Tuesday, February 2, 2010 - 12:19 PM

When I called last year for closing the undergraduate service academies and replacing them with something like the British Sandhurst model, it caused so much controversy that my related recommendation to shutter the war colleges (except maybe for the Naval War College's strategy department) went all but ignored.
So I was pleased to see retired Army Maj. Gen. Robert Scales take up the issue in the February 2010 issue of Proceedings. Scales knows what he is talking about -- he's a former commandant of the Army War College with a PhD in history. He says:
The best and brightest are avoiding the war colleges in favor of service in Iraq and Afghanistan. The average age of war college students has increased from 41 to 45, making this institution a preparation for retirement rather than a launching platform for strategic leadership.
Yow. If we're looking to trim the Pentagon budget, that sounds like a good place to start. But there's more. Scales also worries about the practice of contracting out teaching to civilians. Professional military education, or PME, he says, has become "an intellectual backwater."
The answer, he says, lies not in academic reform but in the military personnel system:
The truth is, PME reform is not a pedagogical problem. It's a personnel problem that can addressed only by changing the military's reward system to favor those with the intellectual right stuff.
Driving home the point, another article in the same issue, by Army Maj. Niel Smith, one of the lions of Ramadi, takes a pop at "a lethargic [military] education bureaucracy staffed largely by retirees and contractors."
hans s/flickr
Thursday, October 8, 2009 - 3:49 PM

Comment of the day goes to "Rubber Ducky," who made this observation in the discussion earlier this week of the Naval Academy:
It's a long time since the US was out-engineered in a war (like never), but one can point to Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan as three examples of a failure of human understanding, the subject of the humanities.
I've studied military education some, but had never quite heard that thought expressed so well.
Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images
Tuesday, October 6, 2009 - 4:49 PM

Prof. Bruce Fleming checks in from Annapolis with this report on how officials at the Naval Academy are reacting to his charge that the academy is bending admissions standards:
I'm writing now to ask if you're interested in rattling the cage again, perhaps in your blog, as a next step on the "diversity" issue I raised this summer. I have to assume you are up on my own contributions to this topic -- first an op-ed in the local (Annapolis) paper, this was widely reported in the Post, USA Today, Navy Times etc. I was asked to post a long piece on the USNI blog, which I did. It threw the admin for a loop, apparently, and beyond: I hear my name came up at all-hands meeting(s) at the Pentagon where the CNO was asked, "What about Professor Fleming's assertions?" He adopted what the admin has chosen to adopt as their "shut down the discussion" mantra, namely something along the lines of "Professor Fleming doesn't have the facts." After that I asked USNI if they were interested in a second posting by me using an internally-generated PowerPoint with facts and figures direct from the horse's mouth to show that Prof Fleming DID have the facts, or enough to make the main points (minor procedural details may have shifted since my time on the Board, 5 years ago, but current statistics and graphs show that the basics are still there, namely what the administration itself calls "streamlined" admission for self-identified racial minorities, who come in one of only two ways, NAPS or "direct" -- not true for non-athlete whites). USNI asked for this, then kept it, then now doesn't even respond to my e-mails saying "are you running this?"
Meanwhile the Dean, a new one who just arrived, has gone out of his way to deny me both of the two merit pay steps recommended by my dept and its chair (two is the max; it's possible to be recommended for two and get one if there just aren't enough available to be given out, but it's unheard of to take someone out of the rankings and move him to the bottom, as he has done). I've filed, last week, a federal whistleblower's protection complaint with the OSC, on the grounds that this has every appearance of being retaliation for my saying in print that this kind of race-based admissions and two-tracking is illegal. I don't know if this grinds slowly or fast, but it's in the works. So they're upset because I'm raining on their parade.
(Read on)
Wednesday, May 13, 2009 - 5:00 PM

Here's a response to my call to shut down West Point from Col. Cindy Jebb, Ph.D., a professor in the social sciences department there:
There has been a great deal of discourse prompted by Tom Ricks's article that calls for the dissolution of West Point. Perhaps because Mr. Ricks has only seen a glimpse of West Point, he fails to understand the institution and its contributions. To appreciate West Point and its multidimensional value, one must grasp that it is much more than the sum of its programs, its graduates, and its faculty.
I would like to provide another voice, one with experience that Mr. Ricks lacks: West Point graduate with 27 years of service in the Army, a PhD from Duke University, and a professorship at West Point. Furthermore, I am the co-chair of West Point's Middle States Commission on Higher Education (MSCHE) Self Study. MSCHE is a regional, peer review commission that accredits institutions of higher learning. Because the brightest students and the best faculty want to work at excellent institutions, colleges and universities seek MSCHE accreditation or its regional equivalent.
The MSCHE perspective values a holistic approach to learning. Tom Ricks misses much of the extraordinary work conducted around the Academy that plugs into key offices at the Pentagon, Training and Doctrine Command, and Combatant Commands as well. Why do these offices seek out West Point? West Point is a genuine academy in the classical sense. It brings together the best minds, from all academic disciplines to forge new ways of thinking and to solve issues of national and international importance, while simultaneously focusing on the personal and professional development of its students and faculty.
(Read on)
Tuesday, May 12, 2009 - 5:27 PM

