By "Larry Nicholas"

Best Defense guest columnist

When I was in college one of my professors asked me what I thought our generation of veterans had to offer our society. I could not give her a good answer at the time and that always bothered me.

Every year on Veterans' Day I think of that question. I also think of the Corporal. The Corporal and I served together years ago when we were both very young men. He was a Marine and I was a Corpsman. He was a good man; easy going, confident, a proud Texan. We were in the same battalion, but in different platoons. I was close to his platoon Corpsman though, and I knew him fairly well. While serving we were sent to Iraq on the same deployment. It was a unique situation. The entire battalion didn't go, only a few. He was with his platoon, and I had volunteered to go with another platoon. 

The year was 2004. Our unit had been tasked with taking back the city of Fallujah from insurgents. We attacked the city, and after weeks of savage combat we succeeded. Several of our brothers were killed, many more severely injured, but in the end we accomplished our mission. We stayed in Iraq a little while longer, after which we went back to our duty station. Upon our return though, we were grasped by a surreal regard.

Everything around us was the same, except for the way people looked at us. They looked at us like we were superhuman. Everywhere we walked people would move out of our way, like Moses parting the Red Sea.

The Corporal was especially well regarded. He had a right to be. While I was proud of my part in the battle, it was nothing compared to what he had done. The tales that were told about his heroism were unbelievable, unimaginable, but they were true.

Shortly after coming back the Corporal started to have problems. He had taken to alcohol too readily, often becoming very drunk. During the Marine Corps Ball he was walking around his dress blues sloppily incoherent, intoxicated out of his mind. Seeing him like that was devastating. I felt as if I was watching him being slowly reduced to ash. I tried to talk to him for a little bit, hoping some sense would come though. He only said this to me, "I wish I was still the man I was in Fallujah." I feared that the Corporal was becoming lost in his own anguish.

I had some issues as well. My hands shook from time to time. I mistook strangers for departed friends. A grim stare had become my default facial expression. People would ask why I looked so sad, often telling me, "You need to smile more." I regarded these as minor developments however. After all, I had no issues with nightmares, no problems with alcohol, and I had a promising military career ahead of me. I thought I had a handle on the situation.

My confidence was boosted by doing something peculiar that no one else had done. I decided not to go home. We were stationed overseas and when we came back everyone went home on leave, except me. I felt that I was not ready to go back home. Fallujah was still very fresh in my mind and I did not want it to be when I saw my family. So I stayed, I worked, I tried to forget.

Some of my Marines thought I was foolish for staying. One of them stated his opinion colorfully by saying, "You're crazy Doc. I'm going home. I have girls to seduce, babies to make!" The Corporal understood what I was trying to accomplish, although I don't think he approved. I had spoken to him about it once. I told him that I just wanted to forget about Fallujah and move on with my life. He gave me a strange look; part sympathetic, part scornful, part amused, part knowing. I wasn't sure what the look meant at the time.

I waited until Christmas to go back to America. I went back in my hometown. I was surrounded by my family. It should have been a wonderful time. There was just one problem. I wasn't home. It was at then that I knew what the Corporal's look had meant. The warmth and comfort associated with the concept of home was absent. I had forgotten what it felt like to be home. To know a place where one felt safe, felt at ease, felt happy. The concept that was once so natural became alien to me. Overtime, I compensated by sometimes becoming hyperactive, expending enormous energy in pursuit of certain goals. But that only covered up the problem, and only for a short while.

So you see, I was more affected by Iraq then I had thought. I had tried so hard to forget Fallujah, but I could not. The place had become a part of me. The Corporal realized this much sooner then I did. The Corporal and I exhibited different symptoms, but we both had the same problem. Our souls had become fragmented. The days that we spent in battle had changed us. They were difficult days. Days filled with hatred, anger, fear, suffering, and sorrow. But they were also days of great pride.

That pride supersedes any pain we could ever feel. If there is a saving grace, any silver lining in what we have been through, then that is it. Those were days when we felt privileged to be able to fight for our country. Days when we made each moment very sincere because we knew that we might not have many more moments left. Those were days when our pride was felt not in fleeting moments, but was instead weaved into the fabric of our being.

