Posted By Thomas E. Ricks

This is the best article I've read about how to think about American moves in the war in Afghanistan.

TAUSEEF MUSTAFA/AFP/Getty Images

By Rebecca Frankel

Best Defense Chief Canine Correspondent

On January 12, a bronze plaque was unveiled in front of the kennels at Fort Belvoir bearing the facility's new name: "Sgt. Zainah "Caye" Creamer Military Working Dog Kennels." It was a year ago to the day that Sgt. Creamer succumbed to wounds she sustained in Afghanistan after her unit was attacked by an insurgent's IED. She was the first "female working dog handler to be killed in action during the Iraq or Afghanistan wars."

Sgt. Creamer and her detection dog Jofa had deployed to Afghanistan in October 2010. Their job was to search for weapons, working ahead of their unit to sweep for explosives. Jofa, who was across the road from his handler when the explosion occurred and survived the attack unscathed.

The Belvoir Eagle covered the memorial service held in at Fort Belvoir in Virginia and reports that during the ceremony her fellow handlers remembered Sgt. Creamer with fondness and respect as a "leader" who had the "ability to light up a room no matter what the situation."    

It was a spirited disposition that, at 28 years of age, she seems to have maintained with ease. Her headquarters battalion commander, Lt. Col. Dwayne Bowyer, remembers that Sgt. Creamer was:  

...Determined, focused and happy the day she departed with her unit. ‘Silently, we all knew that we were sending them into harm's way but we never imagined that Sgt. Creamer would make the ultimate sacrifice doing what she loved.'"

Reportedly after Sgt. Creamer's death, Jofa's loss was visible. But, a year later he is still working and, according to Lt. Col. Bowyer, the dog is doing "great" with his new handler.

In other war-dog news: The United States Postal Service has finally issued a set of working-dog stamps. Among the four canines featured are a guide dog, a therapy dog, and a search and rescue dog, and what reports are calling a "tracker dog." The yellow lab featured on the bottom left of the four-square sheet is clearly a MWD. I would hazard a guess and say a bomb detection dog, made obvious by the fatigue-clad handler's leg visible against the desert-y background. I'll save the nitpicking and compliment the original paintings, which are the work of John M. Thomas and they're lovely. It's enough to make you want to put pen to paper for some good old-fashioned letter writing.

Posted By Thomas E. Ricks

My friend Michael  Yon comments from Afghanistan, "If Anonymous were cyber heroes, they'd go after drug cartels without blinking."

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Tom: I believe this is a Best Defense first, an author commenting on the comments posted in response to his original column and being promoted to comment of the day.

"As the author scans these responses, he's struck by how truly their tones of anger, frustration, and, especially, disgust echo the same tones of anger, frustration, and disgust he heard so often and so eloquently expressed by his students at FOB Fenty. Outrage and just plain-old RAGE toward Afghans, toward the war in Afghanistan, and toward those running the war in Afghanistan often erupted into our classroom discussions. (Most of the time, however, we laughed our relatively clean butts off. The gift of laughter is something that those students at Fenty gave in abundance to each other and to the classroom. Laughter, it often seemed to me, was the only possible human response to what the students described of war's innumerable inhuman absurdities.) As one responder notes, such discussions were nothing but "navel-staring." Where else does one begin a discussion about the treatment of shit, if not by re-examining the essential nature of one's own core values? Navel staring and even sphincter sniffing-indeed!

"Cleanliness," as another responder rightly notes, is a core military value. And shit really is the great leveller. It demands self examination. But after all, our own shit smells like roses, doesn't it? Or, as one student put it, "this type of war is anything but clean."

Behind my student's outrage was his legitimate perception of an injustice. He smelled a turd in the milk. And it was my duty as a professor to encourage him roll up his sleeves and fish around for that turd. As many responders have noted here, there IS something fundamentally unjust about U.S. soldiers being forced to use toilettes made filthy and unsanitary by their ANA counterparts and vice versa. Like many responders here, some of my students suggested that that student's outraged sense of justice points to and emerges from the underlying injustice of the war in Afghanistan. (Or, as they put it, "What the hell are we really doing here?") Others suggested, like a few responders here, that that injustice stemmed from unintelligent, lazy, or incompetent military leadership. ("Give the ANA separate latrines," as one responder put it. Separate but equal?) Still others suggested that that injustice is rooted in the purportedly barbaric cultural habits of Afghans.

(To the responder who distrusts historical canine analogies, the Alexander "meme" was brought forward spontaneously in response to the student's outrage, as what we might call a "teaching moment," because that class happened to be Greek mythology, and I happened to have prepared a lecture on the history of Alexander's invasion of Bactra. You make an excellent point, though, and it would make more sense, especially right now, to give a detailed lecture about the final days of Mohammed Najib's rule, such as Peter Tomsen performs in The Wars in Afghanistan.)

That the situation U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan face right now is fundamentally unjust cannot be denied. As recent events in Afghanistan demonstrate, U.S. soldiers are increasingly likely to be shot by ANA even within the supposed safety of the FOB. Fobbits must watch their backs in Afghanistan today.

All of my students were suffering in one way or another from multiple-deployment fatigue. And all expressed (or vented) serious doubts about the value of our mission in Afghanistan. Morale there, as compared to that of AFRICOM where my students held their head very high, is low.

My intention in posting the essay was to draw attention from an increasingly indifferent civilian U.S. population to the tragic predicament in which our servicemen and women find themselves in the war in Afghanistan.

The trickiness of their predicament was mirrored by what I was also hearing from my Afghan tent mates at Fenty, which were exactly the same tones of anger, frustration, and disgust-only, they aimed their outrage and RAGE at U.S. soldiers. Quartered in a "transient" tent that was supposed to be exclusively designated for local-national Afghan interpreters, Pashtun, Nuristanis, and Pashais, I was the only non-Afghan living in this tent. And I admit that I was not especially comfortable in that tent, chiefly because a few of them told me they didn't want me there. They didn't want any of us there, as one fellow put it. So, I asked him what would happen to Afghanistan if we were to go home immediately, as he claimed he wanted. What about Pakistan? What about the Taliban? What about the Uzbeks? And Tajiks? He responded by saying, "Afghans are not afraid to die." When I heard that, I didn't know whether to shit or go blind.

One responder rightly notes that to get compliance at the macro-level you need to gain it at the micro-level, first. I can only wonder how you gain compliance at any level from a people who are not afraid to die?

And if compliance be impossible in Afghanistan, then I very well may have been sent, as another responder put it, on a "fool's errand." I most certainly did feel like a fool much of my time in Afghanistan, but not when I was in the presence of those students. Despite the impossibility of the many tricky situations they confront daily on behalf of a nation that has largely forgotten this war; despite the frustration, the disgust, the outrage and the rage, despite shit in their showers and in their sinks, despite their deployment fatigue, they demonstrated daily the mental resiliency that General Petraeus believes is essential to becoming a competent war fighter. "We cannot," Petraeus argues, "be competent warfighters unless we are as intelligent and mentally tough as we are aggressive and physically rugged." Fool's errand or not, my students did, on the whole, demonstrate that their core values are strong and resilient enough to "take their shit."

