By "PKL"

Best Defense guest explicator

Another damn army scandal, another damn book about it; worse, a book with a lurid title: Black Hearts, and an even more lurid subtitle: One platoon's descent into madness in Iraq's Triangle of Death. War weariness and a proliferation of books about individual actions in Iraq and Afghanistan seem to have left this book in publishing's no man's land: number 286,309 in the Amazon hit parade this month. Hard to understand why more than a quarter million other books at Amazon outsell it.

This seems a pity. Black Hearts is the battle name adopted by the 1^st battalion, 2^nd brigade combat team, 101st Airborne. The book by senior Time magazine editor Jim Frederick is described by senior British war and military correspondent Max Hastings as matching In Cold Blood, Truman Capote's 1965 account of the murder of the Clutter family on their farm in Holcomb, Kansas. Three Black Heart soldiers murdered the Iraqi al-Janabi family of Yusufiyah, a father, mother and six- and 14-year-old daughters. The cousin who found their corpses in March 2006, demented by grief and his desire to offer some propriety to the scene, snatched a kettle and ran back and forth to a nearby stream, gathering water to put out the fire that had consumed every part of the 14-year-old's upper body, other than her fingertips.

As Frederick recounts matters, the army was called in minutes later, and contrary to physical evidence on the scene, was content to attribute the crime to other Iraqis. Then a Black Heart's conscience started to trouble him and the reality of what happened to the al-Janabis came to light. Those who entered the house and killed them were prosecuted and in his masterwork, Frederick sets the incident in the context of army administration as it was in 2006.

Why his book is a masterwork,  its ten-page foreword makes clear.

At sundry officer levels, the 101^st's leading edge units were administered in an atmosphere of public insults and sarcasm. 1000 men were required to do the work that by 2008 was being done by 30,000, and those lonely first thousand were bleeding heavily. Black Hearts platoons lost their leaders to enemy action one by one; three months after the al-Janabis died, three Americans were overrun by insurgents. One died during the battle. The survivors were later mutilated, beheaded and their bodies were booby-trapped.

In Tokyo, having read reading brief wire service reports about the al-Janabi family's deaths and the later small battle, Frederick, then Time Magazine's bureau chief in that city received a phone call from army captain James Culp, a former infantry sergeant turned lawyer who had been assigned to defend one of the three Bravo Company men accused of the Yusufiyah atrocity. He wanted Frederick to come as a reporter, "if not for the sake of my client, then for the sake of the other guys in Bravo." He did, and later, he gained assignment to Iraq both as a reporter and, in time, in preparation for what turned out to be his book.

His research occupied much of the next three years, and what marks the difference between Black Hearts and most other books on similar subjects was that he started contacting101st men to see if they were willing to talk. Surprisingly, they were.

Frederick writes: "Despondent over being judged for the actions of a few criminals in their midst, they were eager to share their stories ... They were generous with their time, unvarnished in their honesty ... arguing that I could not properly understand the crime and the abduction if I did not understand their whole deployment.

"[As well,] I could not understand (the errant) 1^st platoon if I did not understand 2^nd and 3^rd platoons, who had labored under exactly the same conditions but who had come home with far fewer losses and their sense of brotherhood and accomplishment intact."

In some cases he interviewed individual veterans repeatedly, building a history, scaffolding it with context. He spoke to relatives of the al-Janabi dead and attended the trials of the men charged with killing the little family. He used the Freedom of Information Act to obtain reams of official documents.

"Every opened door led to a new one," his foreword recounts. "Most soldiers and officers I talked to offered to put me in touch with more. Some shared journals, letters and emails, photos ... classified reports and investigations."

Honorable men. The heart and sinew of Black Hearts is those few sentences. The conclusion of this multidimensional examination of army practice is its head. So also is its conclusion: "I had thought that the Army way was for everyone to accept a small piece of the responsibilities for any debacle truly too big to be of one man's making ... [and so,] make the fiasco something that the army could study and learn from. But the ordeal generated so much bile and rancor for so many people that the army seems more interested in forgetting about the tragedy entirely, than in ensuring that it never happens again ... 