In retrospect, that is the answer that I should have given my professor. I should have told her that I believe the greatest gift our generation of veterans can offer society is our pride. But not pride in the superficially vain sense of the word. The pride we offer must be more genuine, more sincere. That pride must be the sort that compels us to encourage our fellow citizens to excel. It must be the sort of pride that drives us to remind people that extraordinary things can be accomplished. In an age consumed with cynicism and doubt, that is a service that is gravely needed. That's what being a veteran means to me.

To all my brothers and sisters that are still haunted by the violent memories of war, I want you to know that I know how you feel. I have walked in your footsteps. Those memories can be a terrible burden to bear. They often inhibit the joy of present moments by pulling us back into the past, sometimes putting a dark overcast on the future. But you do not have to accept things as they are. There is hope for a better tomorrow -- if you are willing to fight for it.

In my dreams, I sometimes see the Corporal. In those thoughts he had fought to get his life back. He was able to secure some peace in recent years. He found a good woman to love. He finally made his way back home. I hope that is his reality. No one has earned it more. In a group of proud warriors, he was a giant. But I cannot be sure. I have lost track of the Corporal, and I have not spoken to him in many years. I do like to think that he is well though.

I hope that all of our veterans can one day come home. Not just physically, but also in terms of spirit. In order for that to happen we will need to offer them more then just a simple plane ride back to their country. In order to ensure an adequate homecoming we have to respect their service without shunning the realties that came with it, appreciate the experiences that they can offer our society, and most importantly, we must try to understand.

"Larry Nicholas" is an Iraq War veteran who fought in the Second Battle of Fallujah in 2004 while attached to the ground combat element of the 31st Expeditionary Unit.

Ah, Jan & Dean. Tonight's appearance is dedicated to them.

I'll be at the Crawford Family Forum event tonight talking to Frank Stoltze about my new book, about General Petraeus and much much more. Don't miss the fun. It is free -- but you gots to sign up here.

As usual, those wearing Best Defense t-shirts will get a special shoutout.

Also, at 6:30 Wednesday night in San Francisco, I'll be giving a special talk on the Chosin Reservoir campaign at, of course, the Marine Memorial Club. I've asked that some front-row seats be reserved for Chosin Reservoir vets. Their beers are on me. 

And Thursday night will find me drifting northward to Book Passage in Corte Madera, California, where Isabel Allende once served me a café con leche. And so on, Friday night at the Seattle Public Library at 1000 4^th Street.

By the way, two people who have contributed to Best Defense at various times -- Paula Broadwell and David Petraeus -- have been making headlines because it turns out they had an affair with each other. My attitude is this: What you guys do on your own time is your own business. But, yes, the news does make me wonder if any other BD contributors are making time with each other.

By Rebecca Frankel

Best Defense Chief Canine Correspondent

Theo, the springer spaniel who died of an undiagnosed seizure in Afghanistan last year was recently (and posthumously) bestowed the prestigious Dickin Award. Theo's handler Lance Corporal Liam Tasker was shot and killed by enemy fire hours earlier. In lieu of a confirmed cause of death Theo is rather famously believed to have died of a broken heart. The bomb-detection team held the record for most finds-a record that holds strong to this day.

Tasker's mother who attended last month's ceremonies told reporters that she was very proud of her son and commented on her son's relationship with the young dog, "One couldn't have worked without the other out there, doing the job they were doing."

The first Dickin Medal was awarded in 1943 and has been given to 64 animals in the years since including: 32 pigeons, 28 dogs, three horses, and one cat. These animals were each presented with a "large, bronze medallion bearing the words "For Gallantry" and "We Also Serve" all within a laurel wreath. The ribbon is striped green, dark brown and pale blue representing water, earth and air to symbolise the naval, land and air forces." The award is named in honor of the woman who founded Britain's PSDA in 1917, Maria Elizabeth Dickin.

For many years the organization discontinued its practice of handing out the Dickin Award but in the aftermath of 9/11 it was reinstated. It was presented to a search-and-rescue dog named Appollo, a canine with the NYC police department. He was the first dog on the scene after the towers were hit.