A research-prone reader sends this interesting note:
Thought you may find it interesting that, with GEN McKiernan's dismissal and the appointments of LTGs McChrystal & Rodriguez to command positions in Afghanistan, every 3- and 4-star general officer exclusively directing the ongoing wars will soon be a West Point graduate:
"War Czar" LTG Doug Lute '75
USCENTCOM CG GEN David Petraeus '74
MNF-I CG GEN Ray Odierno '76
MNC-I CG LTG Charles Jacoby '78 (who recently replaced LTG Lloyd Austin, '75)
MNSTC-I CG LTG Frank Helmick '76
ISAF/USF-A-designate LTG Stan McChrystal '76
New Operational Commander (MNC-I equivalent) LTG David Rodriguez '76
Additionally, the new ambassador to Afghanistan is Karl Eikenberry is USMA '73.
That's not bad, considering that West Point expelled dozens of cadets for cheating in a 1976 scandal -- but I think from the class of '77, which doesn't appear on the above list, perhaps because of its unusually high attrition rate.
Meanwhile, another officer notes that the guys who have been criticized, fairly or unfairly, are disproportionately not from WPCC:
GEN Tommy Franks, OCS (CENTCOM)
GEN John Abizaid, USMA '73 (CENTCOM)
GEN George Casey, ROTC (MNF-I)
GEN Dan K. McNiell, OCS (ISAF)
GEN David McKiernan, ROTC (ISAF)
LTG Ricardo Sanchez, ROTC (CJTF-7/MNC-I)
racketrx
Wednesday, May 6, 2009 - 3:53 PM

The academy didn't teach me squat about contemporary warfare, this pilot complains in his blog:
At no point in my career so far has the Air Force prepared me to fight and win the nation's wars at the operational or strategic levels; instead, it has trained me over and over to fight Desert Storm. The numerous PME courses I've taken are all built on the same canon: a cursory introduction to Jomini and Clausewitz, overviews of historical airpower theories, then discussions of how airpower was used and misused in World War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. The saga culminates with John Warden and his strategic airpower theory which was successfully employed in Desert Storm. This is the holy grail of airpower. Airpower post-Desert Storm is treated only briefly."
I actually know this pilot, and he is a smart guy. My thought: the Air Force Academy has the rep of being a faith-based institution, so perhaps this isn't surprising.
Interestingly, this pilot goes on to credit his wife and the Small Wars Journal and like outlets for providing him the education in warfare that he needed:
It's embarrassing that a captain in the United States Air Force has to turn to the Army for an education about war, but that is exactly the situation I've found myself in. While the Air Force was sitting out the FM 3-24 development process, I was on Small Wars Journal every morning and working through reading lists by top Army thinkers."
He thinks that the Air Force Academy probably should remain open, but certainly not because it passes on the Air Force culture, which he condemns:
. . . I believe the service culture -- both within USAFA and the Air Force at large -- is a liability, not an asset. USAFA and the Air Force PME schools may not need to be closed, but they need to be reformed."
Responsible opposing viewpoints? Also, is the F-16 really an impressive platform anymore?
Tuesday, May 5, 2009 - 4:13 PM

I really liked this note from Marine Lt. Nathan Cox, one of those "bitter grunts," as aviators call them. He has some problems with the academies, most notably in failing to teach genuine leadership. Is this a system that provides the agility we need in our military leaders?
But Cox mounts a passionate and persuasive defense of their worth. Please read all of this before deciding whether he is right or wrong.
I am a Naval Academy graduate and Marine Infantry officer with two Iraq deployments and four years' time in service. . . .
With regard to the quality of the education, I found the Naval Academy quite demanding academically, and I have heard anecdotally from exchange cadets that it is quite a bit different in that regard from West Point. Most of the military officers with master's degrees teach the introductory level and professional courses while the civilian and military PhD's teach the higher level stuff. Grade inflation does not exist. Anything over a 3.0 requires a major amount of work and many bright people struggle just to pass. I found the higher level history courses I took to be outstanding, although I admittedly didn't take civilian courses I could compare them with. I never experienced any of the problems posters cited at West Point involving instructors not knowing material.
The problems I had were with the leadership training or lack thereof. The actual formal leadership training I got was not helpful at all, ranging from completely irrelevant academic "leadership" classes that seemed pulled from corporate boardrooms to ballroom dancing lessons (yes, those really happened). Midshipmen are given less actual responsibility and freedom than a private right out of boot camp and are forced to comply with a byzantine and illogical set of rules, known as midregs. Midregs often violate the spirit and sometimes even the letter of the UCMJ and also occasionally contradict each other, generating a destructive contempt for "stupid rules" among midshipmen that did not serve me well in the Marine Corps.
The end result of this "training" is graduates who have little experience in actually leading people when their actions have consequences and a misperception about the importance (and effectiveness) of working within the system and its rules. The system of student government that exists is ineffective at teaching leadership skills because the elaborate midshipman rank structure provides no actual power or responsibility.... As a result, Naval Academy graduates don't know what it's like to make decisions that will cost the government money, make a real difference in the status quo or determine whether people live or die anymore than ROTC graduates do. In reality, Academy graduates probably have less experience because they're so much more sheltered. The real problem is that there is absolutely no effort made to evaluate whether what the Naval Academy does makes better officers. It is simply assumed that because the Naval Academy does it, it must work. The reasons given for some of the training we had were literally laugh out loud ridiculous, but no one has ever checked with graduates, after some years in the fleet, to get feedback on what training methods helped us and what did not. . . .
(Read on)
Monday, May 4, 2009 - 5:46 PM