"[M]any men feel that blame was unfairly pushed down to the lower ranks and not shared by a higher command they believed was also culpable."

The ten-page foreword is a clear and fair introduction to the rest of the book's contents.

Those closing remarks match what General Antonio Taguba told West Point in an oral history interview available on the web. If you question Frederick's conclusions as reported in his book, ponder the calm and confident retired general telling his interviewer that his investigation of Abu Ghraib satisfied him that army abuses there were widespread through Iraq, and that, given permission to do so, he would certainly have sheeted home some responsibility for them to general Ricardo Sanchez,  V Corps' 1st Armored Division commander when those abuses were in flower.Keep in mind also that Frederick was writing down his conclusions before the 5^th Stryker murders of Afghan civilians were widely known, and before this year's Panjwali massacre, in which 16 Afghan peasants were killed. All these actions were performed either by an individual or a very small and aberrant criminal group. Virtually all other soldiers despise them. And, as Frederick suggests, their recurrence suggests the army isn't very good at forestalling future such outbreaks, staining as they do the name of an entire military arm of this great nation.

Keep in mind also that Frederick was writing down his conclusions before the 5^th Stryker murders of Afghan civilians were widely known, and before this year's Panjwali massacre, in which 16 Afghan peasants were killed. All these actions were performed either by an individual or a very small and aberrant criminal group. Virtually all other soldiers despise them. And, as Frederick suggests, their recurrence suggests the army isn't very good at forestalling future such outbreaks, staining as they do the name of an entire military arm of this great nation.

By “A. Puzzled Prof”

Best Defense guest columnist

I read your piece on the resignation of Hans Binnendijk, the head research guru of the National Defense University and one of America's leading strategic thinkers. It comes amidst much turmoil imposed on the university from the top. It isn't pretty, and it will surely not serve the national interest. I am not directly involved in it, but this is what I have been told by many who are.

The new uniformed leadership of the Armed Forces, i.e., General Dempsey and his staff, apparently intend to prune NDU back to where it was a few decades ago. There will be some modest resource savings, but since the entire university budget doesn't amount to the cost of a single joint strike fighter, one has to wonder what is motivating all of what is happening here. In the cuts that have been discussed, Dempsey's deputy, Marine Lt. Gen. George J. Flynn has wielded the meat axe, often with the aid of micromanaging action officers. No one here in the rank-and-file is sure if the urbane chairman is on board with the details of all of this. (Ironically, both the chairman and J-7 are NDU graduates with advanced degrees.)

This set of changes took place in stages. First, while very few general or flag officer slots were cut in the armed forces, the three-star president of the university slot was downgraded to two, and the school commandants, downgraded from two to one star. No big deal, one might say, but one would be wrong, very wrong. A three star in Washington can go head-to-head with a principal on the joint staff or a senior OSD bureaucrat to protect the university. To compound the problem, the last three star president was retired in the spring and the university was left for a few months under the command of a senior foreign service officer, a former ambassador, a woman of great diplomatic talent and experience with no clout in the Pentagon. The new commandant --- a highly regarded Army two-star --- will not report until deep into June, when all or most of the cuts have been set in concrete. (Interesting question: can an employee of the State Department legally or even virtually assume command of a DoD organization?)

Second, the university was moved from a direct report to the chairman of the joint chiefs to reporting through the J-7, Lt Gen Flynn, whose staff section is nearly as big as the rest of the joint staff. This move violated the old SOP of commanders reporting to commanders, not staff officers. It also made the J-7 the ersatz president of the university during a period of severe resource reductions.