Theo is now the 64th in a long line of deserving four-legged and winged recipients.

Rebecca Frankel, on leave from her FP desk, is currently writing a book about military working dogs, to be published by Atria Books in September 2013.

I'll be giving a talk on my book tonite at the Willard Hotel in DC at 6:30 tonight, along with Susan Glasser, the smart and dynamic editor of Foreign Policy magazine.

It is free, but you must needs register. Click here to do so.  

If you wear a Best Defense t-shirt tonight, you get a free drink after the show. But then again you get the drink even if you don't. However, with the t-shirt you might get it faster.

In other CNAS news, the estimable Nate Fick is leaving the place to become CEO of some cyber company. He will be missed. We need a replacement. So, if you know someone who is energetic, unassuming, likable, married above himself, has a Harvard MBA, and is a fine leader, and who maybe also has written a good memoir of military service, just sent them to apply here.   

A wife writes:

My husband was part of the wounded warrior education initiative and was placed in the military history dept at CGSC. He had only one class group and wasn't even able to finish it due to getting notice. The army paid a lot of money to get him ready for this job and I believe he had no chance to keep his job. My husband gave a lot to his country including limb. He had great reviews from his students and fellow instructors. He had asked if he should get his PhD a couple months into being at CGSC and was told to wait. Which of course his lack of PhD was part of the reason he lost the job he loved and was very good at. When CGSC placed these wounded warriors they knew that they wouldn't have a PhD right off the bat. The wounded warrior project went all the way to Texas to recruit my husband, moved him to Kansas, paid for his masters, paid for his salary while going to school, gave him one class group and then let him go. I'm sure there would be a lot of taxpayers out there that wouldn't be too happy to have no return on their investment. I have been around the military my whole life and for the first time I am very disappointed in how they have handled a situation. My husband feels as though he was set up for failure and that yet again the army has failed him.

One line that I've always hated is "Failure is not an option."

Rather, failure should always be considered carefully in strategic discussions. One question that needs to be asked is, "How could we lose this thing?" That helps sharpen the discussion and helps lead to distinctions between what is essential and what is merely important, as Eisenhower put it early in World War II.

I mention all this because Paul Kennedy mentions in The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery that early in the 7 Years' War (a.k.a. the French and Indian War), the British recognized early on that the only way they could totally lose was through a French invasion of England. So job one was to prevent that.  

By Matthew Schmidt

Best Defense department of Armyology

The U.S. Army doesn't seem to want to be an army. Or, rather, they seem to want to be half an army, like (no offense) the Marines! They want to do the first part of war, the invasion part, but not the less glamorous, more difficult, messy part that is occupation. The Army's seeming disdain for doing the work of occupying a place after the Hollywood scenes of major combat are over betrays a culture that just doesn't get the nature of (modern) war.

To be clear, plenty of individual people in the Army do understand the importance of thinking about the post-combat phase of warfare, but the institutional culture, the code of language, and behavior that dominates the everyday world of the Army is decidedly focused on the minutiae of combat tactics. 

Put another way, the Army has lost a clear sense of what makes it different from the other services. The Navy and Air Force can fight. The Marines can fight. But only the Army can occupy. This is the essential difference in the services when you strip away all the trivia. Armies are built to occupy places. They are meant to be the big ground force that sweeps over an area and sits on it. The Navy can project power to 'turn' a stubborn mule of a regime back in the right direction. The Air Force can heavily influence the ground game by providing air-space superiority for troops, and it can project power like the Navy. And the Marines can kick in the door to places and conduct small-scale land operations for limited periods of time.

But only the Army is big enough to extend control over the ground across an entire chunk of the planet for any length of time. 

Of course this usually (but not always) means fighting conventional battles against other forces similarly armed. So I'm not saying that major combat isn't part of the Army's mission. But no other service can do what the Army should be designed to do after the first part of the fight is done. No other service can control the crucial space where real human beings live, engage in trade, or practice politics. We like to imagine the art of war as being about winning the fight. But at the highest level, as Tom pointed out in his most recent Atlantic article, generalship "must link military action to political results." This is, of course, just a restating of Carl von Clausewitz's famous dictum that war should be understood as the continuation of political policy. Yet most of Army culture is relentlessly tactical in nature, even in the staff college where I teach.

