Here is my summary of where we are now:
Several times the Bush administration tried to transfer
responsibility for security to Iraqi army and police forces, only to see them
unable to handle the burden. Now, once again, the Americans are trying to get
Iraqi security forces to take over, as most U.S. troops withdraw from Iraqi's
cities. Will the Iraqis be able to keep the population relatively secure? To be
honest, I don't know, and no one else does. It's a matter of faith. And the
leap comes tomorrow.
The key issue is whether Iraqi forces will perform any
better than they have in the past. U.S. officials, at least in their public
comments, say they will. "I do believe they're
ready," Gen. Raymond Odierno, the top commander in Iraq, said on CNN on Sunday.
"They've been working towards this for a long time. And security remains good.
We've seen constant improvement in the security force, we've seen constant
improvement in governance. And I believe this is the time for us to move out of
the cities and for them to take ultimate responsibility." But, as he says, it
is a matter of belief.
Here's a contrary view given to Reuters by
Khalil Ibrahim, a leader of a unit in
the turned insurgents the Americans call the Sons of Iraq: "Iran has good relations with our political
parties. They run militias. If the U.S. troops complete their withdrawal, Iran
will do whatever it wants in Iraq. . . . Also,
if the Americans pull out, al Qaeda will return."
Meanwhile, Abu Noor, a college student in Baghdad, told
my old colleague Ernesto Londono that, "We all know the militias are hiding
because they know the Americans are inside the cities."
Who is right, Odierno, or Ibrahim and Abu Noor? No one
knows. Yes, Iraqi units are better trained and equipped than in the past. But
that was never the problem. Rather, the point of failure was political. Sunni
death squads and Shiite militias knew what they were fighting for, while an
Iraqi soldier didn't necessarily.
My worry is that I don't see the political situation as
being much different than it has in the past. Nothing much has changed from the
previous rush to failures. As readers of this blog have seen me say before: the
surge succeeded tactically but failed strategically. That is, as planned, it
created a breathing space in which a political breakthrough might occur. But
Iraqi leaders, for whatever reason, didn't take advantage of that space, and no
breakthrough occurred. All the basic issues that faced Iraq before the surge
are still hanging out there: How to share oil revenue? What is the power
relationship between Shia, Sunni and Kurd? Who holds power inside the Shiite
community? What is the role of Iran, the biggest winner in this war so far? And
will Iraq have a strong central government or be a loose confederation? And
what happens when all the refugees outside the country and those displaced
inside it, who I think are majority Sunni, try to go back to their old houses,
now largely occupied by Shiites and protected by Shiite militias?
A secondary issue is how Iraqi forces will behave once they
are operating without American forces watching them. There are a lot of "Little
Saddams" in Iraq. That didn't used to be our problem-but now these guys have
been trained, equipped and empowered by us.
I hope I am wrong, and that Iraq really is embarking on a
new course this week. But I don't think so. So I think the real question now
is: How fast will the unraveling occur?
Click here to read the previous dozen posts on Iraq
unraveling.
US Army Korea - IMCOM/Flickr
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