A new "charter" was subsequently published by the Chairman. It focused the university on joint professional military education and training, which in itself, is a good thing. Immediately, however, the research and outreach activities of the university, often more focused on national strategy than military affairs, came under intense scrutiny. These outfits had grown way beyond their original charters and had become effective and highly regarded servants of a wider interagency community. Much of their work was not done for the joint staff but for OSD Policy, and some of that in conjunction with civilian think-tanks. The research arm of the university was productive, even if not always useful in a practical way to the joint staff. It also was helpful to the colleges in a much more proximate and direct fashion than other think tanks, like RAND.

Third, a series of this-year and next-year budget cuts were announced. The J-7, armed with the new charter, pushed the university to take most of the cuts in the research, gaming, and publications sections, all of which had grown significantly in the last two decades. The mantra became, in effect, that if this or that did not directly support the war colleges, it was wrong and needed to be eliminated or cut way back. No one, of course, spoke to the need for out of the box thinking on future national security subjects. Fundamental research -- which has to operate miles and years ahead of war college coursework -- had no powerful friends in the leadership of the operating forces.

The research, gaming, and publications arms of the university -- a major part of the big-think, future concepts and policy business here -- will be cut to somewhere between half and a third of their original sizes. To make things worse, many of the specific cuts appear to have been crafted in the Pentagon, and nasty emails have come down from on high, about how the university is bankrupt and going into receivership, which was never the judgment of the military and civilian accrediting officials, who inspect us regularly and have generally given the university high marks.

All of this represents the systematic destruction of well respected institutions, three decades in the making, all in the name of very small savings and right-sizing. The position of the senior vice president for research and related things will be eliminated. The future-oriented, big picture research program will shrivel, the number of academic books coming through the NDU Press will be cut to a small fraction of this year's production, and gaming will be severely restricted. The university will no longer support the popular, interagency-oriented journal, PRISM. The Information Resources Management College and other non-war or staff college schools are in jeopardy of being zeroed out. Sadly, OSD policy has not come to the rescue of any of these institutions which have labored hard on its behalf and that of the interagency community.

Worse than functional changes, many government employees, especially senior professionals hired under yearly contracts, so-called Title X professionals, will lose their jobs. Firing them by not renewing their contracts is much easier than firing tenured civil servants. This takes some financial pressure off of the colleges, but not much. All of the savings will go to meet predetermined cuts, conceived ahead of time on the Joint Staff or passed on to them by the departmental comptroller.

One has to wonder why this is going on here. Sequestration is not upon us. No one is forcing the joint staff to dismember a significant part of this institution. There are no great dollar savings to be had here. Certainly, no academic or management expert would think that dismantling the research, publications, and gaming arms of a policy-oriented university is progress.

In times of great stress and famine, a roach will eat itself, starting with its hind legs. Without such stress or famine, the leadership of the joint staff has decided to consume part of the lobes of its brain. This is an organizational tragedy that will not help us adapt to a challenging future.

So, that's what's going on over here, and I wonder why civil experts aren't writing more about it, and why Congress -- long the guardian angel of the university -- isn't getting involved.

If he's lucky, I think the national security advisor lasts until January. If he is not, he blows up on the launchpad in the middle of the presidential election campaign. His fate, it seems to me, rests in the hands of David Sanger, who broke the news that the American and Israeli governments were jointly conducting a cybercampaign against  the Iranian nuclear program, and had successfully inserted a virus that wrecked Iranian centrifuges. If Sanger cooperates with the special counsels looking into the leaks about this highly classified program, things are going to get interesting very quickly.

It wouldn't matter if Sanger, a fine reporter, first got wind of highly classified info from an underling. What matters is what Donilon said when asked by him. The moment of truth likely will be when a government lawyer says, "Mr. Donilon, when Mr. Sanger asked you about 'Olympic Games,' how did you reply?" If Donilon discussed the program with Sanger, he's got a legal problem, I would think.

Hmmm -- anyone remember who Scooter Libby's lawyer was?

