in by soldiers and given names such as Bacon, Butterscotch, and Momma -- all are cared for and coddled by the soldiers around them, including having dog/cat houses and dining on eggs, tuna, and chocolate milk. (The six-picture gallery is definitely worth viewing.)

One soldier told S&S: ""I can honestly speak for everybody else -- it definitely boosts our morale and gives us another bit of responsibility. It keeps our energy positive, playing with them and spending time with them." But Best Defense readers know that calling these strays "pets" or "mascots" is a misrepresentation of the invaluable contribution the offer. Not only are these stray dogs helping to protect and sustain soldiers on base, but they're going out on foot patrol -- a dangerous job for a mere "pet." Two of the dogs, Thumper and George, who rolled with troops at a combat outpost in the Arghandab district were killed after accidentally setting off an IED.

But the official military lines and rules still stand -- no indigenous pets allowed on base -- but it looks like even the higher ups are starting to consider the weight of the benefits against protocol -- letting this rule bend out of sight entirely.

Lt. Col. Matthew Reid told S&S, "he has a lot more important things to worry about in the life-and-death world of a war zone than who might be sneaking a puppy or kitten into their bunk at night. ‘I really haven't given it too much thought, to be honest,' adding that he was aware of cats employed on some bases to address rodent concerns. "My focus is usually elsewhere…'"

The other day my CNAS colleague Soriana Crisan wandered over to the National Press Club to see what the terrorism big thinkers are thinking. She came back all gloomy, but what did you expect? I think next time we should send her to a Lady Gaga concert.

Here is her report:

By Sorina I. Crisan
Best Defense terrorism punditry bureau

Hey Tom, as you requested, here are some "high points" from the Jamestown Foundation's 4th Annual Terrorism Conference, held on Thursday, Dec. 9.

• Bruce Hoffman, director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University, kicked off the proceedings by arguing that there is no "understanding of what terrorism strategy is." Today, al Qaeda is a networked transnational movement that is just "a shadow of its former self" but has been able to survive "because it has managed to adapt to a changing environment." He said we should employ a dual strategy of capturing terrorists and breaking the recruitment cycle by better reaching the youth demographic.
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You're all winners, of course -- that's why you read this blog. I actually liked a lot of the submissions, even though it kind of deteriorated near the end. (Caddyshack? And someone forgot blog rule 19: Try not to post comments after consuming four or more drinks.)

Anyways, thanks for the laughs. I've long been an Elmer Fudd fan, so one of my favorites was Conormannix's "Be vewy vewy qwiet … we're hunting insurgents."

But I think the winner is this, from Thomas Sheehy (I had posted it as an anonymous contribution, but in a follow-up e-mail, he said it is OK to ID him): "But wait, there's more: I'll throw in an extra troop surge absolutely free! Just pay shipping and handling."   

And to those of you who posted from Bagram -- congratulations on your nerve! I'm impressed you found that much vodka out there.

Meanwhile, here are some terrorist fist bumps in Bagram:

By Rebecca Frankel
Best Defense Chief Canine Correspondent

Since it's Thanksgiving it seemed appropriate to give thanks for our war dogs and acknowledge the significant role they're playing in our wars. As Tom points out, even the Pentagon has determined -- after spending vast sums of defense dollars -- bomb-sniffing dogs are more valuable to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq detecting IEDs than any technology developed to date. It's now a matter of fact that these military dogs are not only worthy of our attention, but the substantial resources the U.S. government devotes to them.

Be they official service dogs, or war-zone strays, they are more than military machines, or danger-detection devices -- they are empaths, healers, loyal friends, and brave soldiers. Their contribution to the war effort extends far beyond the battlefield into homes and hospital rooms. The military has been offering life-long service dogs to wounded veterans since World War I. There are some new and still-developing programs that use canines a means of therapy to help soldiers cope with returning to life after war -- whether it's an injury, PTSD, or deep depression, these programs have so far proven tremendously successful.

Here's a short list of some rehabilitative programs making news lately. (Note: many are certified 501c(3) non-profit organizations and take donations. 'Tis the season ... ) We know there are more, so please send us the ones we've missed.

• Paws for Purple Hearts
• P2v
• Puppies Behind Bars
• America's VetDogs
• Paws and Stripes
• The U.S. Department of Veteran's Affairs FAQ to service dogs

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My CNAS colleague Andrew Exum is putting together a website for platoon leaders and company commanders deploying to Afghanistan. I am helping him as I can. Below is the memo I wrote for him yesterday. But please go to his blog and offer your own suggestions.

My favorite single document is CWO2/Gunner Keith Marine's Afghanistan Lessons Learned report. Start here with his discussion of how to patrol.

There are 17 parts in all, reachable on Tom's blog under Marine's name (which is real, by the way).

Here is a reading list I originally wrote for a friend who was deploying to Afghanistan. It must have been a good list because a year later he was named Marine Corps intelligence officer of the year.