I've always been curious about this reading of military history. If you think of the history of the Army as the story of the battles it fought from the Revolutionary War to today, of course this is what you see. But a deeper reading of history shows that the Army fought battles in order to occupy and administer large swaths of territory with large populations for far more of its history. The battles of the Civil War gave way to the occupation of the reconstruction era, a period of time that had troops engaged in occupation operations three times as long as they had combat. If you count the history of westward expansion, most of the work the Army did involved a kind of armed public-administration, not Indian conquest. The same is true of the Spanish American war, which saw U.S. troops conducting counterinsurgency and civil affairs for years after in the Philippines. Add in the post-WWII occupations of Germany and Japan, the long, tedious mix of combat and occupation in Vietnam, and the extended occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan and it's overwhelmingly clear that the Army's main historical work has been occupation, not battle. 

But we teach "operational art" and "strategy" as though fighting battles is the only work of an army. It isn't. It never has been. At best it's only half of what an army is asked to do and it often isn't the most important part. We wonder how the Army fits into strategic frameworks like the new AirSeaBattle, all the while ignoring the obvious. We skimp on exploring the problems of using military force to achieve the political ends that are the purpose of occupations, and effectively define the work of generals and their staffs too narrowly, as a stringing together of a series of battles in order to gain a military-strategic aim. We pay relatively little attention to thinking about the work of generals as stringing together actions best thought of not as battles, but as the problems associated with using the resources that accompany military occupations to build political regimes that further our interests.

What we should be doing is devoting a much greater share of our time examining how the best generals in history conducted occupations after the main fighting was done. This isn't just the generalship of the future, it's the generalship of the vast bulk of "military" history. Fighting is about the tactics of the battlefield. Winning is about securing the victories of those battlefields. Neither the Navy, the Air Force, or the Marines can secure battlefield victories where they ultimately matter -- where people live. That's the Army's mission. We should recognize that mission as being at least as important as winning in combat. And we should educate, promote, and fire our military leaders to reflect that reality. 

Matthew Schmidt is an assistant professor of Political Science and Planning at the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies. He originated the "Matters Military" blog at the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs and has a book on developing strategic thinkers forthcoming from Wiley/Jossey-Bass in 2013. He can be reached at mattschmidt@mattschmidtphd.net. The views expressed are entirely those of the author and are not endorsed by the U.S. Army or the Department of Defense.

There's a mega-event for my book Thursday night in DC. It is free, but to attend you should to register here. There will be a surprise guest.

Meanwhile, more reviews of the book are pouring in. On the one side stand the unhappy generals. Retired Army Maj. Gen. Robert Scales doesn't like it -- he calls it unfair. He tells me he thinks in his review in Foreign Affairs that he is defending the Army. Me, I think that he is defending today's Army generals. Retired Air Force Maj. Gen. Perry Smith also posted a querulous review on Amazon.

Meanwhile, the best of our military historians are greeting the book positively. Here is a good review in Military History magazine by one of the grand old men of the field, Dennis Showalter. That comes on top of similar praise from three other big names in the field -- Carlo D'Este, Hew Strachan and Brian Linn.

See a pattern here -- generals vs. historians?

Paul Kennedy reports that in World War I, when the Japanese were allied with the UK, they patrolled the Indian Ocean at the request of Britain. They also "dispatched a dozen destroyers for anti-submarine work in the Mediterranean," he notes.

Nor did I know that in the German defense plan of 1938 called for it to build four aircraft carriers.

Finally, I learned that during World War II, more German U boats were sunk by Allied aircraft (288) than by surface ships (246). (Another bunch were deep-sixed by combined actions.)

Back in the late Cold War, there was a lot of talking of an American strategy that imposed costs on the Russkies -- costs they couldn't afford, for things like national missile defense. It seemed pretty snazzy at the time. 