By Robert Goldich

Best Defense department of academic accreditation

I recently had a lengthy discussion with a faculty member at an NDU institution. This person is very concerned indeed. Longtime high quality staff is retiring and not being replaced. The downgrading of the NDU president to two stars and the NWC and ICAF commandants to one is, correctly in my view, seen as an assault on the prestige of the institution and is viewed as unquestionably diminishing its bureaucratic clout. The placing of NDU under the J-7 is construed as interposing yet another layer of bureaucracy between the central joint PME institutions in the country and the CJCS/JCS.  

This faculty member (a civilian) also suggested that as the U.S. military component of the student body is down to a little more than 60 percent, the military orientation of what are, after all, military institutions is being significantly eroded. There are, for example, 35 international fellows in this year's National War College (NWC) class. Almost everybody I talk to values the presence of the international fellows, but the sheer number may be constraining the ability of in this case NWC to focus on U.S. national and military strategy. Similarly, everybody at both NWC and ICAF understands the significance of whole of government, interagency, etc. But too large a proportion of U.s. government civilian students also dilutes the military/war/defense broth.  

What all this suggests to me is that nobody in high places, from the current CJCS on down, seems to attach particular importance to NDU, both its PME institutions and its research components. This is particularly surprising and disappointing in that I have been told by people I respect that Gen. Dempsey was a clear standout in the class of 1996 at NWC. It seems to me it is time for comprehensive study, analysis, and reflection both within the department and congress about the future of NDU and its components. Right now it is incoherent, in steady decline, and adrift. The one bright spot -- the student body, by all accounts, continues to be as high a quality selection of officers and senior civilians as ever, if not more so -- deserves better.

Tom again: Speaking of academic troubles, I was surprised to see the people who recently decapitated the University of Virginia hide behind legalisms: "consistent with sound employment practices, it is the policy of the Board to keep confidential matters of disagreement and those relating to evaluation of progress against mutually agreed upon goals." You can't fire the head of a large and prestigious institution and then pretend its an employment dispute.  

Is anybody else bothered that the U.S. Senate is going through Brett McGurk's old e-mails to his lover, whom he married? What business is it of the U.S. Senate? I mean, it isn't like the guy is going on a soft ride to Paris. He is up to be the ambassador to Baghdad. They should be thanking him for being willing to go to live in one of the world's worst climates, where violence is still rampant, and where the Iranians will make his professional life not so much fun.

Where is our sense of decency? I think the Senate owes this man an apology -- an apology, sir.

I heard yesterday that Hans Binnendijk, one of the pillars of the National Defense University, is quietly leaving out of unhappiness with its decline as an intellectual institution. Word is that Binnendijk, who has worked on Capitol Hill, at the State Department, and at the White House, as well as in academia, is resigning and moving to Johns Hopkins SAIS in three weeks. Part of the problem with the place is that the generals and admirals overseeing the place don't know much about how to run a university, and wouldn't know intellectual firepower from a day-old dud. There's also fear that with a defense budget squeeze looming, big cuts are going to hit the PME world.

Maj. Fernando Lujan gave a fast-paced, lively talk on the future of the American mission in Afghanistan.

His interlocutor, Rajiv Chandrasekaran, kicked off this part of the CNAS conference with a provocative question: Aren't most Afghan soldiers lazy, corrupt guys just waiting to shoot an American soldier in the back?

Lujan tackled that one quickly. Yes, he said, there are some terrible and corrupt senior leaders in the ranks. But for every one of them, he said, there are several good aggressive junior leaders. As for shooting Americans, he said, some of those incidents come from the Taliban, but others are the result of the "well of resentment" that builds up when Afghan soldiers see the contrast between how they live on a base and how Americans have air conditioning, the internet and other "luxuries." Afghan soldiers are also treated insensitively, and spoken to as if they were recruits being corrected by a drill instructor.

Furthermore, he said, the Afghan perspective tends to be different -- our people are on a one-year sprint, and want to see results, while many Afghans have been in the fight a long time.  