A cadet wishing to be identified as "A Concerned Firstie" writes in to recommend requiring a year or two of enlisted service before matriculating at the academy:
West Point should change, and I think forcing all applicants to serve enlisted in a combat arm prior to admission would be a radical change that would dramatically affect admissions and retention. First, it would allow prospective officers a chance to stand among their potential subordinates before they could stand before them, this would hopefully scare away those who come to West Point because it was the only Division-1 school that recruited them or who wanted to get that sweet degree and the potential "Old Grad" connections in the corporate world, introducing a greater degree of self selection. Second, this enlisted time would allow us to weed out the duds before they showed up to West Point and gained untouchable status. A great many cadets are fragile (constantly sick, broken, unfit for duty, outright malingering) or just not cut out for military service for a number of reasons. By getting rid of them early, we would help reduce the cynicism that stems from watching our subpar classmates continue to slip through the cracks till they eventually graduate, and then show up to the Big Army and embarrass the rest of us. Not to say that I'm the best this institution has to offer. I've struggled as much or more than many of my classmates, and I seriously considered quitting at the end of my sophomore year, what eventually convinced me to stay was a chance at leading troops where I was able to excel, receiving my only A grade in the military category. That experience, along with my friends' encouragement and pleas, convinced me to stay.
The biggest drawback would also be its greatest strength, by scaring away these people, we may scare away the Rhodes Scholar types that West Point always points to whenever its academic credentials are questioned. One has to wonder if that is such a bad thing after meeting some of the Wunderkinds though. I'm inclined to believe that academic performance has little to do with officer potential after a certain baseline competence. It's much more personality-driven in my opinion. These are obviously just my impressions, and I would not say that I represent the majority of cadets even."
I like his solution.
ROBERTO SCHMIDT/AFP/Getty Images
Friday, May 1, 2009 - 4:25 PM

Retired Army Col. Stuart Herrington is not just any retired Army officer. He wrote one of the best memoirs of the Vietnam War, and also went to Iraq to review Army intelligence operations there early in that war, producing a good critique of intelligence failings and warning against the abuse of prisoners. That study has never been declassified because he never classified it -- but he only made two copies.
There is a verve in his memories, as well as a dig at West Point. Here is his note:
In 1975, I founded a new Army ROTC Detachment at the University of South Florida (USF) in Tampa (immediately upon my return to the States after the fall of Saigon). I was a captain, 34 years old, and made major a year later. Three months before I set foot on the campus (which was permitted only after the anti-war faculty senate voted to allow me to open an ROTC presence, by one vote, as long as I did not bring weapons on the campus), some anti-war types threw rotten vegetables at a pair of Marine recruiters. My boss, the PMS at nearby University of Tampa, advised that I might consider not wearing my uniform while on campus, but I declined his suggestion, saying that if I couldn't wear the uniform on the campus, we simply did not belong there. Within three months, I had 200 cadets, many of them VN War enlisted vets. These were the years of the so-called Vietnam Malaise, and anti-war winds were still blowing strongly. But the reception I got was surprising.
As soon as I hit the campus, all sorts of faculty members came out of the closet to admit that seeing the uniform was a sight for sore eyes, and offering their support. I would up teaching as a guest lecturer in classes ranging from Poly Sci to history, to sociology, even speech. And the more exposure I got, the more rapidly the new ROTC program exploded. By the end of the year, I sent 52 cadets to the Ft. Bragg Advanced Camp, one of the three largest contingents from any school. The Bragg encampment is the six-week training all ROTC cadets get between their junior and senior years, barracks living, obstacle courses, marksmanship, field training, all of it evaluated, every day. My cadets finished in the top 5 of 103 schools at the camp, beating VMI, the Citadel, and a host of other military schools and major ROTC campuses. They told me that the cadets from full time military schools were cynical and, overall, seemed to expect that because they were from such schools, the whole thing would be a walkover. I stayed in the USF job four years. In year two, we came out second in the camp. In the third year, one of my cadets came out #1 in the camp and copped the Commandant's Sword-the first female to ever accomplish this feat. Our school again finished second of 103. In the fourth year, we won the trophy as the top school at the camp, including VMI, Citadel, Georgia Military College, etc. Then, in a nose-to-nose competition with the #1 schools from the Ft. Riley and Ft. Lewis ROTC advanced camps, we came out on top and the school was awarded the "Warriors of the Pacific Trophy" as the best ROTC institution in the United States. The secret was, I picked smart kids, made it clear that they could not major in ROTC, that their grades were crucial, and that leadership came from those who could excel. Magic.....
(Read on)
Thursday, April 30, 2009 - 4:45 PM
West Point graduates generally do well in the Army, according to several hundred pages of West Point studies I've just finished reading.
"Battalion Commanders report that our graduates possess a solid intellectual foundation, are comfortable with technology, are good problem solvers, are self-directed learners, and take the initiative to learn about foreign cultures," concludes a 2008 survey of graduates and their company commanders. That's a pretty good report card, especially for a so-called "community college."
The other reports, from 2007 and 2004 (three were done that year) are also mainly positive. Even taking into account that this is West Point reporting on itself, I found the reports generally pretty reassuring.
But being a reporter, I also kept an eye out for the negatives. For example, on the same page as the quotation above appears the comment that West Point grads sometimes didn't feel they are prepared to "think outside the box." This was one of several themes in the reports that made me suspect that West Point really teaches followership more than it teaches leadership.
--A 2004 survey of 51 former battalion commanders reported that "some USMA grads had difficulty relating to NCOs." (As one commander put it, "I had lieutenants that wouldn't listen to their platoon sergeant with lots of experience . . . ‘it's my way or the highway.'")
--One theme that surprised me was that West Pointers were socially awkward. "ROTC, OCS graduates were much better at dealing with the real world, much more socially aware," stated one commander. "The Military Academy guys were at a distinct disadvantage in this area."
--This social ineptness actually would alienate others so much that it affected their ability to lead. "Technically, they had the skills to be as good as anyone else, but they lacked the people savvy that made them good leaders," said one commander. "Whether it was rolling their eyes, or arrogance, or standoffishness, those sorts of things to me are leadership aspects, and that to me is probably one of the biggest places where Military Academy graduates did not always do very well . . . They demonstrated a degree of social immaturity that directly impacts their ability to lead."
--The same study found that West Pointers "continued to be perceived as . . . somewhat self-serving" and careerist. One commander said that one of his battery commanders complained that three football-playing cadets from West Point assigned to his unit during the summer "did not want to go to the field, because it was interfering with their workout schedule . . . . Being a military officer for five weeks was actually a deterrent for them versus the ROTC guys that we received in the summer."
One surprise to me is that almost every report mentioned that West Pointers tend to abuse alcohol more than other young Army officers. "Binge drinking seemed to be a favorite activity," said the 2004 survey of battalion commanders.
Another of the 2004 reports contained this troubling quote from a commander:
I will tell you that a lot of the young, more specifically West Point lieutenants, seem to live together, hang out together, and party together. It was almost like letting someone out of a cage and watching them get into trouble. Those that stayed out late and had several alcohol problems were all West Point lieutenants."
By contrast, said another officer, the ROTC and OCS officers seemed to have gotten all that out of their system by the point they became second lieutenants.
So what does this all tell us about the value of West Point? I would say it remains unproven. There is not an overwhelming case to be found in these documents that the additional cost of the academy is justified. The 2004 survey of former battalion commanders found that "differences in military skills among sources of commission largely were not observed at the rank of captain."
(BTW, in response to some of the e-mails I am getting: I don't think length of service measures value of service. I have no problem with the guys getting out now who have done three year-long combat tours since graduating six years ago. That's a lot more blood, sweat and tears than the guy who camped out in a few nice posts in Germany from 1975 to 1995.)
thethirstymoth/flickr
Wednesday, April 29, 2009 - 2:37 PM