But perhaps the really difficult part for many of my students will be leaving the shit of Afghanistan behind when the time comes to make the long odyssey back home to a nation of civilians who largely do not understand the nearly imponderable nature of the task our servicemen and women were asked to perform in Afghanistan."

Carol Mitchell

By Doyle Quiggle

Best Defense department of classical studies

A few minutes before the beginning of a Greek mythology class at FOB Fenty, Jalalabad, for which I'd prepared to lecture on Alexander the Great's swift invasion but treacherous occupation of Afghanistan, my best student stomped into the classroom, slammed his M4 down on the table, and announced, "I can't take their shit anymore!"

After his classmates and I had calmed him down, he explained that the walls, stall door, and floor of the toilet he'd just used were smeared with feces. They were always smeared with feces, he complained. He was furious about being forced daily to use facilities that were, as he put it, "Inhumanely, barbarically unhygienic and filthy." He and his unit shared their toilet with the ANA, as they had been ordered to do by their commanding officers-"hearts and minds." And it was the custom of the ANA to wipe themselves with their hands, smear their excrement on the walls of the toilette, and rinse their hands in the sink, which left the sinks reeking, a reek made especially acrid and pungent by the Afghans' high intake of goat meat and goat milk. While brushing his teeth, my student often had to struggle to keep down his gorge.

The outraged student, who, despite TSIRT, knew dangerously little about the cultural habits of any of the many Afghan tribes, had begun to take the ANA's toilette habits personally. I wanted to get my student to explore the source of his outrage. But I did not want to relativize or dismiss his outrage because I have learned that outrage always points toward a perception of injustice. It, therefore, also implies a healthy and intact sense of justice, which is something I encourage in students. So, I suggested to him that he was being faced (in the toilet customs of the ANA) with what Alexander's Macedonian Greeks would have called "borborygmus," a word that Plato and Aristophanes and Homer used to describe the filthy, excremental sewage of the underworld of Hades. For was he not in a kind of underworld (Hades or hell) on deployment in an Afghanistan he barely understood? Borborygmus not only means "shit." It also connotes "shit fearing." Borborophoba was known as the Goddess of the realm of death. She had the power to keep shit from flowing, but she also possessed the power to make it flow in the face of mortal fear and threat of death. Every combat soldier has been struck by her bowel- and bladder-releasing powers at least once in his life.

We then recalled what we'd read of David Grossman in On Killing, "the physiology of the fight: the body's role in combat and the skill to kill," where he explains in the modern language of physiology what the Greeks described in the metaphorical language of myth:

"Homeostasis is the balance struck between SNS and PNS during normal routine behavior, and can be thrown completely out of synchronicity when confrontation occurs, with PNS systems largely shutting down. One result of this can be the body ‘blowing the ballast', that is the dumping of unnecessary bodily substances which are of no benefit in combat - urine and feces, a rather unseemly but wholly natural bodily response to confrontation. This loosening of muscles which would be potentially drawing energy without contributing to the immediate task of survival is associated with the recession of PNS systems as the SNS is in the ascendancy."

Now, the smeared feces that my student had been dealing with daily in his ANA-USA shared toilet was not the result of a loss of homeostasis due to threat, but it did point to the realm of Borborophoba, and it pointed most directly to the underlying cultural void between soldiers like my student and the Afghan Army. As every anthropologist or mythographer knows, shit is the great leveler. It marks a psychic and cultural border. How a culture treats excrement, waste (all of that which it discards) speaks volumes about that culture. And when we are confronted with another culture's treatment of excrement, we are often pushed to the threshold and outer border of our own most deeply held, highly cherished values.

On the day of my student's enraged expression of borborophoba, I asked him and his classmates to link his I-can't-take-their-shit-anymore outrage to that of Alexander and his men when they arrived in Bactra where they discovered dogs roaming the otherwise highly civilized city, dogs feeding upon human bodies. According to the religious practices of the Bactrians, they threw not only their dead to the dogs but also their sick, lame, and invalid elderly-anyone considered social excrement or waste. Alexander and his men observed that the normal, healthy citizens of Bactria went about their daily business even as dogs devoured human bodies in the streets. An upstanding Bactrian merchant might walk past a pack of dogs feasting on a corpse as nonchalantly as a Greek merchant would walk past a fish stand.

Although Alexander and his men had been exceptionally tolerant of the strange cultural and religious practices of the many tribes they'd conquered since defeating Darius at the Battle of Granicus, the use of devouring dogs was one cultural bridge too far for the Macedonian Greeks. They simply could not imagine disposing of the dead in any form other than a tomb or a funeral pyre. Their invention of a Goddess like Borborophoba itself speaks to how ornately and vividly they'd imagined the world after life. Alexander and his men could not imagine anything more barbaric than encouraging dogs to devour the dead. Contrariwise, the Bactrians could not imagine anyone being barbaric enough not to do so with their dead.

The devouring dogs brought Alexander to a classic cultural impasse. And here Alexander drew a strict line. He would no longer tolerate what he viewed as a barbaric practice. He'd arrived at an I-can't-take-their-shit-anymore point of outrage, and he banned the use of devouring dogs from Bactria. At this historic moment, Alexander's real epic struggle began, the struggle to civilize Afghanistan. And by civilize we mean simply that he enacted policies that sought to force Afghanistan's tribes out of the bronze age and into the iron age.

We spent the rest of the class drawing analogies from Alexander's occupation of Bactra to the current ISAF mission in Afghanistan. That discussion involved our detailing as many incompatible differences between the primary cultural habits of US soldiers and those of the ANA, as well as the cultural habits of Afghans that US soldiers had observed on off-base patrols. We discussed everything from the treatment of excrement to the treatment of women. Many of my female soldier-students could not see any difference between the two as far as Afghan men were concerned. In order for our anthropological discussion to make any difference whatsoever to my students, we had to "keep it real," as they would say. To bite into the marrow, our discussion had to begin with harsh differences, like the handling of shit in latrines, that had evoked an acute emotional response from the soldiers. Only thereafter could we move on to the academic observations made of Afghanis by such notable authors as Thomas Barfield or Maratine van Bijlert or Antonio Giustozzi.

In other words, the professor treated his own students as if they were an alien culture, working from within their value system and emotional matrix, oscillating between their perceptions of an alien culture (Afghans) and that culture's perceptions of them. I'd assiduously gathered the latter perceptions from many chai-tea conservations with my tent mates, who were Afghan interpreters, Pashtun, Nuristanis, and Pashais.