The Afghan war is about to get very interesting, Lujan said. "The really hard part begins right now." With the number of American troops declining, he explained, American advisors increasingly will be forced to let the Afghans lead the way, and do it their way.

One place to watch, he said, is Zabul Province, just north of Kandahar, where the Taliban is very active and where two Afghan battalions are operating "without coalition assistance." The problems the Afghans encounter are not lack of infantry training or ardor, but lack of medics, mechanics, and logistical support.

Lujan heads back to Afghanistan in a couple of months for another tour of advisory duty, Chandrasekaran said. 

If you are a glutton for Afghan stuff, here is another discussion, from the American Security Project.

I'm at the annual day-long conference that CNAS throws every year. Clearly the hot topic this year is the U.S. in Asia.

Lurking just underneath that is the state of the U.S. economy. Kurt Campbell, the assistant secretary of State for East Asia, began the festivities talking about the U.S. in Asia but took a surprising detour into the problems smaller American companies have in learning how to operate in Asia. Because of the size and health of the American economy for many decades, he said, "many companies haven't had to think about exports until recently."

Campbell, who was one of the founders of CNAS before going back into gummint, also said that the U.S.-China relationship is the most complex of any bilateral relationship the U.S. has ever had. It is an interesting assertion, but I suspect that the American relationship with Great Britain was more complicated, at least in the first 100 years of U.S. history.

He also said that the United States needs to work more closely with Europe on Asian issues -- trade, human rights, and political developments. I am not quite sure where he is going with this, or what it means.

If you want to watch the conference, just click here. 

By Lt. Col. Tom Cooper, USAF

Best Defense fine fellow

After a year as the Air Force Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, I think I finally understand how think tanks help make the world work. Prior to this, I had no practical sense of how think tanks are useful in policy debates in Washington. During Air Force Fellows orientation in August of 2011, Peter Singer from Brookings Institution told us, "Think tanks are like the bicycle chain that links the policy world with the research world, applying academic rigor to contemporary policy problems." This analogy became even more clear when I examined what one military service might do with a report published by a think tank.

A recent CNAS report titled "Sustaining Preeminence: Reforming the U.S. Military at a Time of Strategic Change" is a great example of how think tank reports are useful. Recommendations in the report impact diverse organizations and will upset some and please others. The tension created by pleasing some and angering some is exactly what powers the bicycle chain described by Singer. How the pedals are turned by policy actors is what makes the report useful and can help shape future dialogue.

Two issues in the report related to the Air Force can be examined to understand how one organization can turn the cranks moving the chain -- even if in different directions. The first is the ongoing debate about force structure changes and how a think tank recommendation can be used. The second is the report's misperception of how the Air Force has changed over the past decade and how a service can use the report to correct or improve messaging efforts.

In "Sustainable Preeminence," the authors take a stand on a contentious Air Force issue -- cuts to the Air National Guard in the FY13 budget. Based on independent examination, the authors conclude that "reductions to the reserve component proposed by the Air Force in the FY2013 budget are reasonable." This statement is incredibly useful for the Air Force. The authors, not known for their support of air issues, conclude these changes are good and should be encouraged to explain their conclusion. The Air Force could use the support presented in this report and work with CNAS to reinforce this message on Capital Hill.

The second issue in "Sustainable Preeminence" relates to what the Air Force has been doing to support recent conflicts and how it has transformed to support the other services. The report states: "The infusion of billions of dollars in the past decade has moved the services away from deeper integration and interdependence, as each service has sought greater self-sufficiency rather than rely upon the capabilities of other services." This statement is not true for the Air Force.

Over the past decade, the Air Force has changed air mobility methods, ISR force structure (everything from the number of remotely piloted aircraft patrols to a 4000 percent increase in processing, exploitation, and dissemination of intelligence to tactical forces), how combat air support is directly connected to the warfighter, and modifying aircraft and weapons to support ground force engagements. These examples are proof the Air Force has moved towards greater integration and interdependence, all while reducing end-strength and force structure. The lack of understanding demonstrated in the report is an example of how services, and the Air Force in particular, can identify misperceptions and help inform the research world. The Air Force can use this to plan future interactions with the think tank community.