I think this observation made by Defense Secretary Robert Gates at the Army War College in early April captures the essence of strategy, much more than anything about tying together ways, means and goals.
By the time a decision gets to the president, there are no good options. If there was a good option, somebody at a lower level would have made the decision and taken credit for it. By the time a decision gets to the president or secretary of Defense, more often than not, you've having to choose the least bad option."
Of the six defense secretaries I've covered, the two most effective were William Perry and Robert Gates. Both are smart, articulate, reserved, and wise. The difference between the two, I think, is that Gates seems to me to have a killer instinct, which probably helps him herd the services along. Just ask the Air Force these days.
U.S. Army
Wednesday, April 29, 2009 - 2:32 PM
Just in case anyone doubted CNAS welcomes a diversity of views, here is a note from Robert Kaplan, the author and commentator, whose office adjoins mine. (Exum has the palatial office down the hall, partly to house his Voltronic library.)
Kaplan writes:
It's great that you've shaken up the conventional thinking on military academies. But based on my 18 month experience of teaching at the U. S. Naval Academy -- a profound professional privilege -- I take issue with your comparison between service academies and community colleges. Half of the faculty in my department were civilians with PhDs. The other half were naval officers and marines without post-graduate degrees. Yet, these uniformed professors brought something noteworthy to the department and to their students that many community colleges cannot match. In addition to being professional role models, they brought their experiences of service in Iraq, Afghanistan, off the pirate coast of Somalia, and other far-flung locales, which provided a wealth of lessons that they imparted in the classroom. More crucially, their intense experience in war zones had caused them to mature into voracious readers of the classics of war: Thucydides, Clausewitz, Mahan, and the like. To listen to a war veteran react to the literature of the Peloponnesian War is not something necessarily common to community colleges. I think the combination of fine civilian academics and battle-hardened and well-read junior officers made for a stellar combination in the department where I taught.
Data-free though it may be, this is about the best argument I have heard for the academies. Does it resonate with academy grads out there?
Jerry Bauer
Monday, April 27, 2009 - 6:15 PM

Here, entirely unedited by me, is a note that Bruce Fleming, a longtime professor of English at the Naval Academy, sent out to his Annapolis colleagues last week.
I don't agree with all of it -- but let him speak:
Subject: USMA response via LT Schatz/Ricks article
Ls and Gs,
A number of you have sent me the USMA PAO's (Director of Communication's) response to the Ricks op-ed, via an LT in our Poly Sci Dept, and have asked what I thought. My intention in responding is not to give definitive answers; for me the discussion is what counts. But I do want to add my two cents of response, partly in order to be able to move on in class-for plebes, back to the stories; for CW, more Bills and Billettes (actually all Bills from here on out).
First, cost of academies. Ricks is right; the USMA PAO is not. It's true that nobody seems to actually know how much the academies cost, as the quoted figures vary. When I wrote the USNA PAO last year to ask what figure we were quoting, he said he'd have to get back to me as "the Supe hadn't decided on the figure" yet. So it's clear that these figures are rather liquid: what do they include? Letherneck/Quantico? YPs? Still, generally accepted figures exist, and they're far closer to Ricks than the USMA guy-in fact Ricks goes with more conservative numbers than those generally shown. The US COmptroller gives about $352,000 per USNA officer, and a bit more than $448,000 per USMA officer (!!!!). (Go to USNA Intranet and type in "cost of service academies.") So it's disingenuous of the USMA guy to pick a much lower figure out of the hat to make a debater's point that we don't cost much more than, say, ROTC at MIT. In fact, the case is even stronger than Ricks makes it that the academies are money pits. To quote from an article I'm working on: "The study of "Comparative Analysis of ROTC, OCS and Service Academies as Commissioning Sources" put out by the Advanced Management Program of the Navy Supply Corps School's Advanced Management Program (Tench Francis School of Business) notes that "DoD invests approximately four times as much to produce a single academy graduate as it invests to produce a single ROTC graduate. Academy graduates cost approximately eight times as much as Officer Candidate School (OCS) graduates."" FOUR TIMES AS MUCH AS ROTC ON AVERAGE. (Ricks's 130K for ROTC is the SINGLE MOST EXPENSIVE ROTC OPTION at an expensive school like Vanderbilt, NOT the average.)
(Read on)
Friday, April 24, 2009 - 5:20 PM