Here is a link to reading suggestions made by company commanders in the 101st Airborne at the end of a tour in eastern Afghanistan.

Here is a list and discussion of pre-deployment tips from those 101st commanders.

In a nutshell, here are their suggestions:

1. Get fit
2. A little understanding goes a long way
3. If you want stability, work on continuity
4. Don't assume you own the Afghan night
5. Don't underestimate the enemy
6. Your weapons usage may surprise you
7. Find time for training between fights
8. Employ the locals

Read anything by David Kilcullen, especially his basic articles, which I think are more helpful than his book. Don't miss his "28 Articles" on COIN at the company level.

Also, here are links to a discussion of Killcullen's metrics for COIN in Afghanistan.

And then go to this.

Then this.

And finally this.

Read "The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa," a short book that provides a terrific look at COIN in Iraq from the point of view of a platoon leader. Here is my discussion of it.

Here is a reading list on COIN by Prof. Eliot Cohen, who helped write the COIN manual.

Finally, if Andrew hasn't already told you: Get on companycommand.com, and ask for help. Also, get ahold of their book "A Platoon Leader's Tour," which I wrote about here.

Here's a response to Col. Gian Gentile's comments that I ran Monday about how to revise the Army/Marine counterinsurgency manual. The author must remain anonymous.

By "Clair Huldenbild"
Best Defense counterinsurgency defender

I don't usually agree with Gian, but I have supported the idea that FM 3-24 is incomplete and requires substantive updating. I don't buy the "deconstruction" argument, though, or his three options. I wanted to underscore the fact that the Operations chapter lays out three separate but not exclusive operational approaches -- one is pop.-centered, long term and it got the most coverage, while the Limited/El Salvador option and Combined Action (shared FID) got VERY short shrift.

I think our leadership wrote the manual for the war they knew we were fighting and not for posterity. It was doctrine with a mission, and thus it is not applicable enough for future scenarios, as Gian argues. 

I liked this line, and support it: "we would move away from the dogmatic belief currently held that anytime an insurgency is fought it must be of the population centric (FM 3-24, aka state building) persuasion, and that methods of CT and FID are subsumed within it and hence are seen as 'lesser' operations. To reemphasize the key here is operational equality of the respective three."

We definitely need to broaden the aperture of our understanding of different COIN/CT/Civil conflict challenges.

Five 101st Airborne soldiers were killed on Sunday by small arms fire in Afghanistan's Kunar province -- I am guessing in operations in the Pech Valley, which has been frisky lately.

When I saw five had died, I first thought it must have been a big IED. But five being killed by small arms fire feels like a patrol got ambushed or an outpost nearly got overrun, which reminds me of Wanat.

Here's the Pentagon announcement:

They died Nov. 14 in Kunar province, Afghanistan, when insurgents attacked their unit with small arms fire.

Killed were:

Spc. Shane H. Ahmed, 31, of Chesterfield, Mich.

Spc. Nathan E. Lillard, 26, of Knoxville, Tenn.

Spc. Scott T. Nagorski, 27, of Greenfield, Wis.

Spc. Jesse A. Snow, 25, of Fairborn, Ohio.

Pfc. Christian M. Warriner, 19, of Mills River, N.C.

They were assigned to the 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Ky.

My condolences to their families and comrades.

By Paula Broadwell
Best Defense guest columnist

Beyond the noise emanating from the air strikes and guns that surge forces are firing in Kandahar, another surge has occurred over the past year - a surge in the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).

Total ANSF growth, starting from November 2009 to present increased from 191,969 to 255,506, an increase of 63,537 (33 percent). The Afghan army has grown from 97,011 to 136,164, an increase of 39,153 (40 percent) and the national police from 94,958 to 117,342, an increase of 22,384 (24 percent).

In November 2009, only 35 percent of all soldiers met the minimum qualification standards with their personal weapon. There was an unworkable 1:79 trainers to troop ratio at the firing ranges where Afghan soldiers were attempting to learn. Ten months later, the average unit has a 97 percent qualification rate at the range and the instructor to troop ratio has decreased to 1:29, thanks to increasing support from coalition partners.

The quality of the troops may in some way be reflected through public trust. The Afghan Minister of Defense, Abdul Rahim Wardak, mentioned that the Afghan National Police (ANA) is perceived as the most trusted public institution in Afghanistan during a Rehearsal of Concept drill in Kabul in October. According to the results of an Afghan nation-wide survey (sample 6,700), 71 percent of Afghans feel a favorable impression toward the Afghan National Police (ANP) and 74 percent feel favorably towards the ANA. (By comparison, only 23 percent of Americans surveyed in a Gallup poll this month felt favorably towards the U.S. Congress.)

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Counterterrorism without counterinsurgency is alluring -- it seems cheaper and easier -- but it is usually pretty meaningless and in fact can be very counterproductive. People who advocate just doing counterterror generally don't understand that. This is one of the best explanations I've read of why the short, easy way just doesn't work, from a friend who can't be identified, but who is in a position to understand this.