It turns out that this is nothing new. Paul Kennedy, in his terrific study of The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, quotes the Duke of Newcastle as stating in 1742 that, "France will outdo us at sea when they have nothing to fear on land. I have always maintained that our marine should protect our alliances on the Continent, and so, by diverting the expense of France, enable us to maintain our superiority at sea." 

Kennedy says this was the key to British policy for centuries: Keep Europe in a balance of power so that no one nation dominated the continent, and all nations there would have to focus on land power at the expense of sea power. Hence Britain's "perfidious" reputation -- it didn't care much about the nature of its alliances as long as it could balance European powers while it expanded its empire outside Europe. He writes that, "of the seven Anglo-French wars which took place between 1689 and 1815, the only one which Britain lost was that in which no fighting took place in Europe." This pattern gave rise to the expression that France lost Canada in Germany.

This approach worked until 1914.  

The British occupation of Gibraltar grew out of this strategy. By having a base at the mouth of the Mediterranean, the British could deter the French from moving their Mediterranean fleet out to join their Atlantic fleet. 

Kennedy's book reminds me a lot of Piers Mackesy's The War for America in that it teaches not just history but strategy. I am surprised that no one told me to read it years ago.

By Richard Buchanan

Best Defense office of mission command

Currently there is a raging debate in the Force over Army Design Methodology (ADM) which the field has shortened to simply "Design." Design is being currently taught to selected officers attending the School of Advanced Studies (SAMS), the War College, and in a general population Design training course developed and taught by Booz Allen Hamilton (BAH). There is currently not a single course teaching Design to NCOs and or Army Civilians other than the course offered by BAH. There is as well a ongoing debate as to whether Design is strictly for the Strategic and Operational levels and should not be used at the Tactical level.

If one researches ADM you will see it defined and explained in ADRP 5.0 in roughly eight pages complete with terms and charts which attempt to describe the process. In further research of ADRP 5.0 you will see that the discussion of Design and military decision-making (MDMP) takes all of two paragraphs. If you take the BAH course you will be struck by the sheer weight of terms and charts (and a very large Powerpoint slide deck) all trying again to describe Design. In ADRP 5.0 section 2-23 you will notice that by doctrine the Army now has a total of three standalone planning methods all attempting to address the scope of the problem the unit is facing, i.e. the Operational Environment (OE).

The result of all of the above is that the Force now perceives Design to be complex, highly technical (complicated terms and charts with its own language), and Design can only be conducted by those who have attended the Design training mentioned above and our Design doctrine has reinforced that perception.

If we look at the core ADM requirements mentioned in the eight or so pages of ADRP 5.0 one starts to see mentioned over and over; critical and creative thinking, collaboration and dialogue, framing (another term for simply communication), narrative construction, and visual modeling (simply another set of terms for communication/whiteboarding).

Now the over designing of Design kicks in -- if in fact the concept of Design demands communication, dialogue, free flow of ideas, critical discourse -- are we not suppose to be doing that already inside MDMP? Wait thoug,h as per paragraphs 2-61 and 2-62, Design is conducted independently, in parallel to or after MDMP by the Commander and selected Staff all under the guise of helping the Commander understand the OE. Literally a Catch-22 moment.

Just as we often discuss the Army values and what it means to the Force, Design to has one key critical element that is missing, just as it is missing in the Army Values. That is, trust. Steven Covey in his book Speed of Trust wrote that:

There is one thing that is common to every individual, relationship, team, family, organization, nation, economy, and civilization throughout the world-one thing which, if removed, will destroy the most powerful government, the most successful business, the most thriving economy, the most influential leadership, the greatest friendship, the strongest character, the deepest love. On the other hand, if developed and leveraged, that one thing has the potential to create unparalleled success and prosperity in every dimension of life. Yet, it is the least understood, most neglected, and most underestimated possibility of our time. That one thing is trust. . . . It under girds and affects the quality of every relationship, every communication, every work project, every business venture, every effort in which we are engaged.

Likewise, Col. Tom Guthrie in his 2012 article said that, "If we intend to truly embrace mission command, then we should do it to the fullest, and that will require commitment to changing a culture from one of control and process to one of decentralization and trust."

I think (as I said in my previous BD article) that we in fact do have a serious issue in the Force -- namely a glaring lack of Trust at all levels and between individuals.