Robin Walther, a typically well-informed reader of this blog, points out a more recent study that seems to confirm the findings of the thesis I passed along yesterday.
This is his summary:
It shows a positive correlation between NROTC and promotion to Maj, LtCol and Col; a negative correlation between OCS (OCC/PLC) and all three promotion rates; and is mixed for the Naval Academy and the various enlisted commissioning sources."
I keep on hearing cadets and West Point alums demanding data. OK, we've seen some. Now, do you have any evidence that academy grads make better officers? If not, why are we asking the taxpayer to pay almost three times as much for them?
woodgrinder/Flickr
Thursday, April 23, 2009 - 5:11 PM

Jesse Sloman, a smart young Tufts student who wants to be a Marine officer was inspired by this blog to do some research. He found this paper, and wrote this summary:
After some research, I was able to find a Naval Postgraduate School master's thesis entitled: "AN ANALYSIS OF OFFICER ACCESSION PROGRAMS AND THE CAREER DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. MARINE CORPS OFFICERS."
The study (attached at the bottom of this email) was published by a Turkish Army officer named Levent Ergun in 2003. It would seem to largely vindicate your arguments (I realize that the USMC has a unique officer training model which is more conducive to minimizing an Academy advantage than the other services).
Maj. Ergun used data from "more than 28,000 Marines who entered between FY 1980 and 1999" to analyze performance at TBS, fitness reports up to the O-4, and promotion rates. Although the study is too complex to summarize here, a number of the findings directly relate to your argument:
1) Comparing TBS class standing percentiles by commissioning source reveals that NROTC graduates have a higher mean than USNA graduates (54.8% vs. 53.5%). OCC and PLC accessions fare the worst, while former enlisted have the highest means. (see Table 4.12 on pg. 65)
2) 10 year retention rates marginally favor USNA graduates (56.2% vs. 55.3%) but the difference is very small. Prior enlisted have significantly higher retention rates, while PLC/OCC have the lowest retention rates. (see Table 4.13 on pg. 66)
3) Looking at Performance Index (PI) and promotion rates muddies the water somewhat, but it does show that there is little difference between USNA and NROTC graduates, certainly not enough difference to support a purely cost-based argument that USNA graduates are "worth" their cost relative to NROTC graduates.
For myself, as a participant in the PLC program, the most interesting finding -- and one that is somewhat worrying -- is that PLC/OCC grads. have statistically worse performance at TBS and in subsequent evaluations in the fleet. Perhaps the Marine Corps would be best served moving from its OCS-heavy model of officer accessions to one more in line with the other services; one that relies mostly on ROTC and Academy graduates (or purely on ROTC graduates). However, the uniqueness PLC/OCC model -- particularly the freedom it allows candidates during their undergraduate years--is a serious incentive for individuals like myself who did not find ROTC's regimentation appealing. I don't think it is a coincidence that many of the "elites" commenting on your blog are joining the Marine Corps via PLC. Andrew Exum has also revealed on Abu Muqawama that he generally advises undergraduates to go the PLC route.
Of course statistics aren't everything. Considering that Ergun's study ends in 1999, one wonders if the relative increase in "elite" candidates through PLC/OCC in the post-9/11 years has altered the conclusions that held true during the 80s and 90s. Either way, I though you would find the study helpful as this discussion of the value of the Academies continue."
It's not about the Army, but it's a start. Anyone got more data?
John Moore/Getty Images
Thursday, April 23, 2009 - 4:37 PM
Here is a good response from a West Point cadet. Like many, she concludes with the gotcha comment about General Petraeus. She should have read this blog yesterday. More importantly, I wish she had engaged on some of the issues I raised, such as why West Pointers often are regarded in the Army as cynical.
And here is a thoughtful comment from a cadet who asks that I note that this is his opinion, not that of the Corps of Cadets, the USMA or the Army. I am appalled by his anecdote about the basketball game at American University, which is indeed only a few miles from my house. I have some issues with many of his other points. But let him speak:
Sir, I found your article very interesting and found myself in deep contemplation. I also read the responses to your articles and your responses back. I would like to take a few moments of your time to give you another perspective from a cadet who has not only attended Pennsylvania State University but also the Military Academy Prep School or USMAPS, as well as being the son of two army officers who are both ROTC graduates but also War College Graduates.
First, I would like to challenge the cadet who is leaving and agreed with you that the academics are community college level. The cadet in question has obviously never been to a state school or any other school for that matter. In every class I took as a freshman, at Penn State, in my first semester, the class was taught by a TA and most of them only had a bachelor's degree and were working on a masters. Also, the instructors who come here not only get a master's degree but they get it from Columbia University in the field of study to which they will teach. Also, I would like to avoid ad hominum as best as possible but the cadet who is leaving after two years is either leaving for one of a few reasons: failure of academics, physical standards or Honor and Respect standards, unable to handle the stress free, lived a life style which does not reflect well upon themselves or the United States(drinking, drugs, or stupidity), came to get two free years and a good school to transfer from or they do not want to lead troops whether in the civilian world or in combat. Either way would you really want someone who doesn't want to be there to lead your troops, the one's you pay for with your taxes, into combat.
Second, the stories that instructors or some veteran students tell are extremely prevalent to our development as officers and citizens. They not only inspire us to better our selves but also humble. What you can learn from a vet now can completely change someone's outlook on life and how you function as a member of society.