If you work at the White House, please read this slowly.

By Mr. XYZ
Best Defense terrorism columnist

To avoid killing the wrong people, you need intelligence. Good intelligence demands you have very close contact with, and cooperation from, the very constituency the Terrorists are seeking to mobilize. These folks won't cooperate unless they have security of person and property AND believe you won't abandon them after the next presidential election. That means that you can't CT without COIN.

Oh you can try. Clinton made a sport of it -- firing several hundred million dollars worth of cruise missiles into the deserts of North Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. Predictably, fire weapons and fire weapons alone not only did not compel the enemy to surrender, it caused them to multiply.

No serious student of strategic aerial bombardment I know of still believes that bombing a civilian population -- short of nuclear weapons -- will do anything more (or less) than awaken a sleeping giant -- Pearl Harbor and 9/11 are perfect examples, but so too are the largely failed terror-bombing campaigns of the Luftwaffe of Britain (1940-41 and ‘44-45) and the British reply to Germany (1942-1945).

The reason terror bombing does not work, is it causes predictable outrage in the survivors. Even if you use precision weapons -- no, especially if you use precision weapons -- killing anyone in my family will make of me an implacable enemy. I say this because if you use precision weapons you purportedly have the ability to avoid killing the wrong people and yet you killed one of mine. Hence, you MEANT to kill my relative. And now, I will have to return the favor -- especially if I am from a Shame Culture.

Used alone, navies and air forces cannot, therefore, win against insurgents. Why? Because they are fire weapons -- and fire weapons alone can never compel the enemy to surrender. The enemy may choose to surrender -- as happened in Serbia in 1999 and Japan in 1945, but the decision is left to the enemy. True decision in war comes from shock forces -- Marines/ infantry. Once shock forces go into action the enemy must repel the attack or leave. If they can't leave or defeat the attack they must surrender.

If you're going to employ shock forces, you are now going to be in and among the population. If you are going to have a population that is at least neutral, if not supporting you, then you will need to understand their language, culture, and aspirations, and help to provide for their needs. You must also be prepared for a long and costly war, in both money and casualties.

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One of the fun things about doing this blog is coming across new people writing interesting books and doing other good work. Last week I highlighted Adrian Lewis's terrific book The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom. This week he is contributing a column about some of the work he is doing with disabled vets. (And for you conspiracy theorists, no, this was not some sort of set deal -- more just blundering around in the dark.)

By Adrian Lewis
Best Defense guest columnist

America's universities are being grossly under-utilized by the Armed Forces of the United States in the persistent irregular war we are currently fighting in the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and other parts of the world.

In this persistent, prolonged irregular war (IW), it is now well understood that traditional approaches to generating combat power are not enough. The combat power needed in irregular warfare cannot be generated by military forces alone. As a consequence we now talk about the "Whole of Government Approach." The services understand that a more holistic approach on the part of all government agencies is necessary. Agencies such as the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Agriculture, and other such agencies have to be integrated into strategic and operational plans and into the execution of those plans to achieve IW objectives and improve operational effectiveness. These agencies have the education, talent, skills, and abilities that are not found in our Armed Forces, but are greatly needed in many developing regions. As a result of these changes and lessons learned the services are developing and integrating a new vocabulary that is common to the United Nations, the Red Cross/Red Crescent, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and other such agencies. Terms such as capacity building, comprehensive approach, interagency coordination, whole of government approach, security force assistance, conflict transformation, rule of law, fragile state, vulnerable state, crisis state, and other such terms are now being heard in the halls of the Command and General Staff College, the War Colleges, the service academies, and other military schools and training centers.

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By Rebecca Frankel
Best Defense Chief Canine Correspondent

The Marines operating in southern Afghanistan have sent out a call to arms: they want more war dogs, specifically more Labrador Retrievers, intending to double the number they have now to 647 canines. This particular breed of dog has done quite well in the field detecting IEDs.

And it's a good thing -- the number of insurgent attacks using roadside bombs is at an all time high -- in July the number was 1,358 -- and the Marines, heavily dependent on their bomb-sniffing pups, are keen to replenish their troops. "We want as many as we can get," said Lt. Joshua Diddams, a Marines spokesman told the USA Today.

The Pentagon announced last month that it will spend "$34 million to a Virginia firm to supply it with IED-detector dogs and provide care for them until September 2012." And it's not just about bulking up the number of dogs -- it's about giving the animals that have been on active duty time to rest and recuperate. War wears on these military dogs, too, and their performance suffers because of it. According to Doug Miller, working dog program manager at the Pentagon, after months in a combat zone the dogs return looking "thinner, just like Marines."

In the photo above Marines take a break from duty and go for a swim with their bomb-sniffing dog, a black Lab named Bee, in the reservoir above the Kajaki dam on Oct. 12 in Kajaki, Afghanistan.

If you have any war-dog stories to share -- if you know of any adopted military dogs, or have stories of strays in the field, do send them in to Best Defense!