My pedagogical aim for my students was to encourage cultural intelligence toward Afghans without encouraging any kind of soft-minded, limp-wristed relativism of values (cultural relativity) in which their own commitment to classical military core values such as loyalty, courage, selfless service, integrity, moderation, and justice might be diluted or weakened. On the contrary, my goal was to help them strengthen their commitment to those core values by showing them that they can withstand the outside challenge of culture to which they are wholly alien; they can, so to speak, "take their shit."

Doyle Quiggle taught oratory, rhetoric, and the classics to U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in two different war zones, at Camp Lemonnier (Djibouti, Africa) and at Forward Operating Base Fenty (Jalalabad, Afghanistan). The honor of contributing to the education of war fighters on the battlefield was granted to Quiggle by the U.S. Army through a contract with the University of Maryland, University College. Quiggle received his PhD from Washington University.

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A Marine friend writes:

I recall being taught something along the lines of "When it comes to talking to the media, remember: the reporter is going to tell or write a story regardless of what you do or don't say. It's on you to ensure that he or she understands the context of what is being observed."

This lesson was also running through my mind at the end of a patrol one day in Garmsir. On this particular day, I went out with a squad from our 3rd Platoon on a security patrol around a place called the Lakari Bazaar. This bazaar, at the beginning of our deployment, was owned by the Taliban and littered with IEDs. At this stage in the deployment, the ANA, the Afghan people, and the Marines that I had the privilege to serve had joined forces to eliminate the Taliban in the area. The Taliban mayor of the bazaar was turned over to us. More than 40 IEDs located in the bazaar were pointed out to us. And, nearly every enemy that attempted to go back active or to infiltrate back into the area chose not to do so because the people, or the children, would almost immediately pass the information to the ANA and/or Marines. Our new patrol base, much like Fort Page in "Bing" West's The Village, was right next to the main village and bazaar. This made sharing information easy.

As I walked back into friendly lines on this day, I noticed what appeared to be two American women sitting down next to our terrain model. One reminded me of my mother, and the other, to a degree, of my older sister. Curious as to what they were doing in our area, I walked up to them and introduced myself, "Hi, I'm ____, is there anything I can help you with?" As best I recall, the exchange proceeded, "Are you the commander here?" I responded, "I guess you could say that. The Marines and ANA run the show, but ultimately, yes, I'm responsible for everything in the AO." The woman responds, "Are you ____?" I respond, "Yes, Ma'am, I am." She then says, "Oh, good, I've been looking for your unit for about a week. I'm Elisabeth Bumiller from the New York Times, and this is Lynsey, she works with me. We're here to cover the FET. I've been told your Company employs FET teams all the time. We'd like to see and write about what the FETs do."

Decision point - hmmmn, what next? I've been told nothing about the New York Times coming to our AO (I had been away from our company CP for a few days and we were all very busy). I have no clue who Elisabeth Bumiller is, or Lynsey, the woman with the camera. And of all topics, FET? I'm thinking to myself, "FET, Marines, grunts, Afghanistan, New York Times???" This one's going to be interesting...!

Sparing too many details, after the patrol de-brief, I sat down with Elisabeth and Lynsey for a little while, did my best to understand their mission, experience in Afghanistan or Iraq, what accommodations they needed, etc. I was surprised to hear Elisabeth say that she had never been to Iraq or Afghanistan, yet she wanted to patrol at least once a day with an infantry unit and FET. Lynsey, on the other hand, was an OEF veteran; she had previously done an embed tour in the Korengal Valley.

After learning of their desires, I thought it best that they spend the next few days with two of our partnered rifle squads. Both squads were led by multi-tour, tough as nails, highly respected, big, and previously wounded Sergeants. One of the squad leaders had lost both of his parents just before the deployment (one in the tsunami that hit American Samoa). He was given the option to go home to help his family (this was his fourth deployment in 5 years); he refused. I spoke with the squad leaders and platoon commanders. As best I recall, the conversation went something like this, "Gentlemen, Elisabeth and Lynsey will be staying here for a few days. They want to see how you guys have incorporated FET into your patrols. They also just want to see what you and your Marines do every day. How you interact with the people. How you partner with the Afghans. It's on you to determine the patrol routes in your assigned AOs. You know our mission and your tasks. Just be yourselves and take care of them. They're here to tell America about what you do every day. Any questions?" There were none.

Elisabeth and Lynsey then spent a few days with these squads. Once back from spending time with one of the squad leaders, and at our company headquarters, I asked Elisabeth how she liked her time with the Sergeants. I recall her being amazed. She couldn't believe how young, yet old, mature, and determined the Marines were. She was particularly impressed with the one squad leader who had decided to deploy again despite all of the losses to his family. Specific to FET, she was also surprised to see how well the female Marines were received in the villages.

Once at our company position, Elisabeth and Lynsey went on patrol with different units and interviewed numerous Marines and Sailors. My rules to the unit were simple: "Be respectful, be honest, and take care of them." All I asked of Elisabeth and Lynsey was that they not photograph, videotape, or write about a few very specific things that I pointed out to them. They understood why for operational security reasons and agreed immediately.

As the days progressed, they patrolled with most of the company's squads, both of the FET teams, observed a weapons cache discovery (based on a local information tip), and watched a Taliban reconciliation from start-to-finish. As they were about to fly out of Mian Poshteh, Elisabeth still wasn't 100 percent sure of what her stories were going to be about. She said one would most likely cover FET teams and another possibly about the reconciliation. She asked if it was okay to e-mail if she had any last minute questions and then thanked us for taking care of her and Lynsey. A few weeks later, she e-mailed to double check one detail that she planned on writing about. A few days later, I read her first article about the reconciliatioAlex Wong/Getty Images for Meet the Pressn in the NY Times. Shortly thereafter, I read the other. I thought both articles were honest, balanced, and accurate. I also thought they explained to America what we had experienced during our deployment.  If we hadn't embraced Elisabeth and Lynsey's mission, I have sometimes wondered what the stories would have described..."

Alex Wong/Getty Images for Meet the Press

My old friend Marine Col. (ret.) Gary Anderson writes from somewhere overseas that, "No poor dumb son of a bitch ever won a counterinsurgency by sitting on his FOB. He won it by making the other poor dumb son of a bitch sit on his FOB."

Meanwhile, here is a guest column on COIN issues:

By "Ford Prefect"

Best Defense asylum for COIN bitter-enders

I know and respect Col. Gian Gentile from our years teaching at USMA and afterwards.  I think he's off on this -- just like the uber-COIN pundits of the 2004-2007 era were as well. There were a few people (John Nagl and some others come to mind) that were thinking about COIN in the decade prior to 9/11 -- they were very few, and very far between.  Others piled on the COIN train as it left the station, and tend to be the first to jump off as soon as it stops.  Just an observation. 

COIN should not be an organizational "design tool" to build the U.S. armed forces around.  It is a method of conflict -- with its own doctrine, tactics and strategy -- that is applied when it is needed.  Conventional, armored ground warfare is much the same. As is sub-surface, surface, cyber, and so on.  The key point is to maintain a cadre of competent NCOs and Officers capable of doing those missions when needed.  How many Coast Guardsmen are competent in ASW? My bet is less than 10. But if the Coasties ever get the mission, those 10 guys/gals will be worth their weight in gold.   