Third, I think you draw a lot of hostility because many people don't appreciate what veterans have done, did or will do. Yes, we are fighting a war that many people don't approve of, we know that, but don't take it out on cadets or veterans. They are only following legal orders. One example of this actually occurred in your neck of the woods. During the American Univ., Army basketball game this spring cadets, fans and players alike were heckled after the game. After putting up a very tough stand against American, we were heckled , cursed, spit on, and taunted. I have never been so appalled in my life. Kids my age, some of which I knew, booed, taunted, and harassed us all the way out the door. All of this over a basketball game? A good basketball game at that? Yes, I know that begs the question but you must consider the way the cadets felt after that. We ask ourselves why we are doing this. And to give you an answer sir, it's because we love this country and everything it stands for. Now I know that may sound cheesy and brainwashed but there is no other reason. I do this job because what my instructors, parents, friends, family and others have done allows those students, code pink, the Westboro Baptist church and many other organizations that oppose us to say their peace. Although I may not agree with their ideas, I agree with the idea of them having the freedom of speech.
Fourth, As an army Brat (dependent) of two Army Officers who commissioned through ROTC I can tell you that you get the same ratio of bad officers out of ROTC. Many a tax dollar has been wasted on people who are divided over the most stupid things. One example I can think of is when my mother went to Airborne school. While waiting to board the plane to take her first jump two male 2nd Lt.s from Ohio State harassed her. They knew she was a Penn State grad. and razzed her accordingly but also they harassed her because she was a woman. A woman at airborne school seemed to be a big problem to them because they thought women shouldn't have been in the army at all. And these were graduates of a large public civilian school. Also my father, an Engineer officer like my mother, graduated from RPI. And while attending his officer basic course was constantly harassed by West Pointers. They talked of "Back at school" and "The long gray line" this and that. They built up West Point to be heaven but then my father quickly pointed out that his engineering degrees were accredited and theirs were not (West Point is now an accredited school).
Fifth, I would like to challenge you point sir, on the British Military Academy "Sandhurst". Yes, the Brits do have a different system. Their officers attend 4 years of university before taking a full year of military development at Sandhurst. So you are really comparing apples and oranges because they get four years of college plus Sandhurst paid for, by the government. So I don't think you can really compare the two.
Sixth, I don't think you can compare the education and cost analysis between West Point and other schools. You must first ask the question of school, How much is the tuition and cost of living, how much are the books, how much are the lab fees, how much is food at the local mart? Also you must ask about the major and its department at that school? Is the major they are choosing a specialty of the school or are they just attending the school for other reasons such as sports, parties or members of the opposite gender? For example, when visiting one of my best friends at American University who is a AROTC cadet, I asked one of his ROTC buddies what his major was and what type of ROTC scholarship he was on. His response was he was an Art major. Now sir, I know this may be a very dry question but why would an Art student go to American? Or why would my buddy be a physics major at a school that is a specialty in International Affairs and business? And to go along with that both of them are carrying full scholarships to a school that has a tuition of $15,479 per semester with a $1,000 charge per credit hour more than 17. That's over $33,000 a year without books, lab fee's, food, living expenses, which anyone who knows anything about DC knows you pay an exorbitatint amount to live there.
Seventh, going along with the point of Changing our opinions. I find your point dead on in the most case regarding the Academy. The War Collages is a different story. The stereotypical cadet at West Point is a conservative, white male, no one can deny that. Which validates your argument that our opinions are not challenged a lot but that can also be said of the ROTC cadet. Schools like American which are very actively Liberal and opionated have a single opinion in which the cadets are not challenged because they are either outcast for not agreeing and there for conform, or they, like us are not challenged because they agree with what the student body has to say.
The academy however works very hard to diversify. We have all kinds of functions that include presentations of dance, art, literature, immersion, and many other aspects including the cadet favorite, FOOD. I cannot think of a single week or day where I have not heard about a party of some kind where there would be food tasting, dance, art , etc from cadets or civilians from other countries presenting and hosting. We may not have the complete immersion like some schools because there is not much diverse culture in Highland Falls, NY. There is not a whole lot of anything but the academy now offers almost every cadet a chance to go abroad to study at other schools in other countries. Whether these immersions are for a week or for a whole semester the academy still offers the opportunity. Another thing is, all of the corps is not American. A lot of cadets are foreign and their governments pay to send them to West Point. In my company alone we have a cadet from Chad and another from Lithuania. The academy works with what it is given and does the best that it can. You can't make people apply to come here or come and stay if they don't feel comfortable.
Finally, regarding your mention of Gen. Petraus. Yes, I'm sure you know now that he is an academy grad. and instructor. But your response to one question said that he found much more worth at Princeton because of the diversity. Sir, I ask you can you really compare a PHD course load and classes with that of a Bachelor's? Sure the concepts for the area of study are the same but can a school with a graduate school be strictly compared with a four year only school? Not to discredit any schools who are only four year or have advanced level options.
I really think that your article had relevance but I think there are too many questions to call it valid because there are too many unanswered question. I could continue with this and would love to but I am a cadet and as such have other work to do. I appreciate your opinion and as a fellow democrat I can see some of the validity behind your logic. That being said most of your article I think begs the question and I don't think there is enough evidence to support either as a definite right or wrong."
For this cadet and all those inviting me to spend a day, week, month, or year at West Point, here is an article I wrote about the place 12 years ago. It was indeed a crucible of leadership for Col. Hallums. I wonder if there is any evidence that West Point produces better leaders than other institutions.
Wednesday, April 22, 2009 - 3:29 PM