If we look at the argument that Design cannot be conducted at the Tactical level -- then we really do need to ask ourselves why is it not in the MDMP planning cycle? My answer is Design has always been in MDMP in multiple areas -- Mission Analysis, COA Development/Decision, Wargaming, and even in the Rehearsal phase.

In Mission Command it is the "art of command" where the responsibility rests for the commander to lead the development of teams using Understanding, Visualization, Describe, Direct, Lead, and Assess UVDDLA). If the Commander is responsible for team building then why is he, per doctrine, supposed to lead Design independently, in parallel to or after MDMP? What staff officers are to be pulled out of the MDMP process to focus on Design robbing Staff sections of their own team leader, when is the Design plan to resynchronize back to the MDMP process, and which plan has precedence -- the MDMP plan or the Design plan?

If the commander as the team builder and leader does his job effectively as a leader should -- that is, building trust, and creating an open dialogue free of fear which automatically allows critical thinking/discourse -- then Design will occur on its own and it is not a forced process full of terms and charts that no one seems to understand.

Secondly, the debate around Design has opened an interesting discussion -- namely if we take a Command Post and or a Staff section, there will always be NCOs and/or lower ranking subordinates. Not a single one of them have been taught MDMP nor Design and yet they are handling data that has to be transformed into Information/Understanding as per the doctrinal concept of the Cognitive Hierarchy. Or they are substituting as reps to Working Group meetings where MDMP is in progress or should be in progress or they are contributing to running estimates which also feeds into the MDMP process.

I have often wondered while observing Command Post operations, WG meetings, or Staff meetings, what do the NCOs/junior subordinates think about during the ongoing discussions and do they really buy into the decisions made during those meetings or do they simply nod north and south and go about their business?

Now, we are having a Force discussion on whether Design does work or not work, what level should it be used at, should Design planners be additionally trained, should there be a separate Design planning Staff section, and the list goes on. To me, these are examples of over engineering.

My opinion is that Design is the way forward, especially when coupled with Mission Command, but it must be taught together with MDMP/Mission Command to all individuals working in Staffs at all levels and in Command Posts at all levels. In reality, they do a mini version of UVDDLA MDMP when performing their CP or Staff functions.

If everyone who works in a Staff section and/or in a Command Post fully understands MDMP, fully understands Design/Mission Command and the commander has in fact built his team using Trust in an open dialogue manner -- then Design/ MDMP/Mission Command will be able to handle any future ill structured "wicked" problem set. Until then the Force will continue to tread water.

Richard Buchanan is mission command training facilitator with the JMTC/JMSC Grafenwoehr, Germany training staffs in the areas of mission command, MDMP/NATO Planning Processes, MDMP/Design, and Command Post Operations. The opinions here are his own and not those of U.S. Army Europe, the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, the U.S. government. But Bobby Valentine does agree, we are guessing. How did the Red Sox go so wrong in recent years?

While we are rounding up my various appearances, here is an exchange I did with the estimable Mark Thompson of Time magazine. And here is a very nice book review by the historian James Jay Carafano in The National Interest.

I was reading "How Strategists Really Think: Tapping the Power of Analogy," an article from the Harvard Business Review (semi-necessary disclosure: I also have an article appearing in that magazine -- I said I've been busy!) and was struck by this comment:

Trial and error is a relatively effective way to make strategic decisions in settings so ambiguous, novel, or complex that any cognitively intensive effort is doomed to fail. In altogether new situations . . . . there may be no good substitute for trying something out and learning from experience.

Tom again: I found the article especially useful for the section on "How to avoid superficial analogies." The key step, as friend JK pointed out, is assessing the actual similarity of the two cases, or, as the authors put it, to "Actively search for differences between the source and the target."

(HT to JK)

As I said, I've been reading Paul Kennedy's Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, in which I learned in an aside that the Puritans had tried to start a colony in Honduras. I didn't know that. In checking it out I also saw that some Puritans were the first Britishers to live in Belize, aside from maybe a few pirates and shipjumpers.  

Puritans in bikinis? It just don't seem right.