COIN is not "dead" -- it isn't something that can die.  It will exist as long as you send your armed forces to deal with populations outside of fighting their organized armies.  COIN isn't counter-terrorism; the former is a military mission, the latter at its core a law enforcement mission.  CT will continue on as long as terrorism is a tool of a weak adversary; the same with COIN. 

The real question, I think, is how to we keep enough folks around to serve as a cadre for those 'esoteric' missions (like COIN, but also including tactical nuclear warfare, amphibious operations, mass airborne operations and so on) while doing what the Nation expects the armed forces to do -- provide the 'common defense' of the Republic.  Smart reorganization, with a clear understanding of possible future missions, is the key, not dancing on the grave of COIN.

"Ford Prefect" is hitchhiking around Afghanistan. Or sitting in the cubicle to your right. Feeling lucky, punk? Well do ya?

AnnieGreenSprings/Flickr

From a comment posted yesterday by PGMAN25, who says he recently returned from Bagram:

--

 

I would like to add some other jackassery I saw while I was there. While at the DFAC, I saw a group of Army Rangers in PT gear walk in with their M9 pistols with inserted magazines in hand. They did not have holsters. They proceeded to flag each other and everyone else while they got ketchup and drinks. One of them placed the pistol between his legs while he opened the cooler.

I spoke to them (where I discovered they were Rangers) and asked why they didn't have holsters. They had their hands full eating and the pistols were on the table pointing at each other. An Afghan DFAC employee was standing just behind one of the soldiers.

I was told that they were rotating through Bagram and their individual weapons had already been turned in. They were given pistols so they could comply with the order of always being armed. I mentioned how unsafe their weapons handling was and was told not to worry since they weren't given any ammunition."

--
 

Check out I love Bagram for a responsible opposing viewpoint: "2569. When the 11Bravo's come to BAF and they bitch at us or call us pogs. And ask how do we live with ourselfs. I reply 1 hot shower a day."

DVIDSHUB/Flickr

By Mark Hammel

Best Defense guest columnist

As in all human endeavors, knowledge is power. Therefore, in treating an individual unfortunate enough to be suffering from Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), I begin by explaining that PTSD is neither an illness nor a weakness, but rather, an injury. As with all injuries, it is due to exposure to a force that undermines the integrity of a biologically adaptive system of the body. In the case of an injury to the musculoskeletal system, the force is typically of a kinetic nature, such as with a badly sprained ankle. In the case of PTSD, the force is initiated by the perception of mortal danger giving rise to a wave of neurological activity so great that the stress response system of the brain is damaged. Think of this as a power surge.

The stress response system is one and the same as the system that responds to the perception of danger with the fight-freeze-or-flight response. I've found it useful over the years to refer to this system as the danger-monitoring-and-response system of the brain. It is the malfunctioning of this injured system that gives rise to the symptoms that we have come to know in the aggregate as PTSD.

Under normal conditions, our five senses work tirelessly in the background, monitoring the environment for any change in ambient conditions that might represent danger, such as a novel sound or smell, or perhaps movement on the periphery of our visual field. When such a change occurs the system initiates an immediate IFF, consulting its own knowledge base of previous experience, i.e. memory, and at the same time readies itself to unleash the fight-freeze-or-flight response should our memory turn up a match for something that could do us harm.

When the system is impaired, as in the case of PTSD, it enters a sort of safe mode, where the danger-monitoring-and-response function supersedes all other normal functioning. The victim becomes preoccupied with danger, accompanied by an impaired ability to muster the attention and motivation to engage in the myriad of biopsychosocially adaptive activities that uninjured humans accomplish with relative ease.

I hope this explanation makes it easier to grasp the source of two major groups of PTSD symptoms: hyperarousal (e.g. hypervigilance, exaggerated startle response, sleep disturbance, etc.), and avoidance and numbing.

A third group, reexperiencing symptoms, among them so-called flashbacks, is perhaps less easy to grasp, but surely the most salient to victim and clinicians. Normally, when we experience something it brings about a change in the brain that results in the formation of a memory. When we recall it, it is clearly in the realm of having occurred in the past, the there-and-then. In the case of a traumatic experience, the transformation into a memory is incomplete. It exists in a kind of limbo where it is maddeningly reexperienced as occurring in the here-and-now.

Read on

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As a follow-up item to yesterday's post about the blown-up captain getting a ticket in Bagram for not wearing a reflector belt, a congressional staffer passes along this photo he took at the big base at Kandahar air field in 2009. 

Joseph Heller wrote in Catch-22 that it is the nature of military organizations that staffs established to support line units eventually begin thinking that the line units work for them -- and treating line soldiers like it.

"When you do 'Henry V' for a roomful of men in uniform with guns on their hips and M-9s under their chairs, it takes on a whole different meaning.''

-- Tyrus Lemerande, a Navy reservist, quoted in the Boston Globe after entertaining troops with a one-man show featuring selections from Shakespeare. 

 

EXPLORE:AFGHANISTAN

Posted By Thomas E. Ricks

I think that as the United States leaves Iraq and shuffles toward the exit in Afghanistan, we need to think about how to answer that question when veterans of our wars there pose it.

This is a difficult one for me, because I think the war in Afghanistan was the correct response to the 9/11 attacks, but was mishandled for years after that, and I think the war in Iraq was an unnecessary and very expensive distraction from that response. Also, we may well see further violence in both countries that will raise questions about exactly what we achieved.

Also, today's vets tend to have good BS detectors. Recently I walked past a small monument to graduates of a high school who were lost in the Spanish-American War. It stated that they died "for humanity." I don't think so.

I think my response would be along these lines -- but I'd welcome your thoughts. "When your country called, you answered. You did your duty on a mission your country gave to you. In our system, thankfully, the military does not get to pick and choose what missions it will undertake -- that is decided by the officials elected by the people. Those officials are not always right, but they are the leaders we chose to make that decision. No matter what happens in Iraq and Afghanistan, you have the thanks of a grateful nation for answering the call."

Is that enough? I don't know. If someone said that to me, I suspect I would think, Yeah, well where was everyone else? Why did my friends die and yours didn't?

I don't know. Help me out here.

The U.S. Army/Flickr

Posted By Thomas E. Ricks

The new issue of Vanity Fair has a good overview piece by Mark "Black Hawk Down" Bowden about the Wanat battle and its effect on those who fought it, oversaw it and questioned it. Here's a link to the article.

Meanwhile, Rand Corporation surfaces with a report on what Wanat might tell us about small unit operations in Afghanistan. I gave it a skim and can't tell what, if anything, to make of it. I don't want to keep on beating up on poor Rand, but I find their reports tend to be mushy. I read so much stuff that I want people to get to their essential points clearly, quickly and emphatically -- as Col. Creighton Abrams did in an Army War College paper that I was reading yesterday in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. More on that later.