Many West Point cadets have written to me asserting that the academy produces good leaders, and is in face the premier place in these United States to learn about leadership.
One cadet with prior experience as an enlisted soldier begs to differ. I quote this with his permission:
West Point has a poor reputation within the Army, especially for producing petulant and imperious young Officers. This is a product of a thorough enculturation done here at West Point, one steeped in 1850's systems of behavior. Hazing is enforced, not discouraged. Cadets are placed in leadership roles over other cadets at the Academy. Their first leadership lessons are taught to them by other cadets. Subordinates are to be treated with disdain as inferiors. Leaders are entitled to total deference from their subordinates, and special treatment. Fourth class cadets (plebes), pick up trash nightly from their leader's rooms, deliver their laundry and newspapers, and stand outside their rooms calling out the time to let them know when to be at formation. This is all justified by the weight of history, in that everyone else here had to do it before.
Many of my experiences at West Point fly in the face of any idea I ever had about the nature of good leadership. This system of treatment will naturally produce some leaders who both take their position for granted, and habitually abuse their subordinates. Often, good leaders are produced in spite of this system, rather than in consequence of it. One of my sergeants -- a veteran of combat in Iraq -- told me before I left for West Point that most all the Academy graduates he had worked for were poor leaders, except one, who had been enlisted before he went to the Academy."
This is a pretty strong indictment. I welcome responses and comments, especially from soldiers in a position to know. I am especially interested in the observations of senior NCOs, company and battalion commanders. Is this prior enlisted cadet correct in his assertion that other soldiers look upon West Pointers as "petulant and imperious"?
Stephen Chernin/Getty Images
Wednesday, April 22, 2009 - 3:20 PM

Do military officers benefit from attending a civilian graduate school after having learned their trade as warfighters and during a period in their careers that permits them to spend a year or two 'away from the troops'? The short answer is yes....
"The first and most important [reason] is that a stint at graduate school takes military officers out of their intellectual comfort zones...
"Of course, West Point has changed enormously over the years and it is a true national treasure, but despite the varied curriculum and experiences it provides, it is not an institution that puts creativity, individuality and discovery before all else."
Two points to the first person who identifies the writer.
AAMIR QURESHI/AFP/Getty Images
Tuesday, April 21, 2009 - 3:57 PM

I did an on-line chat yesterday (Monday) on WashingtonPost.com about whether to shutter the service academies and war colleges. I thought it was a pretty good conversation, but I wasn't real impressed with the comments ostensibly coming from West Point cadets.
I actually think the war colleges are fatter, slower-moving targets than the service academies. But I think both sets of institutions need to think harder about educating officers for the 21st century environment. We need mental agility.
Meanwhile, another cadet (not a plebe) checks in. I am quoting this with his permission:
Your comment about the classes at West Point is generally correct. While West Point attracts a large number of highly qualified individuals, it naturally gets some duds as well. The core classes, which constitutes three-fourths of the curriculum, tend to cater to these "left tailers" as my econometrics teachers likes to refer to them. I can tell you that I probably learned more from AP classes in high school than I have in a number of my classes here. The English department is particularly abysmal.
On the whole, the Academy does a poor job creating a environment that facilitates intellectual development. Classes involve very little creative and instead emphasize rote memorization. It reminds my of the image of the Catholic school master who lashes students hands for making spelling mistakes. Some classes are better than others, but in general West Point has failed to keep up with advances in university-level education.
That being said, I am an economics major and have had very good experiences within the Department of Social Sciences. Many of the younger instructors have already earned doctorates and all of them are very knowledgeable and enthusiastic about their disciplines. However, in my experience this level of competence is generally limited to the Department of Social Science, hence why I decided to become an economics major.
Cadets do tend to have a very cynical outlook on the Army. This general stems from West Point's command climate. Without going into too much detail, it tends to disincentivize academic performance, which causes some cadets who would flourish elsewhere to fall by the wayside."
And another reader argues that I probably have underestimated the costs of operating West Point:
I think the figure you gave as $300K per officer graduates is low. Low by at least 25%. I worked there for 5.5 years, during a time when my two sons were cadets, Classes of '05 and '06. I seem to recall that the cost/cadet for the Class of 2004 was a bit over $400K. I don't know how to prove that figure, but the Cadet Command at West Point have documents that show pretty precise cost figures. That is, if they don't exclude some costs which a reporter or layman would not know existed.
I am ROTC (Colo Sch of Mines, 1961), my two sons are West Pointers. I tend to agree with you. The military academy costs need looked at as they approach $500K/officer. Maybe we also should consider a system like the Brits and Sandhurst, college first, then military school for one or two years."
--Floyd McGurk
Peter Feaver, a former Bush White House aide who is now undergoing rehab at Duke University, also conducted a discussion about this issue. Here is what one discussant who once taught at West Point had to say:
I am a 27-year Army veteran, an ROTC graduate and also a former West Point instructor. Throughout my military career, I consistently found that ROTC graduates were better prepared to lead, and had a better sense of the role of the military in our society, than their West Point counterparts. While I was teaching at West Point I used to joke with friends (with a nod to Groucho Marx) that I would never attend a university that would have me on the faculty. Although the officers assigned to teach at West Point were thoroughly dedicated to their work, few had any ability or opportunity to encourage cadets to think critically rather than simply learn the syllabus. Daily life at West Point was so structured, with so many requirements and restrictions upon the cadets, that few showed any motivation beyond simply getting through. Perhaps not surprisingly, I also found few cadets who had any inclination to make the Army a career. Whether the country is getting its money's worth out of the academies is a question worth exploring."
signerlaraine/flickr
Monday, April 20, 2009 - 4:41 PM

