There seems to be a generation gap in the intel community, judging by the
sharply different reactions of younger and older spooks
to the controversial new CNAS report on how to change intelligence in
Afghanistan, written by Maj. Gen. Michael Flynn and a couple of members of his
entourage. The
young folks (battalion S-2s and below) seem to be saying they like the
assessment and don't mind the venue. The old
folks (especially back here in the DC area) dislike the assessment and are
appalled at the fact that Maj. Gen. Flynn released the report through a think
tank.
Here, for example, is part of John McCreary's blast from yesterday's NightWatch:
The authors also seem to confuse
strategy, policy and tactics. There is no blurring of lines about the use of
information. Information has always had
different uses at different levels of command. It troubling that some might
think it is new, just because they had an epiphany.
Much of what is discussed is a
rediscovery of what have been the basics of military intelligence for more than
60 years, albeit badly neglected in the past two decades. DIA once excelled at
this work, for example. Claims about new ways of doing business that are in
fact reinventions of old wheels are churlish and show a lack of historic
grounding.
The report contains few new
insights about the nature and needs of military intelligence in support of
fighting an insurgency. Its attempt to distinguish conventional war is
artificial and uninformed. This is old lore that some entities discarded and
have forgotten. Nevertheless, new or old, the intelligence work has not been
done, should have been done and needs to be done.
Intelligence has lost its way when
it cannot support troops in combat. There is plenty of blame to go around.
The key question is whether Flynn's blueprint addresses the systemic,
cognitive problems. The answer,
lamentably, is no, it does not.
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