U.S. Department of Defense

Ok, we had some fun yesterday with the defenestration of General Fuller, but this note arrives this morning and it is sobering:

Fuller told the truth on this one and was mangled as a result. It's no secret that the Afghans want to drain every last dime out of the US and the ISAF nations.

The major problem with the Afghan National Security Forces -- other than the rampant corruption, attrition and neptotism -- is the utter lack of institutional control in almost all of their organizations. This is an inward-looking problem, however. The major outward-looking problem associated with the ANSF is that we have built multiple organizations that have no chance at long-term success because they cost too much to sustain. Once the money dries up, the ANSF is toast and everyone who worked in Kabul or with the Afghans at the Corps level or above knows this.

Fuller was relieved not because he told the truth - the Generals are not idiots who don't understand what the situation with the ANSF is and will be. He was fired because he took his frustrations out in public and embarrassed the Afghan Government, the US government and military and the ISAF leadership.

Congress knows everything that is going on with the ANSF. A DoD special Inspector General makes quarterly visits to Kabul and releases quarterly reports that are available on-line. If they wanted to end this kabuki dance, they could slash funding and tell the Afghans to deal with the consequences. Instead, we continue to pump money into the system. There are systemic problems with the ANSF that have no solutions - unless you really want to station 50,000 US Troops there for the next 30 years.

TAUSEEF MUSTAFA/AFP/Getty Images

EXPLORE:AFGHANISTAN

As a public service, Best Defense is offering this primer for generals on their way to Afghanistan.

Here is a list of 19 things that many insiders and veterans of Afghanistan agree to be true about the war there, but that generals can't say in public. So, general, read this now and believe it later-but keep your lip zipped. Maybe even keep a printout in your wallet and review before interviews.

My list of things to remember I can't say

  • Pakistan is now an enemy of the United States.
  • We don't know why we are here, what we are fighting for, or how to know if we are winning.
  • The strategy is to fight, talk, and build. But we're withdrawing the fighters, the Taliban won't talk, and the builders are corrupt. 
  • Karzai's family is especially corrupt.
  • We want President Karzai gone but we don't have a Pushtun successor handy.
  • But the problem isn't corruption, it is which corrupt people are getting the dollars. We have to help corruption be more fair.
  • Another thing we'll never stop here is the drug traffic, so the counternarcotics mission is probably a waste of time and resources that just alienates a swath of Afghans.
  • Making this a NATO mission hurt, not helped. Most NATO countries are just going through the motions in Afghanistan as the price necessary to keep the US in Europe
  • Yes, the exit deadline is killing us.
  • Even if you got a deal with the Taliban, it wouldn't end the fighting.
  • The Taliban may be willing to fight forever. We are not.
  • Yes, we are funding the Taliban, but hey, there's no way to stop it, because the truck companies bringing goods from Pakistan and up the highway across Afghanistan have to pay off the Taliban. So yeah, your tax dollars are helping Mullah Omar and his buddies. Welcome to the neighborhood.
  • Even non-Taliban Afghans don't much like us.
  • Afghans didn't get the memo about all our successes, so they are positioning themselves for the post-American civil war .
  • And they're not the only ones getting ready. The future of Afghanistan is probably evolving up north now as the Indians, Russians and Pakistanis jockey with old Northern Alliance types. Interestingly, we're paying more and getting less than any other player.
  • Speaking of positioning for the post-American civil war, why would the Pakistanis sell out their best proxy shock troops now?
  • The ANA and ANP could break the day after we leave the country.
  • We are ignoring the advisory effort and fighting the "big war" with American troops, just as we did in Vietnam. And the U.S. military won't act any differently until and work with the Afghan forces seriously until when American politicians significantly draw down U.S. forces in country-when it may be too damn late.
  • The situation American faces in Afghanistan is similar to the one it faced in Vietnam during the Nixon presidency: A desire a leave and turn over the war to our local allies, combined with the realization that our allies may still lose, and the loss will be viewed as a U.S. defeat anyway.

Thanks to several people who contributed to this, from California to Kunar and back to DC, and whose names must not be mentioned! You know who you are. The rest of you, look at the guy sitting to your right.

Wikimedia Commons

By "An American Official"
Best Defense guest whistleblower

Regional Command-East has forgone efforts aimed at transition in favor of continuing kinetic warfare. In an order issued in late September, provincial reconstruction teams throughout the easternmost provinces of Afghanistan are facing dramatic cuts, upwards of 60 percent for some, by the end of the year. The effort is an attempt to meet President Barrack Obama's goal of cutting deployed military forces by perhaps 23,000.

While RC-E is making cuts across the board, other commands are trying to avoid fragmenting PRTs, which serve as the driving force behind transition. PRTs are comprised of military, Department of State, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and USAID experts who are highly specialized in combating sources of instability through empowering and mentoring civic leaders, constructing development projects, and educating public. They serve as a positive U.S. presence in a nation devastated by decades of war and strife.

As the U.S. tries to move toward a feasible "exit strategy," many PRTs are laying the foundations for U.S. consulates to house DoS, USAID, and USDA representatives for years to come. However, with cuts favoring the traditional warfighter in the East, PRTs will be forced to "do less with less," while still struggling to bring transition to war-torn areas of Afghanistan.

For the last five years, PRTs have suffered reduced freedom of movement and the ability to show US presence in a positive way. As a stepchild, PRTs now fall under the battle space owners, who could care less about the PRT mission as long as "bad guys" are still alive.

In Iraq, the success of PRTs was largely due to structuring them under the U.S. ambassador. However, in Afghanistan, PRTs are a "two-headed monster" with the civilian components reporting to the embassy and U.S. forces reporting to the brigade task force. "Infantry runs the Army," marginalizing the impact of PRTs and making them subordinate to a kinetic force.

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army.mil

Adam Ashton of the Tacoma News Tribune has a good if dismaying piece on the Army platoon from the 5th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, that went rogue in Afghanistan. One of the most striking sentences: "Twitty found that the soldiers in that platoon came under fire five times in their year overseas. The Army now considers three of those engagements to be murders orchestrated by members of the platoon."

There's so much more that it makes you wonder just where the hell the chain of command was:

*A private destroyed a housing unit on his base when he accidentally discharged a round from a grenade launcher. His squad leader had not done the correct checks to make sure all of the weapons were turned in. The private was Pfc. Andrew Holmes, one of the five "kill team" codefendants who recently pleaded guilty to killing a noncombatant.

*The entire platoon of nearly 30 soldiers fell asleep in Stryker vehicles outside of a base after a patrol without posting a night watch. A senior noncommissioned officer caught them when he watched them through an aerial drone.

*Leaders at multiple levels above 3rd Platoon failed to conduct routine urinalysis tests and other inspections that could have identified misconduct earlier.

*Soldiers wrote graffiti at least once, scrawling the word "crusader" on a road crossing.