Dunno why, but I've managed to pick fights with parts of the Navy and the Army at the same time. On the ground, I recommended in the Sunday edition of the Washington Post that West Point and the other service academies be closed. Here is what I wrote:
Why We Should Get Rid of West Point
By Thomas E. Ricks
Sunday, April 19, 2009Want to trim the federal budget and improve the military at the same time? Shut down West Point, Annapolis and the Air Force Academy, and use some of the savings to expand ROTC scholarships.
After covering the U.S. military for nearly two decades, I've concluded that graduates of the service academies don't stand out compared to other officers. Yet producing them is more than twice as expensive as taking in graduates of civilian schools ($300,000 per West Point product vs. $130,000 for ROTC student). On top of the economic advantage, I've been told by some commanders that they prefer officers who come out of ROTC programs, because they tend to be better educated and less cynical about the military.
This is no knock on the academies' graduates. They are crackerjack smart and dedicated to national service. They remind me of the best of the Ivy League, but too often they're getting community-college educations. Although West Point's history and social science departments provided much intellectual firepower in rethinking the U.S. approach to Iraq, most of West Point's faculty lacks doctorates. Why not send young people to more rigorous institutions on full scholarships, and then, upon graduation, give them a military education at a short-term military school? Not only do ROTC graduates make fine officers -- three of the last six chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reached the military that way -- they also would be educated alongside future doctors, judges, teachers, executives, mayors and members of Congress. That would be good for both the military and the society it protects.
We should also consider closing the services' war colleges, where colonels supposedly learn strategic thinking. These institutions strike me as second-rate. If we want to open the minds of rising officers and prepare them for top command, we should send them to civilian schools where their assumptions will be challenged, and where they will interact with diplomats and executives, not to a service institution where they can reinforce their biases while getting in afternoon golf games. Just ask David Petraeus, a Princeton PhD.
Photo: Flickr user: Hourman
Monday, April 20, 2009 - 4:38 PM

On the water, I responded to various naval officers who noticed that I questioned in my latest book whether the Navy has had any impact on national strategy in recent years. I see raising issues like this as part of my job-that is, speak up when I think the emperor has no clothes. The commonality in these discussions is that the denunciations are posted on blogs and websites while the attaboys are sent privately by e-mail. As David Halberstam once said to me, "That's the nature of the business. [pause] Suck it up."
Responding to my question of why the Navy hasn't had much effect on national strategy since 9/11, a friend who is a defense expert shot this back:
I would disagree with Tom; naval officers and thinkers have had a profound, but entirely negative, effect on American post-9/11 strategy: think of Mike Mullen, Fox Fallon, Giambastiani and Bill Owens. The first two fought the surge, fought COIN (and Mullen still is), wanted to bug out of Iraq, favored a "light footprint" and "offshore balancing," etc. etc. The latter two were apostles of "transformation" of the "transparent battlefield" variety, which led us down a very bad and wrong path.
Meanwhile, here's a comment from an active-duty Navy officer whose name cannot be used here:
The reason the Navy doesn't have the sorts of folks like H.R. McMaster or John Nagl is that our personnel system is set up to discourage folks from taking the opportunities that would give them the knowledge base they need to do it. When I was selected to go to a fellowship at RAND I was counseled that it would negatively impact my chance to screen for command, primarily because the tour would result in a not observed fitness report, which doesn't look good up against the guy that goes and works in an office somewhere, but gets an observed fitrep. I decided that 9 months at RAND couldn't really be that big of an impact, and I would volunteer to go back to sea again after to make up for it, but it was a big impact, despite co-authoring two studies and participating in several project teams. Then when I was accepted to the PhD program in security studies . . . , I was all but told that I would not select for command if I came here, again because of the not observed fitness reports. We are never going to have warfighters and strategists with the requisite knowledge skills in both sides of that coin if folks have to choose one or the other. When people point out that Admiral Stavridis managed to get a PhD, from Fletcher no less, and still say competitive up the chain--this is an argument I've heard--I'd say it's not fair to point to one of the most brilliant naval officers in decades as the example, and there are very few others, of how the system works well.
. . . I wish we had more naval officers engaged in the national debate over grand strategy, as I think the Navy has a big part to play in it, and our skills sets as naval officers tend to be a bit broader than in some of the other services as we are routinely forward deployed working with allies and friends, engaged with activities beyond the limits of traditional warfighting. Unfortunately, the best contribution the Navy's added to the national security debate in years might just be the three unnamed snipers who took out those teenage pirates on Easter Sunday. However capable we are at completing the mission given us, if we don't have a voice in the debate over what the right mission is, or what the right strategy and policy should be, we are selling ourselves short.
Photo: Flickr user Amanda M Hatfield