In spending the last year at CNAS, I've learned how the think tank research process is useful in creating policy. By watching how reports like "Sustainable Preeminence" are produced, I've seen how important it is to work with think tanks to achieve policy outcomes. The process that sometimes creates tension shouldn't lead to greater tension, instead policy actors would do better to recognize how to turn the pedals and use the "chain linking the policy world and the research world" as a way to help advance their interests.

Lt. Col. Tom Cooper is the Air Force fellow at the Center for a New American Security. He flew the E-3 Sentry, SAMFOX C-9s in the 89 AW and C-40s as commander of the AF Reserve's active associate 54 AS.

I'm a big fan of Colin Gray's work, so I picked up his article in the new issue of Prism with great expectation.

I was disappointed. This is not his best stuff. Basically he says we need to think about counterinsurgency in the context of strategy. Indeed, he repeats the point this several different ways. It doesn't strike me as an astonishing insight. Nor did I put down the article thinking about counterinsurgency differently. The article is long on assertions and short on specifics, so it feels like a lot of shadowboxing with unidentified players.

I may well be wrong. We all have off days, and it may be mine, not his. Gray's no slouch, so I am going to put the article aside and re-read it down the road, and see if it feels different. 

I just finished reading Robert Graves' autobiography of World War I service for the fourth time. I read it first as a teenager in Kabul in 1970. (I have no idea how I happened to come across it there in Afghanistan, or why picked it up.) I think it was the first book of military history that ever really grabbed me, for which I remain grateful. I can't think of any other book that I have read four times, except perhaps for some of Shakespeare's tragedies. 

I read Graves' memoir again in my 20s, at Yale, and then in my 30s, in Washington, D.C.. It was different book each time for me. I realized recently I hadn't looked at it in about 20 years, so picked it up to see how it felt now. I also wanted to see what had captured me so much in the previous readings.

I have to say I was less impressed this time. The first and second times I read it, it seemed kind of shocking. This time it felt a bit tame. That might be because I have read so many other memoirs, some stronger, and also seen some war myself in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and,  Afghanistan.

Some passages that struck me this time:

--On how to pick platoon leaders: "Our final selection was made by watching the candidates play games, principally Rugger and soccer. Those who played rough but not dirty, and had quick reactions, were the sort needed."

--At the front, "I kept myself awake and alive by drinking about a bottle of whiskey a day. I had never drunk it before, and have seldom drunk it since."

--His friend Siegfried Sassoon on leave in London: "very ill, he wrote that often when he went for a walk he saw corpses lying about on the pavements."

--After the war, "It has taken some ten years for my blood to recover." Also, "strangers in daytime would assume the faces of friends who had been killed."   

It made me wonder the extent to which for Europe, World War I, with its  industrialization of killing, was the event that set the tone for the entire 20^th century. I think that maybe for the U.S., World War II was more significant, but maybe not for Europe, and especially for the British.

By Rebecca Frankel, Best Defense Chief Canine Correspondent

The Washington Times ran an article yesterday that caught my attention. The story's subhead, "Fewer canines on battlefield," made me raise a skeptical brow, but its opening line, "In Afghanistan, a soldier's best friend is no longer a bomb-sniffing dog, but an electronic sensor" had me scoffing out loud.

The news of the piece is focused around the comments of Rod Korba, identified in the article as a spokesman for JIEDDO; comments that the reporter says represent a supposed "shift" in the organization's strategy. I assume Korba's statement is recent though no date or forum is mentioned. Though some readers might understandably assume this article is commenting on the MWD program at large, Korba is talking about JIEDDO's investments, saying that JIEDDO-engineered hand-held sensors are outperforming the JIEDDO-funded IED detection dogs (different than MWDs). "What it comes down to," says Korba, "is we have other resources that we have had greater statistical success, handheld sensors and things like that."