*At least one soldier shot dogs and chickens during patrols.

*Another soldier kept fingers from corpses in his housing unit and had access to weapons he should have turned in to his leadership. He was alleged "kill team" ringleader Staff Sgt. Calvin Gibbs.

*Soldiers used their first names when they addressed their leaders and showed poor uniform care, even in the context of relaxed war-zone standards.

*At least 15 soldiers reported smoking hashish.

Tom again: Part of the answer is that the platoon's 1st sergeant had TBI and back injuries and didn't go outside the wire. The platoon leader was a pliable newbie. That still doesn't answer why the troop and battalion commanders weren't on top of this, perhaps breaking up the platoon. The brigade commander, Col. Harry Tunnell, has been cleared. But he was so at odds with his own chain of command that I have to wonder if he contributed to the atmosphere of indiscipline. I think an officer in that situation should be removed without detriment to his career. If General Odierno had done that with Lt. Col. Nate Sassaman back in 2003, Sassaman might well be a general today.

Hellraiser Media/Flickr

Posted By Thomas E. Ricks

Joby Warrick, who used to sit next to me at the Washington Post, has a new book out on the guy who killed a bunch of CIA operatives in Afghanistan in December 2009. Here is a short interview I did with him about The Triple Agent.

Best Defense: There have been a ton of books on intelligence and al Qaeda over the last several years. What makes yours different? Why should a hard-working stiff (or one of the many readers of this blog currently deployed to Afghanistan) pay to download it?

Joby Warrick: Triple Agent is a different kind of read because it is, at its core, a pure narrative, the story of an intelligence operation that unfolds over the course of a year and then goes badly wrong. There's a lot of "news" in the book, including an account of drone warfare that is as detailed, in my humble opinion, as any in the open-source arena. But the reader is pulled along by a story that is populated by unforgettable -- but very real -- characters and races to its tragic climax. For those who closely follow CT, this review by the Brookings Institute's Ben Wittes wonderfully distills what the book seeks to achieve: a penetrating and informative reconstruction of a flawed intelligence operation that, to use Ben's words, "bristles with the energy of a thriller."

BD: Did your research make you more or less pessimistic about the Afghan war?

JW: I became less pessimistic about the prospects for defeating "core" al-Qaeda in the Af-Pak region. The CIA's drone campaign is extraordinarily effective, and the agency is getting progressively better at targeting senior leaders and disrupting their networks. On the other hand, my view of the war itself has not changed substantially. After spending time in the east and meeting with ordinary Afghans there, it's hard to imagine how a future Afghan government will retain control of provinces such as Khost or Paktia once U.S. forces are gone.

BD: What has been the unofficial reaction of CIA types to the book?

JW: I've had wonderful response from individual CIA officers, including some who served at Khost and were present on the day of the bombing. Many said they appreciated the book's straight-ahead approach in telling the story, and the fact that, while pointing out fatal mistakes that led to the bombing, the book is respectful of ordinary men and women who served at Khost and worked under extraordinarily challenging circumstances.

BD: How do you think the CIA should change?

JW: After the bombing, the CIA owned up to what then-director Leon Panetta described as "systemic" failures that contributed to the great loss of life on Dec. 30, 2009. A key failure was an insufficient focus on counterintelligence, which is an even tougher challenge at a time when the intelligence agencies and operatives are strained by multiple rotations and a decade of warfare. There also were mistakes that uniquely reflect the circumstances and individuals at Khost. The CIA has implemented numerous reforms, but a challenge for the agency is how to ensure proper attention and follow-through, given the relative lack of transparency and oversight.


BD: What is the one question you'd like to answer about the book that nobody has asked you?

JW: Some of the events in the book have never been described elsewhere, and I've been surprised that few reviewers or interviewers have asked about them. One favorite: a description in the book of a dirty-bomb threat that emanated from Pakistan mid-2009 and raised alarms at the highest levels of the U.S. government. Information gleaned through SIGINT intercepts suggested strongly that the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) had acquired "nuclear" material-presumably radioactive sources useable in a dirty bomb--and were trying to decide what to do with it. Concerns over a possible dirty-bomb attack directly factored into the decision to take out TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud, who was killed in a drone strike on Aug. 5 of that year. No radioactive material was subsequently found, and to this day, no one knows what happened to it, or indeed, whether it ever existed.

amazon.com

She's back!

By Rebecca Frankel
Best Defense chief canine correspondent

There was blood on his legs, seeping out between the impromptu bandages. From the photos, the blood looked to be caked along his tail, on his hind- and front-paws, even staining the fibers of his leash a deep red. Five Marines, three of them dog handlers, flanked the stretcher that carried Drak, a bomb-sniffing dog with their unit, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, Regimental Combat Team 8, onto a helicopter for emergency evacuation.

Drak, a four-year-old Belgian Malanois, was injured during an insurgent attack, when a suicide bomber targeting Marines and Afghan police, detonated a "vehicle-borne improvised explosive device" outside FOB Jackson in Sangin, Afghanistan on Sept. 8.

Sgt. Kenneth Fischer, Drak's handler, was also injured during the attack when shrapnel from the blast pierced his legs. The pair was flown back to base, then off to surgery.

"He should be OK," Fischer told AP ten days after the attack from Bethesda, MD where he's recovering. "At first, there was some talk about him losing one of his legs, but not so much anymore. Knowing Drak, he should be fine."

Drak, described by his handler as a mostly calm and relaxed dog who never took to the sound of gunfire, is being treated at a facility in Germany but will be transferred to Lackland AFB in Texas to convalesce. If for some reason the young dog isn't able to resume his military service, Fischer has other plans for him, like "spend[ing] his days lying around at Fischer's home at his duty station in Twentynine Palms, California, or playing frisbee."

(The AP posted a gallery of Fischer and Drak, worth viewing here.)

In other news: For those celebrating the Jewish New Year this week, there's a bomb-sniffing dog for that.. The Congregation Mount Sinai Synagogue in Brooklyn, New York is also, for 50 hours a week, home to Gus, a retired bomb-sniffing dog, who was adopted by Rabbi Potasnik last year. Though the synagogue tightens security during the Jewish high holy days, Gus isn't part of NYPD's assistance. Nowadays he spends his time "barking at strangers, chasing rubber balls, and chowing down on treats."

U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Logan W. Pierce

Michael Yon has a strong account of the death of a comrade, as well as some of the prettiest photographs of grapes I've ever seen:

Chazray was terribly wounded and had been thrown and landed on his face. The platoon was staggered yet kept their bearing. There was no light, and the nightvision devices were useless in the thick dust. Sergeant Wooden called out the names of his men in the darkness. Near the detonation, nobody could see each other. Sergeant Wooden called the names, and he called, "Clark!" Chazray was facedown. One arm was gone and his legs were gone, and yet this man had the strength and presence to call out from the dust and darkness saying he was okay. Chazray could still hear. Chazray answered, "I'm okay," and Sergeant Wooden said his voice sounded completely normal. Just normal Chazray. But everyone here knows that when someone calls out and says they are okay, the sound of their voice only means they are still alive. They found Chazray and put on tourniquets and unfolded a stretcher. I was not in the dust and could see brave men carrying him back over dangerous ground and Chazray said his arm tourniquet was too tight. He was in great pain. Through nightvision I could see an Afghan Soldier rush in to help carry Chazray.

Rest in Peace, Chazray Clark. 

Michael Yon in Afghanistan

By Maj. Niel Smith, U.S. Army
Best Defense chief Auftragstatik correspondent

This is the view from being a Stryker BCT S3 in Afghanistan:

1) Mission command requires stable, highly trained staffs and company/troop commanders, proficient in their specialty and job. The Army is still unable to stabilize the "deployment teams" of staff officers and commanders more than three to four months prior to deployment due to the personnel chaos and churn in our system. Staffs have little time to gel, establish SOPs, etc. The most effective thing my commander had me create as an XO was a Squadron Tactical Operations and Planning SOP, which laid out in painful detail every step of the mission planning and orders process for each warfighting function. Over the next six months I spent every Thursday morning teaching my own version of the Captain's course to our (mostly) senior 1LTs filling captain's slots. The SOP came in handy when people changed out or we received attachments - there was no question about what that staff officer's role was and what they contributed to the orders development process. This was especially critical for the non-traditional staff -- the information operations officer, civil military officer, electronic warfare officer, etc. It paid great dividends upon deployment.

2) Company level commanders are more junior than a decade ago, and it reflects. While they are highly adaptable, they are not experienced in how they fit into the larger picture. Their life in the Army has been bouncing from ARFORGEN-deployment-reset-pcs-repeat... They tend to be weak on long range planning and thinking, and struggle to understand how they fit into the fight above them. For example, I spent (a somewhat excessive) 3.5 years on BN and BDE staffs prior to command as a captain, since Germany at the time had a long command queue with few units and many HQs feeding captains. However, this gave me tremendous insight into logistics, personnel, and operations that enabled me to be far more successful in command than if I had taken over right after the career course. All the troop commanders I worked with as a squadron XO were just out of the captain's course and took command upon arrival in the unit. Their prior experience varied, but few had served as more than a PL or XO. As a general rule, they did not understand the BN and BDE fight, the staffs, and how to use them. They also did not get the perspective from learning the unit as a staff officer before taking command, learning how things work, the personality dynamics, and watching other commanders succeed and fail. They were smart and energetic, but simply struggled within the sink or swim environment they were cast into.

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isafmedia/Flickr

By Rebecca Frankel
Chief Canine Correspondent

This week, FP is running a 5-part photo series: The War in Hipstamatic. A mesmerizing collection, these images were shot with iPhones by a group of photojournalists who embedded with the Marines in Battalion 1/8  in Helmand province for five months starting in September 2010. (It's all part of a project called Basetrack -- I encourage Best Defense readers to check it out.) 

The photos from this foray into app-image journalism number in the thousands and I was happy to discover among them three portraits of the company's dogs -- two bomb-sniffers and one adopted stray.

Above: Gunner, a military working dog, looks up from the cot where he was resting at Patrol Base Dehanna, in Nawzad district, on Jan. 9.

Image by Teru Kuwayama

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I was looking at the Army's list of brigadier generals nominated for two stars, released yesterday, and was struck by how many of them I knew as battalion commanders during the first days of the response to 9/11. I am glad to see this happening. But it does seem to me that a decade is an awful long time for battalion commanders to move to division commander during wartime. Maybe it is a good thing, but it certainly is a departure from big wars of our past that I've been studying.

This looks like the next bounce for the BGs picked by the board led by General Petraeus a couple of years ago. Which makes it all the more puzzling to see a big hole in this list. As two friends, and several commenters on the Dempsey item yesterday, pointed out: Where is "probably-our-best" Brig. Gen. H.R. McMaster on this list? What up with that?

Here's the list:

Army Brig. Gen. Ralph O. Baker has been nominated for appointment to the rank of major general. Baker is currently serving as director for operational plans and joint force development, J-7, The Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.

Army Brig. Gen. Allen W. Batschelet has been nominated for appointment to the rank of major general. Batschelet is currently serving as deputy chief of staff, G-3, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany.

Army Brig. Gen. Heidi V. Brown has been nominated for appointment to the rank of major general.  Brown is currently serving as director of integration, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C.

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Wikimedia Commons

By John Stuart Blackton
Best Defense chief Afghanistan correspondent

Before responding directly to Major Wharton, let me step back a bit and put the concept of Afghan corruption into context.

The simple definition that most of the current practical work on corruption uses is something along the lines of: "corruption is the abuse of public position for private gain." This is a moral and legal perspective that assumes a shared social agreement on the distinction between public and private and an agreed moral and legal view of what constitutes abuse around that public/private distinction. 

These basic conditions have not been met for most of the last 500 years in Afghanistan. To the extent that they have a historical basis in the country, it is quite recent as I will endeavor to illustrate in my remarks today. 

The "abuse of public position for private gain" construct is a top-down view of the process. It takes the standpoint of the state. For my purposes, as the United States Military tries to relate the real, empirical fact of widespread corruption in Afghanistan to a population-centric approach to achieving stabilization of security, it may make more sense to take a bottom-up view of the process. 

Viewed from the perspective of a 30-year old Afghan male head of household, corruption (let's simplify it to "bribery") is a functional tool. One pays a bribe for one of two reasons: 

  • To get something, or
  • To prevent something

A bribe is only useful to our putative Afghan father if he is transacting with an official who has something to offer (public services, for example) or with an official who seeks to do something damaging to him that can be averted with the bribe. 

For most of Afghan history over the last five centuries the state was not sufficiently powerful to make institutional bribery a very useful, instrumental tool for an ordinary Afghan man. The state offered almost no services (so he couldn't buy much of value from an official) and the state was not actively taking too much (it was not a notable collector of taxes and it was not raising and maintaining a large standing army by conscription). Afghanistan was on the periphery of two great imperial systems that did, in fact, offer a range of public services and possess serious capability to take away goods, land and chattels from their citizens. The Mogul Empire, to the east, was a massive taxation machine raising enormous revenues to support an expensive imperial establishment and a massive standing army. The Persian state, just to the west, was a similarly expansive tax machine with a costly central government. Elaborate and extensive systems of corruption permeated life in the Mogul empire and in Persia. Even minor citizens at the bottom paid bribes to mitigate having to pay more onerous taxes or having to supply sons to the army. They paid bribes to gain favors and services from an elaborate system of local and provincial governors who could offer or withhold things of considerable value to citizens.