Unfortunately, that "statistical success" is not shared in the Washington Times' report nor is it validated by any reports of on-the-ground experience. Korba might only be speaking of JIEDDO-funded dogs, but the lack of clarity here undermines the work of the entire community. None of the program managers, or handlers I've spoken to who have worked -- or are still working -- dogs downrange, say these sensors outperform MWD teams. Furthermore, those that have seen the sensors in action have told me they've observed battery failure, false readings, and say that to be utilized to full effectiveness these technologies require very controlled situations. (There's also a failure here to address some basic points. For example: Korba references the hand-held sensor which implies the person holding it has to be close to the source of explosives to make a reliable find, while a dog can be worked off leash alerting to odor at a reliable distance from source, but more importantly a safe distance from its handler.)

Furthermore, I didn't find Korba's comments about canines to ring with much truth -- especially his asinine critique that dogs' effectiveness is diminished because troops "end up befriending these animals" -- and their presentation in this instance borders on irresponsible. Korba is quoted early on in the piece saying, "We are sort of de-emphasizing [dogs] because we find that other technologies are far more effective"

Sort of? Well, we are sort of still sending our dog teams out on missions. After spending this last week talking with those in the MWD community struggling with the loss of fellow handlers (as well as canines) who were recently KIA in Afghanistan, this is particularly infuriating.

To be sure, there is no perfect dog or infallible dog team. Dogs get tired, overheated, or they may lose their nerve. Handlers also get worn down; some might even get lazy and neglect reinforcing obedience training (a far greater offense than showing affection to their canine partner). And combat zones are unpredictable and terrible places -- the reality is there is simply no way to avoid every roadside bomb.

Now that the U.S. military is struggling with budget cuts that are likely to deepen with a troop drawdown, we need to make sure that the troops still fighting have the best support funding allows. The real danger with an article like this is not only that it is intellectually or journalistically weak, but that one day soon our troops might be conducting combat operations with electronic sensors in their hands when what they really need is a dog by their side.

Above, U.S. Army Sergeant Nathan Arriaga walks with Zzarr, a 6-year old Dutch Shepherd at FOB Walton, on patrol mission with 1st Battalion 67th Armoured Regiment, Task Force Dealers in the Arghandab district on July 25, 2011.

Jeff Dyche, who used to teach at the Air Force Academy, asserts so in an article I read yesterday. At the academy, he writes, "Learning for the sake of learning was all but anathema. ...  Combine this attitude with a faculty that may comprise a group of the least educated college instructors in the entire country and you have the basic framework of the US Air Force Academy."

Dyche, who now teaches at James Madison University, adds that at the academy, it seemed to him that academic work "took a back seat of military training, athletics, religiosity and ... 'character building'."

I also didn't know that all faculty members are required to be in their offices at 7:30 am, even if they have no morning classes, and that civilian faculty have to fill out time cards every week.

When I read articles like this I wonder why we still have military academies, if they aren't producing officers any better than those from ROTC and OCS routes. It seems to me that the academies are producing bright but undereducated officers at great expense. As Dyche notes, it costs taxpayers five to ten times more to produce a service academy officer as it does a ROTC officer.

"We are trying to have an open, transparent, and mutually beneficial relationship with the U.S. based on our national interest," the Pakistani prime minister told officers at that country's Command and Staff college. Well, that is good news!

But then I read more of his comments and I realized Prime Minister Gilani probably was engaging in what one of my sisters used to call "grandma talk," to signify when my mother would say the opposite of what she actually meant (e.g., "You look thin!"). For example, the Pak PM said, "we want to play our role in the stability and peace in Afghanistan." And he said he believes that "our children and the generations to follow will lead a peaceful and productive life." Just use the Grandma interpreter, and you will understand what he is saying.