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peretzp via Flickr

By Jaron S. Wharton
Best Defense guest columnist

Corruption[i] has a deleterious effect on International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) efforts and may be the greatest impediment to accomplish its mission along with the greatest obstacle to the Afghan government's ability to establish enduring security and stability.[ii] A counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign is ultimately a competition for good governance and "when corrupt officials slowly drain the resources of a country, its potential to develop socially and to attract foreign investment is diminished, making it incapable of providing basic services to or enforcing the rights of its citizens."[iii] If a COIN force cannot offer a credible alternative in the form of support for a relatively clean local government it will fail grossly. When done properly, these campaigns last roughly a decade. When done improperly, failure takes much less time.[iv]

Indeed, well-grounded perceptions of injustice and the abuse of power have directly fueled the insurgency in Afghanistan, making ISAF appear complicit in a range of activities from the empowerment of national security forces to contracting practices. According to a 2010 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) survey, "Poverty and violence are usually portrayed as the biggest challenges confronting Afghanistan. But ask the Afghans themselves, and you get a different answer: corruption is their biggest worry."[v] Afghanistan was ranked 176 out of 178 nations in the 2010 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index.[vi] Yet despite frequent public statements made by President Karzai, there has been an overall lack of political will to address the corruption problem.[vii] As Sarah Chayes, former NPR reporter and author of The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan After the Taliban, writes, anti-corruption "is the issue that will win the war."[viii]

Part of securing and serving the people of Afghanistan means protecting them from the abuse of power as corruption is not a victimless crime. Moving forward, ISAF must focus on reducing the corruption that impedes the success of the mission and the viability of the Afghan state. Countering corrupt activity requires an international effort far beyond just ISAF. While this is a delicate task, I believe ISAF should consider re-issuing "anti-corruption guidance." General McChrystal published initial guidance in February 2010, but it is prudent to offer an update -- especially against the backdrop of distressed autocratic regimes in the Middle East and North Africa. The following eleven tenets should inform any new ISAF anti-corruption guidance to troops.

1. First, do no harm. In many ways, we have contributed to the corruption problem through insufficient oversight of international contracting and development efforts (ref: June 8 Senate Foreign Relations Committee report titled "Evaluating US Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan"). Some think that corruption is endemic to Afghan society and assert that Afghans view today's abusive practices as normal. They are wrong -- the current scale of corruption deviates from traditional norms and cultural practices. Since 2002, Afghanistan experienced unprecedented growth in illicit economic activity that continues to prevent growth of the licit economy and foster kleptocratic behavior. For us to reduce the space where corruption can occur, "we all must sweep in front of our own house."[ix]

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Doctor Yuri/Flickr

Posted By Thomas E. Ricks

It appears to be up for grabs now that President Karzai's half-brother has been assassinated. Amazing how many people are killed by their bodyguards.

I never met Ahmed Wali Karzzi, but I have eaten at the family's restaurant in Baltimore. I was a little surprised to see seafood served in an Afghan restaurant --"Helmand River salmon," as I recall.

Wikimedia Commons

EXPLORE:AFGHANISTAN

Everybody's trashing COIN these days. Reminds me of the baseball player who fouls out and blames the bat. I think a COIN approach remains a useful tactic, as part of a larger strategy -- if done well. But as Little Jimmy Rushing used to advise, it takes patience and fortitude.

Here's a perspective from remotest Afghanistan.

By "A Staff Guy in Afghanistan"
Best Defense department of salvaging COIN

From my perspective a large part of COIN doctrine involves connecting the local population with the government. Coalition forces in Afghanistan spend a great deal of time and effort attempting to improve local governance and its relationship with the people. I would suggest that this local governance already exists and that our shortcoming, as coalition forces executing COIN operations, is our failure to recognize this governance and how the existing governance interacts with and within the larger governmental context. 

Take an average village. They have a village governmental structure that interacts with other villages, with their district, with local ministerial representatives, and with coalition and non-coalition elements. The village makes something -- food, rugs, whatever -- and this economic activity necessitates interaction with external actors. Basically, they import and export. Our problem set, as a coalition force, is how to understand both the immediate governance of the village and its interactions with the external actors.

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U.S. Department of Defense Current Photos/Flickr

By Rebecca Frankel
Best Defense Chief Canine Correspondent

Peg featured prominently in Private Conrad Lewis's letters to his family from Afghanistan and when Pvt. Lewis went home on leave for Christmas last year he told his family that when his tour was over, he wanted to bring Peg home with him.

Peg, short for Pegasus (the emblem the parachutists wear on their sleeves), is a caramel colored stray dog that Lewis adopted and looked after her at his base in Helmand Province. The dog took to Lewis a young, paratrooper at 22, and trailed after him wherever he went -- on patrol, through firefights, and sleeping with the unit at night. Apparently, she was a natural war dog who didn't flinch while under fire and while "on patrols Peg would sit down when the [paratroopers] took cover, then run alongside him as his platoon advanced."

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For a program stamped expressly as the top personnel priority of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the AfPak Hands initiative sure seems to have a lot of participants who feel abused and misused by the process. Just listen to this poor guy working with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("USACE") in the south:

By "A.P. Hand"
Best Defense guest columnist

Four months of language training in one of the most difficult languages in the world, Pashto -- where I worked hard enough to come out with a 1/1 language proficiency in four months. And off to a two week COIN Academy at Camp Julien, Kabul. Afterwards I was dropped in Kandahar and forgotten about.

I was supposed to have a 1 month immersion in order to help solidify my language and cultural training. It didn't happen. This is when I had a feeling that all the scuttlebutt during language training was probably truth. Four and one half months later, I'm still trying to force a rectangle into a round hole to work out my AfPak intent into my assignment here in Kandahar with the USACE and I find a memo that was dated the month that I arrived in theatre -- the month I attended the COIN in Kabul.

This memo is attached and it tells you just how much of a priority this personnel request was given to the CJCS's request. It seems that the USACE officer shortfall trumps the CJCS's personnel shortfall. See the attached memo for my meaning.

I am not offering my opinion as a disgruntled employee-type communiqué. I just want someone to help me get the word out that maybe the CJCS is not aware of how his top priority is being run in the war zone. I spoke to Captain Muir as well as his predecessor Captain McLachlan a more than a few occasions and they continue to tell me that the intent was there but it changed.

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U.S. Department of Defense/Flickr

Posted By Thomas E. Ricks

The Ink Spots has a good proposal for better names for phases of the Afghan war than "Consolidation II" and so on:

  • Bombing the Piss out of the Taliban - Sept. 11, 2001 to Nov. 30, 2001
  • Escape from Tora Bora - Dec. 1, 2001 to Dec. 31, 2001
  • General Indifference - Jan. 1, 2002 to March 18, 2003
  • Economy of Force - March 19, 2003 to Nov. 30, 2009
  • The Good War - Dec. 1, 2009 to June 21, 2011
  • The Expensive, Disappearing War - June 22, 2011 through a date to be determined

expertinfantry/Flickr

Thomas E. Ricks covered the U.S. military for the Washington Post from 2000 through 2008.

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